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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents an analysis of the conflict which 
arose between two groups of people in Rwanda, before it 
achieved independence from colonial rule in 1962*
I have set out to demonstrate that the conflict cannot 
be understood unless it is seen in relation to the traditional 
Rwanda social system and the impact of colonial influence on 
the traditional principles of social organisation.
The analysis demonstrates why violent conflict erupted 
between two major groups of -people at that particular moment 
rather than unifying them in a-common attempt to reach 
independence. It further demonstrates why these two groups 
aligned themselves in ethnic terms.
:I have firstly made a functional analysis of traditional 
Rwanda society as it was operative at the moment it became 
subject to western colonial rule. Although Rwanda is 
essentially a social and political unit, I have developed 
the considerable intracultural and regional variations of 
an ecological, demographic, political, socio-economic and 
religious nature to be found within Rwanda. The analysis
shows how these variations are reflected in the different 
social institutions of Rwanda society. The functional analys 
demonstrates the existence of elements of competition and 
conflict in Rwanda, society despite a highly complex but 
centralised political structure* However in the traditiohal 
system processes and mechanisms for containing conflict were 
provided through institutions making for cohesion in different 
ways.
Secondly, I have made a diachronic analysis of the 
impact of new pressures, during the period of colonial rule, 
on the principles of social organisation, especially in the 
political and socio-economic fields.
lastly, I have analysed the ultimate conflict situation 
and correlated the form it took,with the effect of these new 
pressures on the traditional system.
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IKPRODUGPIGI
On the 1st July, 1962, the; twenty fourth new African 
nation came into being** fhis was the Republic of Rwanda, 
which had hitherto formed a part of the Belgian $rust 
territory of Ruanda-Urundi * fhis highland country, right 
in the centre of Africa, covers an area of. 10^165 square 
miles and is, with its two and a half million inhabitants, 
one of the most densely populated areas south of the Sahara.
Up;till January 1961, when the republic was first 
proclaimed, Rwanda had been one of the interlacustrine 
Kingdoms, and had been studied by scholars of many different 
disciplines. The firm impression conveyed by the various 
studies was of a homogeneous unit,’based firstly on the 
traditional monarchy which was subsequently continued as a 
separate territory of colonial administration. Homogeneity 
was further emphasised by the fact that, as scholars and 
administrators observed, the inhabitants thought of themselve 
as one people who spoke one common language, Kinyarwanda.
However closer observation and analysis demonstrates 
the variety within and the complexity of Rwanda society.
But this variety and the complexity of underlying principles 
of the social structure did not destroy theamage of homo­
geneity* On the contrary, it was its uniquely complex 
structure which distinguished it from other neighbouring 
Kingdoms and was one of the means through which it 
established its own identity, both to outsiders and to the 
people themselves.
The heterogeneous character of Rwanda society manifested 
itself to observers’ in the presence of three ethnic groups, 
which exhibit different physical characteristics, the Tutsi, 
Hutu and, Twa. These formed sixteen, eighty three and one 
per cent of the population respectively.
Apparently these ethnic groups- coincided to a large 
extent with social cleavage based on political hierarchy.
On the one hand, rulers, with the King as their apex were 
identified with Tutsi. In this context the Tutsi stood 
out as the aristocrats providing the personnel for the 
machinery of government. On the other hand the ruled 
were- identified with Hutu.
However, as will be shown, both these assumptions need 
to be qualified.
It was also held that ethnic differences coincided 
with social cleavage- based on occupation in that Tutsi were
cattle people while Hutu were agriculturalists.
The Twa on the other hand were hunters, gatherers and 
potters, living partly in small groups scattered all over 
the country and partly as mobile groups of hunters or 
singers and story tellers. In this study, when speaking 
of duality in Rwanda society, I will be referring to Tutsi- 
Hutu relationships. Twa were dispersed and numerically 
unimportant. They had very little if any impact on the 
overall cultural pattern either of traditional or modem 
Rwanda society. Because of this and their lack of influence 
on the conflict situation which arose, they will be left out 
of this study unless they need to be drawn in when de facto 
they did play a role of sufficient importance in relation 
to the subject matter of this study.
The ethnic groups making up Rwanda society perpetuated 
themselves through endogamy. Miscegenation by legal 
marriages rarely occurred. However sufficient people show 
in their physical features proof of a certain amount of 
mixing of the ethnic groups such as to justify the assumption 
that it happened not infrequently. It is not surprising
that this heterogeneous composition of Rwanda society and 
its social differentiation has led to its being identified 
as a- caste structure.
However caste as an analytical model remains primarily 
a concept expressing an Indian phenomenon, not only including 
endogamy, hierarchy and occupational specialisation, but also 
repulsion. If we accept these differentia which are given a 
positive value based on religioxis metaphysic, then we should 
be extremely careful in applying the concept of caste to the 
different ethnic groups in Rwanda. While I shall not be 
concerned in this thesis to argue the case in detail for and 
against the classification of Rwanda society as a caste system, 
I prefer not to refer to the groups concerned in this study 
as castes.
There is considerable intracultural and regional 
variation in Rwanda which, as I will develop, are of greater 
importance than hitherto may have been recognised. These 
variations are also reflected in the different social 
institutions * contained within Rwanda society.
The successful movement fox1 independence by the people 
of Rwanda however was accompanied by violent conflict between 
the two groups. Because this happened at a time and in a 
continent where conflicts of this nature were not untypical, 
the danger exists of dismissing it as a typical pattern of 
African tribal society. The danger is all the greater if
the conflict results in overthrowing the ^monarchy** and 
doing away with, "feudalism" as elements which have no part 
in, "modem". society. I believe however that this is an 
all too, easy statement and does not answer fundamental 
questions about the nature of the particular form which 
conflict took in Rwanda.
The,problem with which I shall be principally concerned 
in this thesis is the explanation of the conflict situation 
which arose in 1959.
An analysis is needed not only of the reasons why 
conflict erupted into open violence at this particular 
moment, but also of the reasons leading to the alignment 
of the two groups, of people involved.
My method of approach will be first to make a functional 
analysis of the.traditional Rwanda social system and to 
examine how far there were elements of conflict inherent 
in the principles of social organisation or between the 
various groups.
Secondly I shall examine the impact of new pressures 
and opportunities external to traditional society, during 
the period of . European control dating from the beginning of 
this century.
finally I shall analyse the situation at the moment of 
open conflict, correlating the form it took with the effect 
of these new pressures* and opportunities on the traditional 
system.
This problem evidently poses,specific difficulties of 
functional analysis of a highly complex, society which has to 
be considered as a unit containing considerable cultural and 
regional variations.
Moreover we have the problem of a functional approach 
in the examination of a society undergoing radical change 
over a period of time.
One problem in the analysis of traditional society is 
that we are dependent on historical sources. Ho study has 
been published on traditional. Rwanda society as a whole.
Maquet1 s study deals with the central part of Rwanda and he 
obtained his information, as he confesses in his introduction 
to "The Premise of Inequality", £1961) exclusively * from Tutsi 
informants. In i960 Gravel did fieldwork in Gisaka in 
Eastern Rwanda and was thus able to draw attention to regional 
cultural variation, and the working of a'community at the 
time of. "the play for pov/er" at the moment the country 
reached independence. The anthropologist d*Hertefelt also
: published a'number of studies as did Kagame. The former 
gave more attention, to the, Hutu, the latter to the Tutsi. 
However a vast amount of material of a descriptive and 
historical nature is available. My attempt to. reconstruct 
the working of traditional society has been helped by my 
access to the sources contained in the Rapports Annuels of 
the white Bathers, especially those from I9OG to I9I8.
These it would seem to me are of■ great importance, not only 
because the Bathers had'been established in several'parts 
throughout the country for^ seven years before any form of 
civil administration was set up by the German authorities, 
but also because of the quality of the reporting by such 
persons as Fr. Schumacher, known for; his publications in 
Anthropos as far back as lglO. They alone were able to 
observe at first,hand the traditional structure and the 
first impact of new values exterior to that structure.
In the analysis of the traditional system we have not 
only to examine the existence of tensions, within the society 
■ but also the principles of social organisation which were 
able to contain these latent conflict situations.
Previous-analyses of the Rwanda social structure have 
been set in terms of the early functional approach, stressing
the integration of the social system. Maquet’s study in 
particular puts across an image of a highly stratified hut 
also highly centralised society with a remarkable degree of 
social integration and cohesion, and in doing so stressed 
the' functionalist? & impression of durable equilibrium, 
expressed in his premise of inequality. Although perfectly 
permissible as an analytical tool, this study has the 
disadvantage of presenting a static society.
However Simmel has stressed the, point that ”no group 
can be entirely harmonious for it would then be devoid of 
process and structure” (Coser, 1Q56 p.*51).
More recent studies e.g. Wallers ^1957)> Kuper (I963)
j H r .
and Beattie (1965) have fxirther stressed the dynamics of and 
conflict in social systems and demonstrated that the social 
institutions not only do not always complement one another 
harmoniously but are conflicting in one degree or another.
Initial reading, especially of the Eapports Annuals, 
made it evident that Ewanda was no exception. Although a 
general overall description of Ew%nda society and culture is 
possible, there existed within it not only cultural 
variations but also various avenues for competition and 
potential conflict in the political and economic field*
Hence even in traditional Ewanda society there were signs of
opposition and tensions which threatened the internal cohesion
of the principles of social organisation and thus affected the
relationships between the groups of people within the
boundaries of the Rwandan kingdom.
Beach in his Political Systems of Highland Burma writes-^
”We,must recognise that few if any of the societies 
which a modern field worker can study show any 
marked tendency towards stability. On the other 
hand I;hold that it should be possible for 
anthropologists to develop methods for analysis 
of changing social systems.” £1957 p.285)
The Rwanda material shows how a diachronic analysis of social
change is* necessary for the explanation not only of the
ultimate conflict situation that arose but also of the
principles of social organisation which were able to contain
latent conflict within the traditional system.
In tracing the effects of new pressures and opportunities
in traditional Rwanda society which resulted in a situation
of incompatible opposition between two groups of people, the
arrows of factual correlation will point away from the past
but at the level of intellectual correlation the arrows will
point both ways. In analysing the conflict situation which
arose in Rwanda at the moment of independence, it is important
to distinguish those elements of conflict which were latent 
in the traditional system from new factors of conflict 
introduced through external influence. The system provided 
sufficient alternative avenues for competition and redress 
of grievances to prevent* conflicting persons and groups from 
reaching a position of incompatible opposition. >. Through 
changes introduced in the system,* new wants were created, 
at the same time as some important avenues for competition 
were closed. In this way the system lost its flexibility 
When competition between persons and groups had increased.
Although the idea, of conflict may convey the notion of 
destruction, social conflict is closely related to the 
constructive process of social cohesion. Conflict at one 
level may engender cohesion at another. I shall demonstrate 
in my analysis of tjae development of the* conflict situation 
how this resulted at one level in incompatible opposition 
between groups and at another level in creating group 
identity and strengthening group cohesion. Moreover I will 
demonstrate that there had been no development of alternative 
avenues of legitimate competition.
This was the situation at the moment when the seat of 
government was to be vacated and the system found two 
incompatible contenders* between whom the only form of
communication had become the ”minimum form of socialisation” 
which is open hostility. . iHtmetional flexibility and 
dynamism had- gone out of the, system* where it had for so 
long played a. functional role in upholding a complex 
heterogeneous structure* within the boundaries of its 
homogeneous identity.
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C-HA'P T E R  I 
THE G O m m x  M D  1TB PEOPLE 
Pars I . ■ WHO . IB WHO IN RWATOa
In the introduction I have spoken of Tutsi and Hutu who, 
with the fwa, are the inhabitants of Rwanda and have indicated 
that we are principally concerned with the former two. We 
are concerned with their place in traditional Rwanda. Further 
we want to analyse how they were affected by new opportunities, 
pressures and values, or in other words what changes occurred 
in their traditional society and how these led to the conflict 
situation which arose between the two groups of people. It 
is therefore essential to examine more closely who are the 
Tutsi and Hutu especially in traditional society as it is 
from there that our study starts. Moreover we have to 
examine whether we can establish certain patterns of Tutsi- 
Hutu distribution against the background of other ecological 
variables. {0 1 * part 2)
Speaking about the population of Rwanda, every writer, 
be he historian, ethnographer, physical or social anthropologist 
refers to the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa as the inhabitants of Rwanda. 
Everybody agrees as well that the Hutu by far out-number the 
Tutsi and the Twa, and that there are more Tutsi than Twa.
Another point of general agreement is that, speaking about 
government in Central Rwanda, the Tutsi play a dominant role 
With all this we’ can fully agree. - But any further 
specification of them as * patrons1 or 1 clients*, 
'agriculturalists1 or 1pastoralists1, 'tall* or 1 small1, 
needs’ further definition and precision.
In the official reports of the Belgian information 
service we reads. Rwanda il-y-a trois groupes ethniques"
Frankenberg in his unpublished thesis refers to them as 
"classes1 and so does Gravel. Others again such as 
d-'Hertefelt writes: "La population du Rwanda se compose' de
trois castes", but writes in the same article: "Le type
physique des Hutu 6t6 influence par les Tutsi $ l^nvers 
est 6galement vrai." • (d'Hertefelt I962 p.16 and 17).
Arnoux writes: "Rien qui corresponds aux castes fermfees",
and "Les Tutsi et Hutu! contractent des marriages qui durent" 
(‘Arnoux 1947: p. .19) and Tan Overschelde writes in the same 
terms.
We, read further that the Tutsi form about fifteen 
per cent of the population, but that ^real1 Tutsi form only 
five per cent (cfLacquer and Bourgeois) or even only three 
per cent (Arnoux). Bourgeois mentions as well that the 
Baswera "sont des Tutsi’ bahutuis&s", and "Le terme Muhutu
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d&signe avant tout un 6tat social", or "Le vocable Mututsi
indique plus une situation social qu!un caractere racial.”
(Bourgeois 1957 P-58) Kagame, a Rwandan himself, says,
"Du moment le Muhutu accede a la richesse bovine il est
politiquement Tutsi". (Kagame 1954 p.26) The Rapports
annuels of I9O7 from Gisaka mentions:
"Habitants du pays: Distinguons entre chefs et 
sujets. Parmi les premiers il-y-a des chefs 
Tutsi, riches en b§tes de comes. II y a ensuite 
des chefs Bahutu ais§s sans 6tres si riches eommes 
les premiers. Toyons la masse, Batutsi appauvris 
ou d6chus par marriages a des femmes Hutu puis les 
Bahutu ou paysans,"
or from Shangugu in I9O8:
"La population qui nous entoure est, comme partout 
dans le Rwanda, composfe de Batutsi et de Bahutu, 
qui s'adonnent d la culture des champs. Ces 
derniers sont le plus grand nombre; Parmi eux il 
y a beaucoup de Batutsi.'*
or a report from Maragara in Central Rwanda in lg07:
"Poss§der des vaches voila I'id&al du Mututsi, 
mais parmi eux il y a beaucoup qui sont forc6s 
de prendre la pioche*"
Examples of this kind could be multiplied many times, 
but the illustrations given Indicate sufficiently the lack 
of clarity in ethnical, political or occupational terms as 
to whom one is referring. I believe that unless, with 
greater clarity, we describe whom we refer to we are open to 
misleading and confused statements and to incomplete or even
false conclusions. The remarks quoted above justify the 
query as to whether the ethnographer, the historian, the 
physical anthropologist, the administrator or the social 
anthropologist' really refer to the same people? It is 
evident from the examples that the writers use different 
criteria as bases for their differentiation. , As a result 
the boundaries, of the groups referred to may overlap or the 
same, word may refer to different categories of people.
Although it: may be possible to arrive at certain definite 
differentiations between those people collectively referred 
to as Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, it is essential to be clear about 
the. exact criteria, in kind and in range, for differentiation, 
since otherwise the same word may be used to refer to different 
characteristics of these people.
The examples demonstrate that the criteria for 
differentiation overlap; each writer thus interprets the 
terms according to his own special interest. Equally, and 
maybe of greater importance, the reader, without being given 
sufficient explanation as to the basis for differentiation, 
may not be aware of the- difference in criteria which may be 
used by different authors and interprets the words according 
to his own criteria of special interest. It may be not 
without interest to demonstrate how infringements against
elementary rules.of logic have led to confusion and indeed 
false conclusions. By using the words fDutsi, Hutu and Twa 
indiscriminately, authors and readers, by not-basing their 
conclusions on criteria but on words, establish an a priori 
identification of ethnic and social differentiation. This 
would, it seems, be not without importance in relation to 
the different assumptions that Tutsi, Hutu and Twa are 
castes, classes or ethnic groups. It is essential to raise 
this point as to whether they are, really referring to the same 
groups of people because these are the realities with which 
we are concerned.
The practical application of.Aristotle1s dictum "quo 
maior comprehensio eo minor extensio, quo minor comprehensio 
eo maior extensio" - i.e. the broader the definition the 
more people it refers to and the narrower the definition 
the fewer people it refers to - is all too often overlooked. 
Infringements against this rule are at the basis of mueh 
misunderstanding and futile-argument and misleading 
conclusions. , We have an example closer to home in the 
recent discussion about the implications of - British passport 
holders. If one person defines an Englishman as somebody 
born in Britain and another as somebody who holds or has 
the right to hold a British passport, they will find that 
their use of the word Englishman does not refer to the same
people. In other contexts even people who would agree 
in certain circumstances with the definition of "being 
born in Britain" will find that e.g. 'Scots' refers to 
different people from ?English'. Again in other 
circumstances,. those who define an 'Englishman* even in the 
stricter sense will not agree with one another as to whom 
they are referring because some will include and others 
exclude West: Indian immigrants, born in Britain, holding a 
British passport and who might even be cricket fans.
If it is true that unless we have the same range of 
criteria wo are not referring in reality to the same people 
in Britain, this must also be true when referring to Tutsi, 
Hutu and Twq in. Rwanda. In the examples quoted they are 
variously referred to as castes, classes or ethnic groups.
d*Hertefelt defines caste as follows: "Le terme caste
dfefinit un groupe hfer^ditaire qui s'adonne d des occupations 
specifiques, qui est endogame et qui s'insdre dans une syst&oe 
hierarchises." The basis of recruitment is here 'ascribed*. 
This subject is dealt with in connection with the study of 
the political structure, but we can note here that on the 
basis of his stated criteria, d'Hertefelt cannot' be referring 
to the same people as, other writers who say that there’ has 
been considerable intermarriage or that there are many Tutsi
2?
who are cultivators, who, are poor or that* there are^  Hutu 
who are Tutsi-ised through wealth or marriage*
Those who refer to Tutsi, Hutu and Twa as social classes 
imply the existence of social mobility. They refer to Hutu 
being, enobled. and to a certain amount of intermarriage in a 
hierarchically ranked semi-open system, in which recruitment 
to a class is based only partly on birth and partly on 
achievement. I am* not discussing here whether Tutsi, Hutu 
and Twa are, either castes, or classes, I am only, saying that 
the quotations show that, authors have used widely different 
criteria both in kind and in range and that therefore they 
cannot' be referring to the same group of people and that the 
disregard of Aristotle's rule must result in loss of clarity 
and precision* : The same must be said of descriptions such 
as those used by Maquet that Tutsi are pastoralists. and Hutu 
agriculturalists. (Maquet I96I p., 10) First'of all this 
is not a definition because it infringes thefirule$
"Definitio nil convertibilis cum definito". There are as 
we know from, his own and other sources many agriculturists 
who are not Hutu and there are pastoralists who are not Tutsi. 
Moreover unless everyone clearly agrees on the: nature and 
range of attributes which define a pastoralist or an 
agriculturalist descriptions of this kind only make'for 
confusion. What has been said here can also be applied
to descriptions such as that Tutsi are nobles and Hutu are 
commoners* (Maquet 1961 p.. 10)
X would like, however, to take this point one step 
further. The population of Rwanda has been divided into 
three categories. A category is an analytical tool or a 
model, of which-Leach has said that it is "too good to be 
true". (Leach 1964 P*22) It is a concept or a way of 
classifying a* certain’number of phenomena which the observer 
perceives as existing. Only when.it coincides with a 
social reality is it useful in social anthropology if one 
wants to classify a population into different categories.
The categories should neither overlap nor exclude anyone.
For this it is necessary; (1) That the criteria are mutually 
exclusive and this will only be if the criteria are both 
exclusive and, adequate. By exclusive I mean that the 
criteria referred to are true only of the group which one 
wants to indicate. If not there will be overlapping.
By adequate I mean that all members of the group referred to 
can be described by these criteria, otherwise some of the 
group are left out and the category is no^  longer useful for 
classification. (2) That the classification itself (divisio) 
is adequate. By this I mean that all the members of the 
total group, in this case the inhabitants of Rwanda, should
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be covered by the criteria used. If not some of the 
inhabitants will be left out and we cannot speak of 
adequate classification, ’rulers* and ’ruled*.
From the examples quoted it is clear that any such 
distinction on the basis of political status held only for 
Central Bwanda and not for other areas of the country.
If these remarks are not without value in the wider 
context of anthropological discussions, they seem to be 
essential in the specific context of: Bwanda. fi‘he importance 
of adhering to these rules: will be more fully appreciated in 
the analysis of thef political structure, the cattle and the 
land complex, but in this chapter I would like to go a little 
further into the division made on ethnic grounds.
It is said that the inhabitants of Bwanda can be 
classified as Qkitsi-Bthiopoid; Hutu-Bantu; and Twa-Hegroid. 
However in reality this classification fails to describe 
them exclusively and adequately, and scientists do not use 
the same set of descriptive criteria. These points may be 
illustrated as follows:
(1) By using the word Bthiopoid, one under-writes an as 
yet unproven theory cf. Johnston (1902) Baumann (1948) and 
Beligman (I93O) that there is a link between certain people 
in Bwanda and. Ethiopia. Moreover Vansina, de Heusch,
Olliver and many others agree with Seligman when he writes
of the Bwanda, Bundi, Sukuma, Hay a and Hyamwezi that:
"It seems that all these tribes have a Hamitie 
(presumably Galla) element brought in by the 
Huma, far more recent than those incoming waves 
of Hamitie blood which, mixing with the Hegro, 
originally' gave rise to the Bantu. " (Seligman I966 p. 137)
But the various writers have used different criteria, 
including myth, legend, institutions connected with divine 
kingship, linguistics and agricultural methods to establish 
ethnic links between tbe Tutsi and their origin from the horn 
of. Africa, without sufficiently defining who are the Tutsi.
Myth and legend, often indiscriminately used for 
historical examination, have been interpreted in so many 
different ways by e.g. Vansina, Kagame, d’Hertefelt and 
de Heusch that it would seem to be very difficult to reach 
any' definite conclusion. The institutions of divine kingbMp 
have been described as occurring widely in Bantu societies as 
much as being characteristic, of Hamitie culture, and any 
theory, based on diffusion of this institution, that Bantu cul­
ture.. has been influenced by* Hamitie immigration and integration 
rests so far on conjecture.
Since everyone in Bwanda speaks the same or nearly the same 
Bantu language it is difficult, if not impossible, to use 
language as a basis for differentiating ethnic groups.
However there are* certain physical characteristics which are 
considered to- be typical of each group, and similarity of 
physical characteristics of the Tutsi with other peoples 
sometimes referred to as Hamitie have given rise to a 
presumption of Ethippoid origin. According to the accepted 
stereotypes, a Tutsi is tall with an average of 69.5 inches 
and slender, while the Hutu;is smaller with an average of 
65.9 inches and stocky, and the Twa is small with an average 
of 61.1 inches. However one can quite easily find people 
who are called Tutsi who are smaller than their neighbours 
who are called Hutu, Prof. Hiernaux has done much through 
the publication of his objective measurements to-undermine 
what might be called the Hamitie Myth, which has definite 
undertones of establishing 'favourable1 comparison with 
certain European features. Although in general the Tutsi 
may have straighter or'narrower noses than Hutu, the Tutsi 
have by far the thickest lips, while there is no difference 
in the kind of hair or the eolourof the skin or eyes, 
contrary to1 general subjective opinion. * Moreover blood- 
sampling on a very wide scale proved that Tutsi, predominate 
in the 0-group. Both this and the classification on the 
BiH. system shows*that it is impossible to differentiate 
between Tutsi and Hutu and Twa.
Posnansky therefore, rightfully suggested that on the 
one hand we need much more evidence, especially of an 
archaeological nature, to arrive at any definite conclusion 
about the movement of people from the Horn of Africa, and on 
the other hand he offers the • suggestion that’ certain 
characteristics of the Tutsi might well be due to nutritional 
and social factors. (Posnaa.sky.l966) If it is possible to 
trace definite physical;differences as regards height and 
weight between the Hutu of the • north and the centre of Bwanda 
or between the Tutsi of TJrundi Sid Bwanda, as Kiernaux has 
done, and to relate these differences to climate and-occupation, 
it is not. excluded that a high protein diet and socially 
preferred marriages are at the basis of the natural and 
social forces which have operated to produce the differences 
so apparent to the first. European observers. Recent 
statistics from the United States show an average growth of 
one inch in one generation due to a high protein diet.
Suggestions of this kind justify the conclusion that 
much more evidence is needed to substantiate the Hamitie Myth
voiced since Speke in 1863* when he wrote in The Journal of
/
the discovery of the sources of the Hile that:
"The unusually complex political organization of 
the inter-lacustrine Bantu is explicable only in 
terms of the influence of superior immigrant people." 
(wrigley 1958 p.11)
This myth has survived for a- long time. we read in the
official report of the Belgian Colonial Government in I938:
"Qu'il doit s'enfforcer de maintenir et de 
consolider le cadre traditionel de la classe 
dirigeante des Batutsi & cause de son 
ind&tiiable superiority intellectual."
Even in the I966 reprint of Seligman's Races of Africa,
we.read;
"Ho doubt it is at least in part due to this 
'European* influence that we find the curious 
mixture of primitive -and advanced elements in 
the social institutions of the interlacustrine 
•communities." (Seligman I966 p.138)
To bring this discussion back to our original argument,
it is clear from the remarks made above: (1) That the term
Ethiopoid does not refer to the same set of phenomena,
either in kind or range, acceptable to everyone and'therefore
5not everyone is referring to the same number of people;
(2) There is however a second reason for objecting to this
classification. while 'Ethiopoid* refers to territorial
origin, 'Bantu* refers to' language* As Seligman remarks,
• and so far no one has disagreed with him,
"The Bantu are a congeries of peoples, named 
from and defined by the peculiar type of 
language that they speak." (I966 p.117)
It is evident that on the basis of lack of exclusiveness of
criteria, this classification has to be disregarded. There
is considerable overlapping, not only because those who are 
called Tutsi speak a Bantu language and can thus be called 
Bantu, but also because, as we have seen, some theories 
hold that the peoples who are called Bantu were already of 
a mixed Ethiopoid^Hegroid origin before the arrival of 'Tutsi 
On. the basis of this theory we might say that both Hutu and 
Tutsi are Bantu but that Tutsi are purer Ethiopoid than Hutu.
(3) Moreover we'come across one more difficulty on the basis 
of lack of adequate classification. The Tutsi, even within 
the context of the Ethiopoid theory, are not adequately 
described by it, By limiting the criteria to country of 
origin only, we not only include the people called Tutsi but 
also the Hima, who are semi-nomadic pastoralists much like 
the Masai, but who do not in any way take part in government. 
If one in Rwanda calls a Tutsi a Hima, he will understand, 
by analogjr, what is meant, that is to say that they have one 
thing in common - a special interest in cattle. However 
the Hima cannot be and is not called a Tutsi because he is 
neither -.-sedentary nor interested in government. The Tutsi 
is interested in cattle as an instrument of power, the Hima 
is interested in having cattle. nevertheless Tutsi in the 
sense of the Ethiopoid theory must include Hima.
From this rather negative exercise we have to take the 
subject one step further. Who are Tutsi, Hutu and Twa?
As* far as the Twa goes there seems to he little argument.
Kagame gives* the etymology of the words Tutsi and Hutu as the 
former meaning immigrant and the latter cultivator.
Bourgeois’ draws attention to the fact that in Kivu a Hutu 
means patron,- because they have- Twa as serfs. Gorju has 
noted that Tutsi means' having migrated from the place
1
- Htusi in Ankole, which is not far from the Bigo archaeological!
\
\
site.
Although these opinions as such do little to contribute 
to the understanding of the terms Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, they 
clearly indicate a search for two different solutions to what 
are in fact’ two different• questions. Gorju talks here in 
terms of an ethnic group basing recruitment on place' or 
origin, whereas Kagame and Bourgeois speak in terms of 
categories. Indeed Tutsi and Hutu can be talked of either 
as groups of people or as*categories, that is as elements 
of the system of social organisation.
(1) When we speak here of groups we do not mean it in the 
sense,of 'corporate* group which Ra&cliffe Brown defined 
as existing:
"if its members, or a considerable proportion of 
them,■come together occasionally to carry out some 
collective action, e.g. if it possesses or controls 
property which is collective or performs certain 
rites." (195^ P*41)
Whereas it is not hard to identify the corporate
characteristics of a group, it is much more difficult to
define the boundaries of ethnic groups. The Irish or
Italians who migrated to the United States do not constitute
corporate'groups, hut few if any would object to calling
them ethnic groups because the people referred to have a
common link, in different degrees, to a common country of
origin, a common' cultural heritage and are moreover at times
conscious of it. When speaking about Tutsi and Hutu we do
not refer to them as ethnic groups, because as we have seen,
the‘ criteria of establishing the bases for recruitment into
these groups of people are open to different interpretations
and do not give sufficiently clear grounds for differentiation
and therefore identification of the members of a group.
The term reference group according to M. Kuhns
"denotes a social group with which an individual 
feels identified and to which he aspires to 
relate his identity. a person derives from his 
reference group his norms, attitudes and values 
and the social object these create." (1964 P*4l)
It is in this sense that I would refer to Tutsi and Hutu as
groups of people.
Setting aside the disputed question of origin, 'Tutsi
are all those who think of themselves on the basis of
kinship or affinity as related to the two elans which provide
the king and the queen mother. These links are expressed 
and justified, through myths and legends, in terms of ethnic 
origin. Moreover these links are externalised through 
certain prototype physical characteristics, certain patterns 
of behaviour and ideals, standards of moral conduct and the 
observance of certain taboos. In this way Tutsi are 
ideally linked with the royal family* This privileged 
minority group needed to protect itself by drawing into the 
group by means of hyper gamy those who, through power and 
wealth, became a threat. On the other hand, less successful 
Tutsi were forced away from the group through marriage to 
Hutu. If their descendants remained less successful, they 
would become in the full sense Hutu, even if they retained 
some Tutsi physical characteristics and were related in 
some degree to the Tutsi group, just as descendants of the 
hypergamous unions might retain the physical characteristics 
of their Hutu origin. The people involved in this two-way 
mobility constituted the fringe cases of the reference 
groups Tutsi and Hutu. Rwanda recognise this process of 
social mobility since they have special names to indicate 
the persons involved. \ Ashyhuture means someone who has 
moved up into the group of superior social status, while 
umuwore means someone who has dropped into the group of 
inferior social status. (lacquer 1939 P*53)
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(Those (Tutsi who are ideally linked to the royal family, 
expressed in terms of ethnic relationship, hut who do not 
themselves1 participate in the political power structure, and 
are semi-nomadic herdsmen, are the (Tutsi-Hima, often called 
Hima, fhey belong- to the same reference group because of 
this ideal link and the fact that their women marry the 
(Tutsi of the administration.
The basis of membership of the (Tutsi group is therefore 
social recognition of ideal ties expressed in the idiom of 
ethnic origin and supported and justified in myth and legend. 
It is in this sense that we must understand the figures 
published by I.R.S.A.C. when speaking about futsi-Hutu 
population, (Tutsi constituting sixteen per cent and Hutu 
eighty five per cent of the population. Moreover they gave 
in 1956 the following pattern of population distribution:
Province fa of futsi in population
Astrida 22.97
Kigali 12.79
Hyansa 19.34
Biumba 12.67
Kisenyi 5.62
Huhengeri 8.37
Shangugu 22.08
Kibuye 3O.7I
Kibungu 15.77
The overall average of (Tutsi in the population is sixteen 
per cent. We find an average percentage of futsi in 
eastern Rwanda, a low percentage in the north and north­
west, a higher than average in central Rwanda and the highest 
percentage in western Rwanda.
(2) ‘ On a different level, when talking about categories,
(Tutsi and' Hutu are referred to as elements of the system of 
social organisation. Here the basis of differentiation 
and classification is the element of actual or potential 
participation in the government of Rwanda, through the 
channels established by the king. Here tbs criteria for 
(Tutsi differentiation are extended to all those who actually 
or potentially participate or have access to all levels of 
the system of power as exercised by the king, and is therefore 
limited to those areas where the king had de facto established 
authority.
We therefore must, with Prof. Yansina, speak of (Tutsi
as a category within the context of the political structure
of kingly power. It is in this context that the remark of
Prof. Yansina becomes clears
"In Hoord en west Rwanda bestonden er van I9OO 
geen least en, daar er geen (Tutsi waren.M 
(In the north and west of Rwanda we cannot 
speak of castes, because there were no (Tutsi.)
U 962 p.98)
It remains -unfortunate and a source of confusion that we 
have only one verbal expression for both the reference 
group and the category. Such an identical expression is 
only justified on the basis of reality if the categories 
used in the classification coincide with actual membership 
of the reference group. writers saying' that Putsi form 
sixteen per cent of the population but real Putsi form only 
five per cent are speaking about Putsi as a reference group 
in the former and as a category in the latter instance.
Writers dealing with- Putsi as caste or class, that is in 
terms, of categories, are*not talking about Putsi or Hutu 
as groups of people who constitute the actual population 
of Rwanda. In terms of categories we can speak of Putsi 
or Hutu only in Central Rwanda, where the king had established 
channels of administration and military .power. In the 
other areas we can only, speak about Putsi and'Hutu as groups 
of people.
Putsi ■Horth-west Central East
as groups of people + + +
As categories - - +
* PART 2 ECOLOGICAL FACTORS
(1 ) Geographical situation and discovery.
Rwanda as we find it on the map today lies in the 
centre of the African continent just south of the equator. 
Being equidistant from Capetown and Cairo and roughly 
nine hundred miles 'from Mombasa on the Indian Ocean and 
one thousand two hundred miles from Boma on the Atlantic, 
it hud for a very long time escaped the enquiries of the 
early discoverers. Although Speke arrived at its eastern 
borders in 1861, he was forcibly prevented from entering.
It was only in 1894 that the first European, von Gotzen, 
entered Rwanda, crossing it from east to west, accompanied 
by his six hundred and twenty askaris. He met Kigeri 
* Rwabugiri who was on one of his military operations in 
western Rwanda in> Kingogo of'Kisenyi district.
little did this expansive warrior king know that at 
the Berlin Conference, British, Belgian and German diplomats 
had decided nearly ten years previously in 1885 that M s  
kingdom was part of the German zone of influence in East 
Africa and was marked on the maps as district fourteen
of the vast area called Deutsch Ost Afrika. It was only 
in lgOO that the first permanent garrison along the Congo 
border was established and Rwanda thus militarily occupied 
in a definite form, having formerly been controlled from 
the station at Usumbura, in Urundi.
From the early missionary reports it is evident that 
before civilian occupation took over there were never more 
than five or six German officers in permanent residence in 
Rwanda. Although in I9O7 civilian administration took 
over, during the whole period of German rule there were 
never more than ten- Germans stationed in Rwanda. They 
introduced a system of indirect, rule, putting the force of 
their authority behind the current political hierarchy and 
established the boundaries as we;now know them. The only 
changes were made in I9IO when the same diplomats decided 
that the Kinyarwanda speaking provinces of Gisigari and 
Zomba and the isle of Idjwi in Lake ICivu w.ere to be given 
to Kivu, while the northern district of Bufumbira was to* be 
attached to the Uganda Protectorate. In.I9I9 a. large strip 
was taken from its eastern-borders and given to Tanganyika 
in connection with the plans for the Cape-Cairo route, but 
this was restored to Rwanda on January, 1st 1924. In this 
way the actual boundaries of Rwanda do*not coincide either
with the Kinyarwanda speaking peoples or with those 
territories which in one way or another were part of the
zone of influence of the king of Rwanda prior, to European
ini ervention.
Rwanda as it appears on the maps today covers an area 
of slightly over ten thousand square miles. But the' actual 
surface area must he considerably larger on account of its 
extremely hilly terrain. On the north it is bounded* by 
Uganda where the frontier runs through open country. ’The 
north-western and western boundaries with the Congo are 
formed from north to south by the1 Yirunga’ mountains, * Lake 
Kivu and the Rusisi river. The north-west is volcanic, 
the highest peak being the Karisimbi (fourteen thousand 
seven hundred and eighty feet). a : number of these volcanoes
are still active. Over the last sixty years, apart from a
number of smaller eruptions such as those in I9O3 and I9O5, 
great natural disasters were caused by the Katerusi in 1912 
and the Ryamulagira in I93O. In I938 a very fertile and 
densely populated area covering two hundred square miles 
was destroyed between the volcano and Lake Kivu.
On the south the boundaries with Burundi run along the 
Lua and Akanyura rivers, along the lakes Tshohoha and Rugwero 
and along part of the Kagera river which also forms the 
eastern border with Tanzania. From a hydrographic point
of view Rwanda is in a strategic•position. The waters 
from the western slopes of the Viruga mountains find their 
way westward and flow into the Congo river, while the waters 
flowing eastward contribute to the Eagera which flows into 
Lake Victoria and thence into the Kile.
The ifhct that Rwanda has so many natural boundaries in 
itself strengthens the image of internal homogeneity and 
unity. On the one hand, as we have said, these boundaries 
do not contain all the territories where the king of Rwanda 
had some sort of influence. On the other hand it should 
not be assumed that prior to the introduction of European 
authority the Icing had traditionally by any means the same 
degree of power or effective authority over all the 
territories within these boundaries. The nature of this 
authority will be more closely examined in chapter two. 
However it seems imperative both for the understanding of 
the word1 TRwanda" as we are going to use it with reference 
to the beginning of this century and for the appreciation 
of the ecological factors within the territory and the 
importance to be attached to certain variables within the 
territory, that we define the nature of the boundaries as 
we find them around I9QO. It is even questionable whether 
we are able to speak of boundaries at all. without going
into detail and staying within the realm of verifiable 
historical data, the following very brief survey of Rwanda 
after 1850 will throw sufficient light on how the nature of 
these boundaries should be understood.
. In the year Speke tried to enter Rwanda, King Rwogera 
died. The kings of Rwanda had their court in'Hyanza, which 
is situated in the heart of that area which is known as 
Central Rwanda and contains the provinces of Astrida, Hyanza 
and Kigali. King Rwogera had just conquered Gisaka, which 
had for some time sent tribute to the King of Rwanda* The 
three local chiefs had started to quarrel among themselves. 
One,of them had appealed to the King of Rwanda for help which 
was promptly given. Gisaka however continued to be ruled by 
its own autonomous chiefs but the king of Rwanda left three 
representatives to keep an eye on things. Such was the 
situation when the first mission was founded in 1900. We 
could call the east and south-east an area controlled but 
not administered by the king of Rwanda although these early 
missionary reports also stress that all the people of Gisaka 
considered themselves Banyarwanda and expected protection 
from the king to whom they paid tribute. In some sense he 
was their king. In 1861' Rwabugiri succeeded Rwogera. He 
tried to extend his influence over a wider territory.
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Accompanied by his troops, he entered Kivu in 1874,
Ankole in 1886, and 'Bushubi in 1889, where he killed 
King Nsoro. Although he tried to establish effective 
authority in these areas, the campaigns had no lasting 
effects from the point of view of territorial expansion*
Within the territory of Rwanda he led campaigns against 
the largely autonomous chiefs of Bugoyi, Bwishaza, Kingogo, 
Mulera, Bubereka, Busigi, Kyantonga and KLnyaga, where he 
established some form of nominal authority by leaving 
representatives who tried to destroy or undermine the 
influence of the local chiefs* All these regions are in 
the north-west. The western regions were all brought under 
his effective influence with the exceptions of Bukunzi, 
Bosozo, Bushira,* Kibari, Bunyabiri and Impara. As late as 
1924-26, a military occupation of Bukunzi and Bosozo was 
needed to bring them into submission. The Belgian 
government replaced these chiefs by Tutsi* Thus, in recent 
historical times we must distinguish three distinct zones 
within the current boundaries of Rwanda. These were Central 
Rwanda, the north-west and west which had been recently 
occupied and brought under the military control of the king, 
and eastern Rwanda which had been recently attached to the 
centre.
we can agree with Prof. Yansina when he states;
"Assigner des frontidres au pays, en 1900, est impossible’1, 
but v/ould like to qualify this statement to some extent, 
we surely can speak about boundaries, but only if we mean 
that outside these frontiers, with the exception of the 
corrections made in I9IO by the colonial powers, the king 
of Rwanda had no permanent influence, but on the other hand 
no outside power had any form of authority within these 
boundaries. Furthermore it does not mean that the degree 
of influence of the king in the different districts was 
everywhere the same. The degree of his authority was 
determined to a large extent by the following factors:
1^) whether these districts had been brought under the 
influence of Central Rwanda at a recent date or not,
(,2) the relative strength of the different Hutu and Hima 
chiefs at a certain moment, and
{3) the power the king could exert in keeping the different
autonomous districts in control.
Tn his report from Hyundo in Elsenyi district in I9O6,
Pr. Schumacher sums this up:
"Bans cette partie montagneuse les Batutsi, 
dll6gu6s du Roi, ne viennent qu*& epoques 
fixfes lever leur imf>6t. Ils n fy ont aucune 
habitation raSme pas un pied a terre."
Or Classe in I9O4:
"Bans les Cantons du nord les Batutsi ne sont 
gudre repr&sent&s que par les fonctionaires du 
Mwami r6c eminent imposes d*offices."
Or from Bugoye in 1905*
"An lieu d*enlever & la classe dirigeante des 
- Batutsi du centre quelque peu de leur pouvoir, 
les1 Europfeens vont le leur augmenter. Ils 
ont fait du roi le grand percepteur d*impflts 
en lui donnant une eompagnie de soldats pour 
I-1 aider dans cette besonge. Ba consequence 
en est que les gens au lieu de devenir plus 
libres- le seront un peu moins at auront double 
impdt a payer. Ils travaillent pour leur 
propres chefs' eomme par le pas'sfe at du plus 
il leur faudra trouver tout ce qui est demand^ 
par le roi. Bes cris de mort contre les 
• Burop6ens retentissent partout."
However the same reports stress that there are pockets1 of
Tutsi, as for instance in Mulera, who sent regular tribute to
the king and in whose areas the king had his regular
established representatives. Before the arrival of the
Europeans we find a very fluid situation with regard to
established authority from central Rwanda in the west,
north-west and south-east. It is in the light of this
that we have to understand the nature of the boundaries
of Rwanda around- the beginning of the- twentieth century
when the area was made into one district of Beutsch Ost
Af rika.
Topographically Rwanda slopes from west to east in 
three relatively homogeneous regions. The north-west and
4-6.
west lie at an. altitude of six thousand feet and above, 
the central' upland plain lies at five thousand feet 
descending' towards' the east at between five thousand and 
three thousand sevenhundred feet. In the north-west and 
west we still find some forests which cover about three 
per cent of the total surface of Rwanda while we find some 
savannas covering another three per cent of the total surface.
Coinciding with these natural regions we find clear 
differences in soil fertility. Ihe west and north-west is 
very fertile while the centre and eastern regions have rather 
poor sandy soil, with the exception of Mirenge in G-isaka, 
which is the best banana growing area in Rwanda. Again 
we find a remarkable difference in rainfall between these 
historically and physically distinct regions. .average 
rainfall per annum varies from sixty inches in the west and 
north-west to forty inches in central Rwanda and thirty inches 
in the east and south-east. Significantly, rainfall is 
subject to considerable annual variation especially in 
central and east Rwanda. fhe irregularity of rainfall 
together with steep contours and porous sandy soil contributed 
to large-scale famines at irregular intervals when literally 
thousands of people died and an et^ ual or greater number were 
uprooted to find food in other parts of the country,
especially in the north-east or in Uganda. The early
missionary reports give some indication of the gravity of
these recurrent famines especially when they were almost
invariably followed by epidemics of disease. References
include the following:
Gisaka in 1902 -
"On nous parle souvent de la fameuse famine de 
I9OO, le Rugaya; elle fit p&rir un grand nombre 
de personne et obligea beaucoup d'autres & aller 
sffetablir ailleurs. Rous trouvons les traces 
encore un peu partout. Huttes abandonn^s et 
mis^re,*
lyundo in 1910 where about six thousand people are reported
to have died within a radius of twelve miles of' the mission;
ftIl-y-a trds peu de families od il n*y a pas un 
ou deux morts.1
Ryansa in I9O7 -
f,Ramine d6sa,streuse: par milliers les gens quittent
le pays, pour le Idorwa ou lord. Beaucoup d*autres 
sont morts de faim.1
Astrida in 1910 -
"lous avons dans nos livres 2,000 Chr6tians. Cette 
ann6e notre liber defunctorum compte plus de 3OQ dfeces 
dus & la m6ningite.H **Plus iue 7,000 sont baptises 
en articulo mortis.*1
Astrida in I9I9 -
f,Sur I70 hibitants de notre colline, 40 sont morts 
dans l*espace d*un mois d cause de ia grippes espagnol.*1
According to - Government statistics, the great famine of 
1928, despite all the efforts made to control it, caused
4 8 .
forty thousand deaths and forced eighty thousand people to 
leave the country. Again in 1942 famine and- disease struck 
on a very large scale in Central and Eastern Rwanda. In 
later years with the improvement in communications, medical 
facilities and administration, these disasters were largely 
controlled, hut the early reports, dealing especially with 
the period before civil administration was set up after 1919, 
give a picture of great insecurity and instability especially 
in Central and Eastern Rwanda, due to irregular rainfall 
followed by outbreaks of severe epidemics.
In the context of these physically distinct regions, 
attention should be drawn to the variables listed below
REOIORS 
W.R.W. Central
Recent occupation + -
Rainfall -1- -
Distance from King +
Soil fertility +
t,l) + for Mirenge 
^2) + for ICLrenge
K.B. Missionary reports of.I902 and I9O3 estimate a 
population of between eighty thousand and one hundred 
thousand in Mirenge.
East
+
-+ (i) 
+
-+ (2)
(2) Population.
The first serious and sustained effort to enumerate 
the population of Rwanda, was made by the' German ethnographer 
Czekanowski in I9O6* He spent a full year in Rwanda going 
from hill to hill coxrnting huts. He arrived at a figure
of one and a half million people. In the-Rapports annuels
the fathers report having checked-Czekanowski1 s findings 
against their own and remark’ how astonishingly accurate his 
estimates are. fhey report him as an extremely methodical 
and conscientious observer. On the basis of his findings 
we would arrive at a population density of one hundred and 
fifty per square mile at the beginning of this century.
Prom I93I onwards, the - Government produced annual statistics 
in their reports to the United-Nations. In lid plan decennal 
the following official figures are published for I949.
Province Total Population Population.
per square
Kisenyi 260,581 209
Ruhengeri 217,453 320
Shangugu 162,435 156
Biumba 130-, 012 118
Ribungu 161,671 65
Ugali 226,808 156
Ryanza 363,956 250
Astrida 305,860 230
1,808,776
Average population density, in 1949* 180 per square mile.
.v:
CD
CD
5 1 .
(1  )In 1952 I.E. S. A.C. ' became responsible for census 
calculations and produced a figure for the total population 
in 1958 of two million four hundred thousand giving an 
average of two hundred and forty persons per square mile. 
Comparison of the breakdown of these figures by province 
has become impossible because in 1953 the- Government changed 
the boundaries of the provinces and created one more province. 
If we have no reason to doubt the findings, obtained through 
prolonged scientific research by the specialists of 
• I.R,o.A-.0., we can equally safely accept the figures of 
'he Plan Decennal of 1949 ft would mean that there had 
been an average population increase between 1949 su& 1958 
of 5*5 per cent, a figure which compares well with findings 
from other parts of Africa. • Csekanowski1 s estimate of 
one and a half million around I9OG would mean that for the 
first forty years of this century there was only a marginal 
increase. Phis is not very surprising when considered in 
relation to the frequent famines and epidemics, and also the 
very late start of any form of efficient civil administration 
and its services. vve have'noted that the German civil 
administration from I9O7 to I9I6 never had more than ten
(1) Institute pour la. Recherche Scientifique, en nfrique 
- Centrale
civilians. From 1016 to I919 there was a Belgian 
military occupation, while the Belgian civil adminstration 
was only slowly established after 1910* Ihe first 
government hospital was built in I93I, while the protestant 
mission opened its first hospital in 1937 and the Homan 
Catholic mission only in I946.
Although we have no way of knowing whether Czekanowski*s 
estimate was entirely accurate, it can be taken as 
sufficiently exact to allow the conclusion to be drawn that 
in the period around I9OO we cannot speak of overpopulation 
as far as the whole of Rwanda is concerned. However, more 
important for our argument is information 011 population 
distribution. Astrida,1 Hyanza and-Kigali, the districts 
which comprised Central Rwanda, with a total surface of 
four thousand square miles had a population of eight hundred 
thousand in 1949, i.e. an average of two hundred per square 
mile. Within the limits of this area in which there are 
no lakes or forests, the population was evenly dispersed 
without dense concentrations. In the north-west, in the 
provinces of Kisenyi and Ruhengeri, with a total area of 
one thousand nine hundred square miles, we find a population 
of five hundred thousand, i.e. two hundred and sixty per 
square mile, and here we must add that a substantial area
/-
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is taken up by a part of Lake Kxvu and the forest. Other 
densely pop.ulated areas are found in the north, in the 
western part of Biumba province, and along the western 
Borders with the Congo, as well as a concentration in 
Mirenge in Gasaka.
REOIOTS
W»» & H.W* Central ■ gisaka
1 Population -f - ■ ~
■ - = relative average 
Ihe following conclusions seem to be justified:
(1) Well over half the population lived outside Central 
Rwanda.
2^) I'he greatest population density was found along the 
borders at the periphery of Central Rwanda*s zone of 
influence.
Figures for the cattle population given in le Plan
/
Decennal are as follows:
Province * Area in •0attle • Humber of cattle
square miles population per-square mile
Kisenyi 1,243 56,000 45
Ruhengeri 677 35,000 52
Shangugu 1,000 35,000 55
Biumha 1,100 45,000 40
KLhungu 2,400 45,000 18
Kigali 1,500 116,000 77
Hyanza 1,500 168,000 112
Astrida 1,120 88,000 78
R E ’S I O ' I S
Horth-west Central G-isaka
Cattle ■ . 4*
The plus and minus signs indicate a marked difference 
between Central Rwanda and the other areas, not only in the 
total number of cows hut also in the cattle-density per 
square mile*
I am aware that this is not an exhaustive description 
of the ecological factors within the Rwanda setting.
Further cultural variation as expressed in such matters as 
dress, smoking and eating hahits would have to he considered* 
if this was a study of cultural variation in Rwanda.
However in the context of the task which I have set myself, 
the points mentioned throw sufficient, light on the fact,
which functionalist writers like Maquet seem to have 
overlooked, that the terms Rwanda, Hutu and Tutsi require 
greater specification and refinement. Even with reference 
to the operation of the system of social stratification 
which has heen the object of these studies, it would seem to 
be important for the successful isolation and identification 
of criteria for comparison and classification to be aware of 
the regional variables if one wants to talk about Rwanda, 
Tutsi and Hutu. Por the understanding of the process of 
political and social change leading to a violent clash of 
groups of people, it is essential not only to indicate these 
variables but also to indicate the correlations between these 
factors which are shown in the following graph:
RE&IONS
Horth West Central East
Hewly acquired territories + + - -f
Distance from the court + + - +
Rainfall + + - - +(1)
Soil fertility + + - +(1)
Population density + + - -
Humber of cattle - +
Cattle .density - + -
Tutsi as group + +
Tutsi as category - + -
(1) -h for Mirenge
.The importance of the isolation and the correlation 
of these factors will, I hope, he more fully appreciated 
as the argument proceeds, especially in the context of 
the political structure, the development of new interests, 
the emergence of conflict and the formation of group identity.
PARI1 5 KINSHIP
In Rwanda, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, independent of the 
region they lived in, reckoned their descent patrilineally.
The four named groups based on the principle of agnatic 
descent are the’ clan (ubwoko), .the sub-clan (shanga) and 
the lineage \umulyango)  ^ while the shallower lineage 
group is called inzu^^ - The shanga group is found only 
in the North and North Y/est.
In this chapter, I propose to consider the relative 
importance and different functions of these groups and the 
variations as between Tutsi and Hutu and as between Central 
Rwanda and the peripheral areas. In later chapters I 
propose to demonstrate how these differences can be correlated 
with other factors of variation within the wider framework 
of the political and economic system of Rwanda, In this 
chapter I shall also explore the composition, organization 
and activities of the various descent groups and of the 
family as the smallest social unit based on kinship, and 
indicate correlations between certain patterns in kinship
(1) Por clarity the kinyarwanda terms for lineages will 
* be used in the text: 
s. :umulyango ; pi, imilyango 
s, inzuj pi, amazu
organization and other elements of the social system within 
the framework of variables of a demographic, geographic and 
ecological nature as already outlined in the previous 
chapters.
Although these internal variables have to be stressed, 
it should be noted here that the overall unity of Rwanda 
society is also expressed in the form of quasi-kinship 
relationships. All Rwanda recognize a genealogical link 
with a mythical common ancestor, Kanyarwan&a. His three 
sons, G-atutsi, Gahutu and G-atwa, who were full brothers, 
were the founding ancestors of the three groups Tutsi, Hutu 
and Twa. In accordance with this myth, all Rwanda recognise 
a common mutual loyalty expressed in the term bumwe 
(literally - togetherness). The same word bumwe is used to 
express kin solidarity at all levels of the kinship system 
from brothers in the> nuclear family through lineage and clan 
up to this level of all members of Rwandan society whose 
solidarity is thus expressed in terms of kinship following 
the genealogical charter of common origin. While the 
actual obligations based on bumwe differ at each level of 
kin organisation, the expression of bumwe defines the 
boundaries of Rwandan society in that it implies an 
obligation of solidarity in the context of warfare with 
external groups. In this context, it is important to note
that1 despite the fact that peripheral areas were brought 
under effective control of Central Rwanda only recently, 
they were evidently afforded protection from external threat 
since, Arab slave traders were never able to gain access to 
these areas.^
The elan
In Rwanda we find1 fifteen named clans or patrilineal 
descent groups each claiming an apical ancestor and each 
having a common totem animal which must be- protected by all 
members of the clan. Contrary to other sources, (Kagame 
1957 p.272 and Bourgeois 1953 p.112), Maquet writes that 
the clans were not exogamous and moreover states that 
according to his Tutsi informants, not all the members of 
the same* clan were descended from the same ancestor.
(Maquet I96I p.46) - However here Maquet, in the case of
exogamy,5 must be' interpreted as referring only to the special 
case of the* royal elans in- Central Rwanda who alone had a 
special prerogative of endogamy. Maquetfs data further
'(1) Ref. G*. van Overschelde I957 p.114, who quotes the 
slave trader 'Ahmed' Ibrahim admitting to Stanley in 1875 - 
"During my stay in Kax*agwe I have tried for the last 
twelve years to enter Rwanda and1 have even sent important 
presents to the King* s* mother in order to obtain permission 
to trade in Rwanda. Khamis ben Abdullah, Tippo Tip and 
Said ben Habib have more than once tried to cross the 
border but never succeeded." (Translation from Dutch)
poses'^the problem that if we are to refer to groups as 
clans this should imply adherence to at least the minimal 
definition which demands acceptance of putative descent from 
a common ancestor. we need not be concerned to argue here 
on the validity of the translation of the kinyarwanda word 
ubwoko as clan, as used by all authors on Rwanda. But the 
statements of Maquet*s Tutsi informants justifies us in 
stressing the point that we have to interpret the. relevance 
of clan or other' group membership according to the actual or
verbal behaviour of the members themselves. we have here a 
situation in which Tutsi, Hutu and Twa recognise their common 
membership of a named group, e.g. Abanyiginya or Abega.
Such groups are categorized by Banyarwanda as ubwoko, 
normalljr translated as 'clan*. According to Maquet, who is 
referring to the situation in Central Rwanda, Hutu members of 
a clan accept the implication of common ancestry with Tutsi 
co-members, but Tutsi in some contexts choose to refute the 
implication of common ancestry with Hutu. This would seem 
to imply that while in some, reference situations common 
membership of an ubwoko provides a context for cross-cutting 
ties of allegiance as between Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, in other 
situations the value of clan membership for Tutsi, which 
implies common ties with Hutu, may be overruled by the desire
to express internal hierarchical distinctions between Tutsi 
and Hutu belonging to the same ubwoko.
The cleans were permanent’ descent groups in that there 
was no recognition of clan fission over time or throiigh 
growth in membership. A l l  clans, including the royal clan 
(Abanyiginya) included Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. Although no 
exact data are available concerning the distribution of these 
groups among the clans, authors refer to the fact that Tutsi 
comprised ninety per' cent of the Abanyiginya and Abega clans 
while Hutu comprised'ninety per cent of the Gisera, 2igaba 
and Singa clans. The presence of Hutu in predominantly 
Tutsi clans has been explained through adoption and clan 
identification of Hutu servants and clients with their Tutsi 
masters. (Pauwels "I965 p.262, and-Maquet 1961 p.46) But 
this suggestion cannot explain the presence of Tutsi in 
predominantly Hutu clans. Kagame (1954)9 basing himself 
on the oral traditions of the court historians, states that 
all clans are of Tutsi origin and that- Hutu adopted the clan 
of their masters. (Pauwels I965 p.260) It would seem 
however that this suggestion cannot be accepted without 
further evidence since it leaves us with the unsolved problem 
of how to account for the- fact that. Tutsi clients did not 
apparently adopt the clan of their masters. Purthermore,
(ref. p.37) whole areas of Rwanda existed where Tutsi 
influence was, only minimal and royal domination only 
nominal. While it is possible that certain lineages 
should-have adopted the clan and totem of their chiefs, 
the fact that whole clans should have abandoned their clan 
allegiance and adopted another clan and totem without 
retaining any trace of their original clans would, it seems, 
demand further proof, especially if seen against the back­
ground of large autonomous areas and the fact that the clans 
are everywhere dispersed rather than localised. Anyone 
attempting to define who are the Tutsi, Hutu‘and Twa must 
at least recognise that this problem of recruitment into the 
same clan must be taken into consideration.
Although the clans were not corporate groups, and had 
no internal organisation, nor clan heads nor councils, the 
members recognised and expressed a vague kinship bond. 
Ozekanowski (1917 P*233) ©specially was very much impressed 
by what he called the "clangemeinde". The early missionary 
reports also mention the obligation of members of the same 
clan to help one another ih times of famine and disease 
although no specific mention is made that clan ties were 
operative as between Tutsi and Hutu. One important role 
of the clans was in providing a context for cross-cutting 
ties of affiliation between Tutsi, Hutu and Twa.
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while the above characteristics held for all clans through­
out Rwanda, there were certain regional variations which 
should he noted. In Central Rwanda there was a concentration 
of those clans whose membership was predominantly rlutsi.
Clan membership was here important in relation to the power 
structure of Central Rwanda, especially in the case of the 
royal clan and the Bega clan which had provided the Queen 
Mother for the li*st six reigns. Other clans who were to 
some extent also directly involved in the Central Rwanda power 
structure were the Baha, - Bakono and Bagesera who could 
possibly provide the Queen Mother and were known to have done 
go on previous occasions. Only the Bagesera* could perform 
the duties connected with the ritual required for the building 
of a house which was necessary even for the Ring’s palace or 
for hpuses required by his wives. i’he Bazigaba performed 
the ritual of purification’necessary after a death had 
occurred in the house.
. In Central Rwanda, clan affiliation was mainly important 
in relation to the manipulation of ties in the context of 
the central political power structure, either when participating 
directly in the struggle- for power or, for those who were 
excluded from participation, when seeking protection.
In. the, peripheral areas of the Rorth and Rorth-West, 
we find evidence of the existence of clans dually linked by
joking relationships. Ihis is indicative of a difference 
in the role.of clans which is correlated with the presence 
of localised clan groups and evidence of widespread feuding 
in the northern areas* In this context, the clan joking 
relationships may have been linked with a framework for 
preferential marriages and the containment of feuding with 
neighbouring clans. Such an. interpretation is supported 
by dfHertefelt*s reference ^1962 p.451) to institutionalised 
joking relationships between affines of the same generation 
and also to a predominance of neighbourhood marriages among 
the.Reera of■, northern- Rwanda. vl’hertefelt 1954) ■
Ihe sub-clan (shanga) is, .like the clan, a permanent 
group with no internal organization, no. authority structure 
and no collective activities, but is, unlike the clan, only 
found in the'Horth and Horth-west. Here again, paired
sub-clans were dually United in joking relationships, and 
were also paired for ritual services and'games. (d’Hertefelt 
1959 p.118) Ihis indicates that sub-clans were clearly
localised and further acted as a framework for the operation 
of specific social ties between sub-clan and clan members, 
despite the. absence of internal organization and authority 
structure. Ihese.institutionalised relationships may also 
be interpreted as a containment of potential clan fission and
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as serving to prevent the outbreak of feuding,
Correlatively, the notable absence of sub-clans in 
Central Rwanda must be seen against the background of the 
different political and social organization which gave primacy 
to the centralised political authority and hence to the 
possibility of individual vertical mobility* In the centre, 
in contrast to other areas, security lay in establishing 
relationships with powerful chiefs and not, as in the 
peripheral areas, in affiliation to i^elatively large autonomous 
descent' groups which were not hierarchically ranked*
Umulyango and Inzu
It is among the pa triline ages of varying depth that we 
find the most significant differences as between the different 
areas and as between the social groups. The umulyango was 
larger in membership than the inzu* An umulyango contained 
two or more constituent amazu whose members were able to 
trace direct agnatic descent from the founder-ancestor of 
the umulyango.
Before discussing the differences with reference to the 
various areas and social groups, certain general characteristics 
should be noted* The lineage, (umulyango and inzu), was 
everywhere a non-permanent descent group, of varying depth 
formed through the process of segmentation which in turn is
related to factors of a socio-economic nature. Pauwels
^1965 P*l37) gives several examples of how this segmentation
occurred. The hiving off of three inzu heads and their
dependants who were formerly members of one umulyango is
cited: Rugaga, who had distinguished himself as a warrior,
was rewarded by the king with an appointment as hill chief
in some "other part of the country. Gahenda was given charge
of a herd of cattle by the king because of his successes as
a rain maker, Karuranga, owing to land shortage, migrated
to another part of the country and established himself there.
People refer to descendants of these three men as Abagaga,
Abahenda and Abaruganga, indicating membership of tie
separate amazu. However, the members of these amazu
continued to refer to themselves in addition as members of
their original umulyango.
Ifles descendants de ces personages continueront 
a se dire appartenir d leur uiaulyango11. Cp«l38)
Prom this it is evident that it is the social context which
determines whether members refer to themselves as either
belonging to the inzu or to the umulyango. It is for this
reason that I would like to draw critical attention to
Maquet!s remark that:
"There was some uncertainty in terminology: the same
group, say the Abahindiro, has been referred to by our 
informants sometimes as inzu and sometimes as umulyango,,
iMaquet I96I p.33)
6 8 *
(The lineages were invariably exogamous groups which, 
in contrast to the clans and sub-clans, include only either 
(Tutsi or Hutu or (Twa, On the> other hand certain differences 
of a general nature emerge in relation to the different areas 
and social groups* (The degree of internal organisation, the 
authority structure and the extent to which they have some of 
the characteristics of corporate groups is related to patterns 
of political authority which differs as between the Centre and 
the peripheral areas* (The variations in lineage depth, which
were also correlated with the degree to which the lineages 
had corporate group characteristics and the variations in the 
extent to which lineages tended to be localised or not, also 
differs as between the (Tutsi and Hutu groups*
I shall now first discuss the umulyango and inzu as 
found in the central area of Rwanda.
Umulyango
(The' umulyango varied in depth between three and seven 
generations. However tie (Tutsi imilyango tended to be of 
greater depth than among the Hutu, and this fact is correlated 
with differences in authority structure within the lineage.
(The lineage was a non-localised group but here again the (Tutsi 
lineages tended to be more dispersed than the Hutu lineages 
and this was related to the need for greater mobility among
Tutsi in connection with administration and political 
manoeuvering. On the other hand the dispersal of Hutu 
lineages was related to the availability of land since in 
the centre there had been a greater fragmentation of 
landholding \ref. p. 54-55). The Hutu imilyango had no 
head, while the Tutsi lineages in contrast had heads who were 
at the same time political chiefs* Internal organization 
and authority depended on the existence of a lineage head. 
Moreover the degree and extent of his authority within the 
lineage was related to his importance in the wider political 
structure * Oe.g* as a court for appeal cf. Maquet I96I p.146) 
There was no collective ownership of property by the unruly ango 
and we do not find any trace of an' ancestor cult at this level* 
Members of the lineage recognised a general obligation of 
mutual assistance but the nature of the assistance differed 
widely as' between Tutsi and Hutu. In the case of the Tutsi,
1
the larger size of the lineage and the existence of a head, 
who was at the same time a political chief, lent itself to 
the possibility of greater manipulation of lineage ties in 
political affairs* These could be operated both directly 
through the political chief and indirectly with other members, 
particularly in view of the importance to the political chief 
of rallying support. { ref. p.167) £n case of the
Hutu, mutual obligations of support' between lineage members 
was primarily in the context of agricultural activities such 
as harvesting and planting, and in house-building. In both 
Tutsi and' Hutu lineages, members recognised a mutual 
obligation of assistance in feuding, which was, however, 
subject to interference in the case of both groups by the 
superior political chief, especially in the case of the 
politically headed Tutsi lineages.
Inzu
For the same reason as applied to the umulyango, the 
Tutsi inzu was on the whole of greater depth than the Hutu 
inzu and' varied from three to seven generations. The amazu 
among Tutsi tended not to be local’ groups and this was again 
related to the greater need for mobility and the control of 
circumstances conducive to successful political activity, 
nmong the Hutu, the amazu tended to be localised. Segmentation 
and’ geographical hiving off occurred more frequently, thereby 
giving rise to a shallow depth umulyango composed of the 
separate inzu sections. This segmentation was primarily 
related to the availability of land and to political pressures. 
’In the case of both Tutsi and Hutu lineages there was a 
recognised inzu head. In both cases he was chosen by his 
predecessor, subject however to the approval of the political 
chief. Railing the chief’s approval, the inzu members would
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have to propose another candidate. If the inzu members 
themselves did not agree, appeal could be made to the 
umulyango head where he existed or to the political 
authorities* The inzu head was the representative of the 
group vis a vis the central authority ana was also responsible 
to the various chiefs for the collection of levies and the 
recruitment of army personnel* The inzu was the administrative 
unit in the context of the central administration as for 
instance in collective assessment for the inzu dues and 
services*
The inzu head had internal judicial authority over the 
members. Among Hutu he represented members in all cases of 
dispute with persons external to the inzu * Among the Tutsi 
however, he only represented members in cases of dispute 
with members belonging to a different umulyango* In cases 
of intxa-umulyango dispute between members of different amazu, 
authority rested with the umulyango head. Inzu heads, among 
both Tutsi and Hutu, controlled the arrangements for marriage 
alliances of members. There were no patterns of preferential 
marriages and patrilateral cross-cousin marriages were 
permissible. A l l  amazu had councils whose members were 
elected by the adult male members of the inzu and who assisted 
the head. Only those disputes which the inzu head could not
or did not want to settle himself were referred to the 
council. For certain decisions the council and the inzu 
head would invite all adult male members of the inzu to 
participate in the discussions. These facts suggest that 
there was no clear cut division between the powers of the 
head and of the council, since the council had' no recognised 
specific function save as a forum. However, the political 
chief, especialljr in the case of the Tutsi amazu,could exert 
great influence.
The inzu held regular collective rituals in connection 
with mourning, harvest celebrations and the ryangombe cult. 
These ceremonies were attended by all adult male members", 
who had to bring their share of contributions for the 
collective feast which was held at the family shrine of the 
inzu head, who performed the ceremonies. Whereas the Tutsi 
amazu had no collective property rights in land or livestock, 
the Hutu amazu had a collective estate in land, which was 
controlled and distributed by the inzu head. This was of 
particular importance in the context of finding and clearing 
new land and of its distribution among members. The inzu 
head also allocated a plot of land to each male member on
g
marriage. The types of collective action and support were 
the same as at the iimulyango level, but the obligations were
stronger and more frequently activated. The responsibility 
of organising the collective services’ required by the political 
chiefs and patrons lay with tbe inzu head.
In summary we may say that in Central Rwanda the role of 
the umulyango was more important among Tutsi than among Hutu. 
Por both Tutsi and Hutu the significance of the umulyango 
and the inzu was related to centralised political government 
in that the autonomy of the lineages was subject to the 
control of political chiefs. The umulyango was a corporate 
group only amongst Tutsi and only in the limited sense of 
having a head and some collective activities and obligations, 
but with no common property. She inzu however was a fully 
corporate group among Hutu. It was of equal importance 
among the Tutsi in its political role although it lacked 
the characteristic of collective property; In terms of 
social groups based on kinship, the inzu was the most 
important unit and had a* considerable degree of autonomy
V
vis a vis the umulyango. Moreover it was more important 
than the umulyango because of its role as a unit of 
administration in relation to central government, although 
it thereby lacked political autonomy.
I shall now compare and contrast the umulyango and inzu 
in the peripheral areas as distinct from CentralRwanda.
The umulyango
In the peripheral areas the umulyango was of much 
greater importance than in central Rwanda in the case of 
both Tutsi and' Hutu. Evidence for this is1 to be found in 
certain differences of organization and activities. The 
umulyango in the- North and North-West tended to be shallower 
even among Tutsi and was always a localised lineage group 
exercising collective ownership over land and cattle, the 
latter especially referring to Tutsi. It was a politically 
autonomous unit whose head,' nominated by his- predecessor, 
was not subject to the approval of the political chief.
Members of the umulyango council were elected by the heads 
of the constituent amazu. The umulyango head controlled 
the estate and allocated new land to the separate inzu heads. 
The umulyango head had supreme judicial authority in that he 
not only settled disputes between members of different amazu 
but also between disputing members belonging to the same inzu 
if an appeal was made to him. He was also the representative 
of all members of the umulyango in disputes or relationships 
with members of other- imilyango. Be had very strong 
influence in the arrangements for new marriage alliances.
In the peripheral areas the umulyango performed the same 
ritual activities as were found in central Rwanda at the
level of the inzu. Correlated with its greater degree of 
internal organisation, obligations of mutual assistance 
between umulyango members were more frequently activated 
than at the umulyango level in central Rwanda* 
fhe Inzu
fhe main differences in the organization and role of 
the' inzu in the peripheral areas as compared with the centre 
were related firstly to its integration into the wider 
kinship framework of the - umulvango, and secondly to the fact 
that it did not occupy any special position as an administra­
tive unit within the wider political framework.
fhe inzu head was normally nominated by his predecessor, 
but in case he had failed to do so, before his death, it was 
’k*16 'amulyango head assisted by his council who made the new 
appointment rather than the members of the inzu. Moreover 
his appointment was, in contrast with central Rwanda, not 
subject to the approval of the political chief. Once 
usufruct rights in land had been granted to the inzu by the 
umulyango head, it was the inzu head who controlled its 
redistribution among members. land vacated by any member 
of the inzu, or lacking an heir, reverted to the umtilyango 
head and could be redistributed to other amazu. Another 
aspect of the integration of the inzu into the wider kinship
structure has "been referred to in the context of the inzu 
head’s limited judicial powers* For instance, in case of 
dispute over property, members of the inzu could appeal to 
the umulyango head.
Collective activities of inzu members in ritual and 
mutual assistance were the same as in central Rwanda with 
the exception of additional emphasis on the obligation of 
support in feuding. From the early missionary reports 
there is strong evidence that feuding occurred on a very 
wide scale. Pages v^ -950 p.647) gives a list of thirty- 
seven families who, in the area of Bugoyi alone, had in the 
one year 1910 a member killed in feuding. In the peripheral 
areas patrilateral cross-cousin marriages were forbidden 
while 011 the other hand matrilateral cross-coxisin marriages 
were preferential.
. Summarising this outline of the kinship structure in 
the peripheral areas we can say that the much greater 
importance of the larger lineage group - the umulyango - 
is related to the security sought by large autonomous land 
holding groups in mutual competition over access to and 
exploitation of land outside the context of central political 
control. Ihe influence of the umulyango head in establishing 
marriage alliances should be seen in the same light. In
contrast, the relatively greater importance of the smaller 
lineage group - the inzu - in central Rwanda, is related to 
the pattern of vertical manipulation of the centralised 
political system in which security is. sought through political 
affiliation and economic clientage. Squally the importance 
of the inzu group was strengthened hy the fact that it was 
the largest kingroup recognised as a unit of administration 
by the political authorities.
In the context of these differences of a socio-economic 
nature as between central: Rwanda and the peripheral areas, 
the different patterns of preferential cross-cousin marriages 
in. the two areas receive added importance. leach 1,1951) has 
pointed put how preferential matrilateral cross-cousin 
marriages establish wife giving and wife taking relationships 
between a number of lineages even if these marriages do not 
materialise. Ihis divides the range of people with whom, 
through kinship, one is more likely to come into contact, 
into lineage mates and potential affines of two kinds 
those whom he may marry and those whom1 his sisters and 
daughters may marry. In the context of Rwanda* the emphasis 
on. preferential marriage of matrilateral cross-cousins and 
the exclusion of patrilateral cross-cousin marriages in the 
Rorth is related to the need for multiple marriage alliances
with potentially hostile or competing neighbouring lineages
of a different clan. In contrast, in central Rwanda, the
absence of preferential marriage on the one hand and the
permissibility of patrilateral cross-cousin marriages on
the other, indicate the importance of a wide ranging freedom
of choice in marriage alliances and the subordination of the
exploitation of kinship ties*to achievement within the
political context.
against the background of these differences in size,
organization and roles of the lineage groups as found in
different areas and social groups in Rwanda, it seems
pertinent to reconsider the tisefulness ofMaquet’s terminology
for the kin groups. He writes:
. 1 We would suggest calling the inzu a primary and 
the umulyango a secondary patrilineage in order 
to convey the idea that the umulyango originated 
from the inzu and that the inzu1 s. functions were 
more important for the individual and society at 
large than those of the umulyango,1* and that the 
- latter is 1 rather the surviving shadow of the 
first.1 (Maquet I96I p.34)
l’his description of ,fdescent groups in Rwanda1 ^Maquet I96I
p.34) can be seen to apply only to the central area since in
fact, hs has been shown, the umulyango was of considerable
importance outside central Rwanda, and was moreover not in
any sense a “surviving shadow11. Ihe evident lack of
regularised lineage segmentation and the absence of an
internal authority system at the level of the umulyango
in central Rwanda must have prompted Maquet to dissociate
himself from the kin terminology as used by Evans-Pritchard
(see Maquet 1961 p.34) and to refer to the inzu and umulyango
as primary and secondary patrilineages respectively.
However this introduces confusion into the interpretation
of what seems to be a not abnormal process of segmentation
which was, however, operating under widely differing political
and economic conditions in the different areas. An umulyango
is a1group of living persons who are able to trace their
relationship to a common ancestor, but who, as a result of
segmentation, are divided into constituent amazu i.e.
patrilineages of shallower depth. Examples of quite normal
patterns of segmentation occurring in Rwanda have already
been given (p.65). Moreover, as we have seen, outside
central Rwanda the umulyango had the characteristics of a
corporate group whereas in the centre many of these
characteristics were absent and were only present at the
inzu level. From this it seems evident that Maquet is not,
as he states, speaking about “descent groups in Rwanda1 but
is limiting his description to the special conditions
(1 )characteristic of central Rwanda; J
1,1) Maquet’sdata were based entirely on information received 
from three hundred futsi informants. Maquet 1961 p.3)
The rugo
The smallest social group based on kinship is the rugo 
or household which normally coincides with the nuclear or 
polygynous family and may include dependent members. There 
is no evidence of significant differences in organization 
and activities of the rugo as between the different areas 
nor as between Tutsi and Hutu, except in terms of the 
occupation of members', a point which will be developed later. 
Before his death the father indicated who was to be his 
successor and often this was not done on his deathbed. His 
successor did not need to be his eldest son. The one who 
succeeded had a larger share of the inheritance while other 
sons received equal shares. However, the father’s choice 
could be reversed by the lineage head, by the political chief 
or even by the patron. The successor took over responsibility 
for members of the rugo where necessary, especially in the case 
of any unmarried younger brothers and sisters. The widow of 
the deceased family head retained usufruct rights in the land 
which was left to her and which was, at her death, divided 
among the children of her husband. Because of the absence 
of fixed rules for succession, brothers competed for their 
father’s favour and there was often considerable rivalry 
and distrust between them. Wherever possible the father’s
choice was publicised in advance by the gift of a cow called 
inka y * indabukirano. This cow was a recognition or a 
public registration of the new relationship.
Marriage and affinal ties
In all areas the wives retained membership of their own 
lineage and became adopted members of the husband’s household. 
In cases of ritual obligation, as for instance after child­
birth, a wife had to. go to the shrine of her own lineage. 
Moreover she retained the right of protection in her own 
lineage. Patrilineal affiliation of the children was 
subject to the transfer of the bride-wealth.
Apart from these characteristics which were valid for 
both-Tutsi and Hutu in all parts of Rwanda, we find some 
differences related to these variables. The extent of the 
control over marriage alliances in this context have been 
dealt with when discussing differences be tween the umulyango 
and the inzu in the different areas and groups of people. 
Marriage was virilocal among Hutu but was more often than 
not neo-local among Tutsi. This is related to the fact that 
the role of the Hutu wife was primarily one of child bearer 
and as furnishing labour for agricultural production which 
necessitated residence on her husband’s land. Women could 
not own land but had the usufruct of their husband’s land 
subject to the duration of the marriage. On the other hand
the pattern of neo-local mairriages among Tutsi is concomitant 
with the mobility of the Tutsi husband, the lack of agricultural 
duties of the Tutsi wife and the usefulness of having links 
in different parts of the country which served as channels 
of influence and sources of information.
Ideally the bride-wealth was one cow, but among poor 
people, including Tutsi and Hutu, the bride-wealth often 
consisted of goats or hoes. Moreover in the North and 
North-West we find evidence that the bride-priee was sometimes 
in the form of groom-service in which the husband had to work 
a certain number of days for a certain period for his father- 
in-law. .among Tutsi and Ilutu alike the parents of the bride 
gave the parents of the bridegroom a return presentation 
equal in value to the bride-wealth. This was called 
indongoranyo. In case of divorce, both the bride-wealth 
and the indongoranyo were returned but if the indongoranyo 
had not as yet been paid, the bride-wealth did not need to 
be returned. In central Rwanda, important Tutsi families 
did not accept bride-wealth, neither did the King, while 
other important Tutsi paid their indongoranyo on the same day 
as the marriage took place. This must be seen against the 
background of their quest for freedom from indebtedness in 
relation to political manoeuvring. In the same light must
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be seen firstly, the occurrence of child marriages outside 
central Rwanda, and secondly, the existence of the 1evirate 
and ghost marriage in the peripheral areas. The latter 
were related to the role of the wife as a provider for the 
matri-segment and of the increase of the lineage. since 
the wife's security is only provided for through the 
institution of marriage, the marriage tie had to be continued 
with another member of the inzu. This was normally the 
deceased husband's brother or his son by a senior wife.
The absence of these institutions in central Rwanda indicate 
weaker control exercised by the lineage over the wives of 
their members, and the subordination of the role of lcinship 
and affinal relations to the political structure. This is 
concomitant with the greater importance of the wife in 
providing new political links rather than in producing food 
and children for the lineage. In the case of a widow, the 
freedom obtained through her husband's death again enabled
o
her to be used for the creation of new political links.
Blood Pacts
-a relationship, expressed in kinship terminology, 
resulted from the blood' pact which was very widespread in 
all groups in Rwanda. Two persons could enter into a blood 
pact so long as they did not belong to the same umulyango
or inzu. Blood pacts between members of the same clan were 
however allowed. • formally only men entered this pact, but 
cases are known (ref. Pauwels 1958) where husband and wife 
entered into a blood' pact in particular cases where one of 
the parties was related to a very powerful Tutsi chief, to 
prevent the divulging of secrets. Whereas tbs Tutsi were 
very secretive about their blood pacts, the Hutu were much 
more outspoken about them. This difference must be seen 
against the wider backgroxind of the particular aspects of 
power manipulation in central Rwanda where blood-brothers 
who were unknown to others could render great service by 
obtaining information or when acting as witnesses in court 
cases. The' number of blood-brothers one had was related 
to the importance of one's status in the social system and 
therefore the powerful Tutsi of the centre and the Hutu chiefs 
in the peripheral areas often had a large number of blood- 
brothers. Moreover Banyarwanda concluded blood pacts with 
other people* Pages (1930 p.137) &nd itaaoux (194-0 p. 100) 
describe how Banyarwanda who made regular caravan safaris 
to Bukoba in Tanganyika had concluded 'blood-brother pacts 
with people on their way to assure themselves safe passage 
through non friendly territories. Even King Rwabugire 
concluded a blood-brother pact with the Hutu king of Bwito.
The ritual was held in private before some witnesses. 
While the people who became blood-brothers drank some drops 
of one another's blood, the principle witness explained the 
obligations of mutual assistance and the supernatural 
punishment which would fall on the person who broke the 
blood pact. The nature of the ritual and the fact that 
Tutsi and Hutu and even Twa, although less frequently, 
became blood-brothers, is another example of the existence 
of specific cross-cutting ties between members of the three 
social groups. In this context the pact assumed not only 
the absence of any recognition of social inequality,' but 
also a high degree of intimacy between the individuals 
concerned.
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0 H; A P T E R I I  
THE POLITICAL COMPLEX 
PART I INTRODUCTION
Up to this point I have been concerned with providing 
a basic outline of the ecology and population of Rwanda as 
a framework for the analysis of social control and conflict.
It should be clear from the preceding chapters that pre-1900 
Rwandan society constituted a bounded political and social 
system within clearly defined territorial boundaries which 
nevertheless contained within it considerable internal 
variations. The nature of these variations have been 
brought out in the comparisons between the central and 
peripheral areas of Rwanda.
I now come to the major concern of the thesis, the 
analysis of social control and conflict situations in*Rwanda 
which form a necessary part of the explanation of the 
situation of overt conflict which arose in I96I. An 
adequate explanation requires both diachronic and synchronic 
analysis. we have to analyse the traditionalu Rwandan 
social system, the impact of new factors on the system and 
the conflict situation which arose at the moment of independence 
from colonial rule. It is necessary to make a synchronic 
analysis of the Rwanda social system prior to the impact of
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major changes occurring from the early igOO’s. Here we 
have to analyse the latent elements of a conflict situation 
and the flexibility and forces of cohesion in the social 
system which contains these tensions. In this context it 
is important for the subsequent analysis to consider the 
latent conflict situation arising from the opposing centrifugal 
tendencies of the peripheral areas and the centripetal 
tendencies of central Rwanda. Developmental analysis is 
necessary to show how the forces of social cohesion were 
rendered inoperative over the time period from I9OO to I96I.
A final synchronic analysis is necessary of the changed 
social system at the time of the eruption of conflict in I96I.
(This process of analysis which is necessary for an 
adequate interpretation of the problem of social control and 
conflict in Rwanda, relates to the wider controversy over 
the relationship of social anthropology and history.
M.Gr. Smith has summarised the position in his discussion of 
the opposite views of Radcliffe-Brown!s radical rejection of 
history, whether conjectural or established, and Evans- 
Pritchardfs contention that “history alone provides a 
satisfactory situation in which the hypotheses of functional 
anthropologjr can be tested.’1 (M.Gr.. Smith I962 p.73)
The problems of analysis of the Rwandan material fit in 
general Smith’s concept that:
“the appropriate field of study is a unit over 
time, not merely a unit at a particular point
in time." (Smith 1962 p.81)
He advocates that, as for otir case in hand, the field of
study is a spatio-temporal unit or continuum, we may usefully
begin with the hypothesis that this unit is, or forms part of,
a system, many elements of which are somehow inter elated.
Moreover his hypothesis that the continuum under study
represents a system neither includes nor excludes the
possibility that it is part of a larger system or contains
other systems, Since the system is a temporal unit it
includes continuity and change alike and therefore requires
combined synchronic and diachronic analysis.
In the ease of Rwanda, prior to I9OO we are dealing with
a largely self-contained system, which was subject to external
influence only through its aggressive or defensive relations
with other neighbouring societies. Prior to I9OO, Rwandan
society was a closed system in that there were institutionalised
prohibitions on external contacts. This situation was given
value and supported in myth. As a result of the introduction
of colonial rule, Rwandan society became incorporated as a
dependent sub-system in a different framework. This process
of incorporation changed the'nature of the former relationships
of the Rwandan system with outside forces. By becoming a
sub-system, Rwandan society was no, longer closed and 
self-contained.
In terms of developmental analysis, the fact of 
incorporation into a wider unit of colonial administration, 
introduced new factors which impinged on and changed the 
pre-existing balance of relationships determining the 
flexibility and forces of cohesion relating to social control 
and conflict. A diachronic analysis of these changes both 
as they affected the total system and as they affected the 
inter-relationships between its various parts are imperative 
for the explanation of the conflict situation in I96I.
Moreover the Rwandan material demonstrates that a closer 
and more specific account of historical data may have to be 
taken than that which seems to be implied in Smith's 
conceptual framework. Smith writes that:
' “Synchronic regularities isolate units and relations 
within static systems. Diachronic regularities 
reveal the outlines of an order within processes 
of simultaneous continuity and change. The 
objectives of diachronic analysis are to identify 
this order, to determine its constancy, and to 
dincover the logic which regulates it. The 
structure of a diachronic process1 consists of 
these elements and their inter-relations.M
(Smith 1962 p.82)
It is my contention that social anthropological analysis 
may sometimes profit by going one step further in the use 
of historical data. In tin case of Rwanda we can see that
a system is not only “a set of relations among events", 
(Radcliffe-Brown 1952 p.5-6) and thereby neither completely 
continuous nor completely changing. Further than this it 
should be realised that a. synchronic analysis of a system 
at a particular point in time may be influenced by the fact 
that not only is it subject to ’* diachronic regularities*’, 
but also the form of the system itself may be influenced by 
particular historical events. This is of particular 
importance if, as in the case of Rwanda, the particular and 
possibly temporary form of the system at the introduction of 
colonial rule then becomes frozen and perpetuated in the 
process of being absorbed as a sub-system within a wider 
framework.
The form of the: Rwandan social system which was found 
by the first German occupiers and which was subsequently 
adopted as the “traditional** Rwandan system by the Belgian 
administration and missionaries in the process of indirect 
rule, had been strongly influence by certain specific and 
verifiable historical eventu. The most important of these 
concerned the military campaigns of King Rwabugiri, a recent 
rinderpest epidemic and a serious famine. as will be evident 
from a more detailed examination of these events, the form of 
the Rwandan system taken over under colonial rule was one in 
which the position of the king had reached a zenith point.
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territorially this was a result of his successful military 
campaigns, while within central Rwanda he had successfully 
eliminated powerful Tutsi lineages. His position was 
further favoured by the fortuitous occurrence of famine and 
rinderpest which created a situation of greater need and 
competition for the hing!s favour. I shall now deal with 
these events in more detail and point out their implications 
for the current pattern of the Rwandan system in-the early 
1900's.
King Rwabugiri, who reigned from 1853 to I89O, was the
last king who tried to extend his influence through a series
of military excursions. He failed to effectively incorporate
regions which are now in the Congo, but through military
campaigns managed to enforce his control over large areas
of Horth, Eorth-Rast and South-west Rwanda. His campaigns
against Urundi, the last of which was conducted in 1873, were
a complete failure* Many Tutsi from those areas of Rwanda
where he had managed to exert greater control went to Kivu
Province of the Congo. (Vansina 1962 p*9^) However other
areas remained completely outside any form of administration
from central Rwanda.
"Jusqu!au dfebut de notre siScle touts lea territoires 
de Eisenyi, Ruhengeri, Biumba et Shangugu resterent 
en pratique en dehors de lfadministration central,"
(Maquet and d'Hertefelt 1959 P*B)
Moreover Kibungu, which had formerly submitted, revolted 
in I9OO.
To enforce his position, Rwabugiri rearranged the 
districts, increased the number to twenty one and established 
a whole series of' head-quarters all over the country.
(ref. Vansina 1962 p. 42) he broke up the power of 
important Tutsi lineages as much as possible and reduced the 
autonomy of1 local chiefs. His successor, Rutalindwa, lived 
only for one year when he and his family committed suicide 
to avoid falling into the hands of a rival to the throne. 
Rutalindwa was succeeded by Musinga who reigned until I93I.
The great rinderpest epidemic of 1890 to 1891 decimated 
large numbers of cattle. Several wars into neighbouring 
countries were organised "pour combler les vides'".
(Bourgeois 1957 p.163) These raids were called "mulyamo" 
or rinderpest razzia. On the one hand these wars contributed 
to the forces of social' cohesion on account of the common aim 
which inspired them. On the other hand they demonstrate how
1 ;
those relationships which were based on thepossession of 
cattle were upset, since the shortage of cattle created a 
situation of fiercer competition for the restoration of what 
had been lost. This gave the king greater power in 
manipulating relationships. This particular circumstance
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shows how external factors may have great influence on the
internal operation of the system.
Another factor of great importance was the great famine
of I9OO. The early missionary reports testify to the enormously
disrupting effect of this "act of God11. The famine was called
Ruyagu - "the great famine", The missionaries reported on
their arrival in 1901*
"There is hardly a family which hab not lost at 
least one victim. Many have left and a large 
number of hills and houses have been abandoned."
The great famine was long remembered by the people who, as
soon as another famine threatened, expressed the hope that
it would not be as severe as’ the Ruyagu, From the missionary
reports' of I9I7 to I9I8, we can gather the extent of the
casualties which were lilcely to have ensued from a serious
famine.
"Au 30 Juin I9I8 le Vicariat comptait dans ses 
livres 27,536' Chr&tiens vivants. Tandis 1-an 
dernier nous accusions un chiffre de 27>594«
< Hous sommes en diminution de 58!"
In that year two thousand six hundred and forty six people
were baptised as Christians, about as many as during the
previous year (two thousand three hundred and sixty one).
Out of a population of twenty seven thousand five hundred
and ninety four Christians, two thousand seven hundred and
four had died, or ten per cent. These figures give an
impression' of the: ravages of a famine in one year at a time 
when colonial rule had already been established, roads had 
been improved and large scale relief work (with more than 
fifty lorries!) was put into operation. We can thus well 
imagine the disrupting effect which the great famine had had 
on the system of social relationships at the moment when the 
colonial power had its initial impression of "the traditional 
system".
Although my diachronic analysis is taken only from I9OO, 
there is sufficient documentary evidence, discussed on page 126
that the Rwandan political system followed a cyclical process \ 
of aggressive expansion and peaceful consolidation. Military 
campaigns in warfare and raiding and also outbreaks of famine 
and disease were recurring phenomena in Rwanda* Although 
these events were regular occurrences, they brought about 
peculiar situations in the balance of relations’ between 
central Rwanda and the peripheral areas and also as regards 
internal social cohesion which is related to the power structure 
within the social system of Rwanda. In the traditional 
i.e. pre-colonial period, such temporary imbalances were 
subject to redress in the cyclical process. The point that 
I wish to' make here is that when Rwanda became incorporated 
as a sub-system within the colonial framework, the peculiar
pattern of events found in 1900 was no longer subject to
redress through, the operation of "traditional" processes,
hut was frozen and perpetuated through the support of
exterior forces*
It is clear that the German and Belgian colonising
powers and also the1 missionaries accepted this particular,
albeit possibly temporary form of the^  Rwandan system as
"traditional" and that which should be incorporated by them
in the system of indirect rule. Von Gotzen, the first
military governor wrote in I9O2:
"Our policy should aim at supporting the rulers*
■ authority" (Ryckman 1953)
His successor, Dr. Kant, repeated this position:
"Our political and colonial interest require 
that we should support the' king and maintain 
the Tutsi domination."
In 1916 Belgian troups entered Rwanda and administered it as
an occupied territory. In I9I9 Belgium was given Urundi and
Rwanda as a mandate territory. This was confirmed by a
decision of the "society des Rations" in 1923 and accepted
by the Belgian Government on thirty first of August I924.
When they took over from the Germans the same policy as
expressed in the letters of Von Gotzen and Dr. Kant was ■
followed, as is clear from the following:
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Ordonnance legislative 6.7*1917 
!,Les sultans (i.e. les rois) exercent leurs 
attributions politiques et judiciaires dans 
le mesure et de la maniere fixfee par la coutume 
indigene."
fhis intention to maintain and continue the traditional
system as it had existed at the particular period of igOO
is evidenced in further official documents up to as late as
1.939* ■ The following quotations illustrate this:
Rapport sur 1! administration beige au Rwanda - Burundi 1921 
"l^utoritS beige sf inspire de la ligne de conduite 
suivie anterieusement par l'autoritfe allemande: 
assurer la paix et I’ordre public en maintenant 
I'fequilibre qui existait entre les groupements 
indigenes”.
Rapport ibidem). 1939 P*77*
1,Qu’il doit s'efforcer de maintenir et de consolider 
le cadre traditional de la classe dirigeante de 
Batutsi,d cause des grandes qualities de celle-ci, 
de son indfeniable superiority intellectuelle et de 
son potential de commandement. ”
This same attitude we find expressed in the missionary reports.
in I9I9 9 Mgr. Olasse, the Roman-Catholic bishop of Rwanda
remarks:
"Nous n*aurons pas de meilleurs chefs, plus intelligents, 
plus capable de comprendre le progres et memeplus 
acceptls du peuple que les Batutsi."
While in I924 he wrote to the Governor of Rwanda:
”If we wish to further the well-being of the country 
we must maintain the privilege of birth. l*he 
aristocracy of birth is a'necessity at the moment. n
(Lumen Yitae 1966 p.13)
The developmental analysis of the social system will have
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to take into account this historical evidence as to the 
attitude of the colonial powers.
This brings us back to the more specific implications 
of the fact that, under the influence of the colonising 
power, Rwanda became incorporated into a different and wider 
framework. This had a twofold effect. First of all the 
boundaries and external relationships of. Rwanda remained 
fixed at the point which had been reached in I9GO, having 
forces exterior to the system at its disposal, to ensure its 
stability. The importance of this will be more evident from 
the following survey.
* In 1898 the peoples of the North and-North-East revolted 
against the King, and the1 German troops very forcefully 
supported the king’s troops in bringing them back under his 
authority. In the missionary report of I9Q5 we reads
: ’’Les cris de mort' contre les Europ&ens retentissent 
partout,f
or in 1908s
» “Pendant 1 1 ann6e trois fois les mausers allemands 
sont venus prScher d nos voisins les avantages de 
la paix. EspIrons que ces lecons de choses ont
6tfe comprises.1
In 1901, Gisaka, which had been annexed after a bloody campaign 
in 185G, revolted, the* German troops intervened and the Tutsi 
leader of the revolt, Rukura, was imprisoned in Usumbura, 
where he died. The years 1911 and 1912 saw a long and
fierce rebellion in the-North where both Tutsi, Hutu and
Twa managed to hold out against several European conducted
military campaigns* It is significant to note that the
rebellion was’led by a Tutsi challenger to the king, Ndungutse,
who had the support of Hutu and Twa. The Hutu were led by the
local Tutsi chief Rukara, while the Twa were commanded by their
own leader Basebeya. Ultimately Rukara and Basebeya were
caught and executed1 by the Germans, while Ndungutse fled to
Uganda where he was interned at Jinja and died there in 1918.
In the South-west the districts of-Busozo and Bukunzi managed
tc escape incorporation into the administrative structure
operating from central Rwanda until 1926, when the-Belgian
authorities for the first time forcibly instated a Tutsi
administrator. In I9I3 a military campaign aiming to
establish a Tutsi chief in Bashiru in the- North-East had to
be abandoned. In the same year, the Governor, Kr. Kant, wrote
to Mgr. Hirth, bishop of Rwandas
“Les missions facilitent la taphe du Governement. 
L'influence de vos missionaires nous d epargne la 
necessity d’y entreprendre des expeditions militaires.
Le district du Bashxrp. est reste insoureis jusqu’d 
ce jour. Je prie la Mission Catholique d’y fetablir 
un poste.“
From the above two points are clear. Firstly that as 
far as effective territorial control of the administrative 
system of central Rwanda is conceivied, very large areas of
Rwanda were not only recently subjected through military
campaigns, hut also the situation was stabilised only as a
result of the assistance of the colonial military force.
Secondly, these revolts were not clashes between Hutu and
Tutsi. On the contrary they were conflicts arising from
the combined Hutu/Tutsi resistance of the peripheral areas
against the efforts of central Rwanda to incorporate them
into a unified administrative structure.
J&though it is true that the^  North was largely Hutu,
contrary to the pattern of central-Rwanda, where Hutu and
Tutsi were residentially interspersed, in the North, North-
East and South-west, concentrations of Tutsi were found in
the less fertile places (Vansina-1962 p.83) and formed
isolated pockets among the Hutu population. ^Vansina I962
p.75) These Tutsi took partin or even led these rebellions.
These examples could be multiplied but are enough to illustrate
the importance of the particular historical circumstances.
This has special reference to the peripheral areas where;
“la normalisation administrative ne f&t atteinte 
que sous I'fepoque colonial© europfeenne vers 1925- 
I93O. I*assimilation psyehologique n feut1jamais
lieu.“ ^Vansina 1962 p.81)
The administrative incorporation of peripheral areas was thus
a direct result of Rwanda having become a sub-system in the
wider framework of* German and Belgian colonial policy.
The second effect to he considered as a direct result
of becoming a sub-system is related to the field of
cosmological thought which was given value in myth and
expressed and upheld in several institutions* Since Rwanda
came increasingly under the influence of western and
Christian influence, these cosmological concepts and their
associated institutions were undermined. Banyarwanda saw
their soci ety as the centre of the universe and
Hle principe essentiel de la soci&tS Rwandaise 
6tait unifier tous les pays sous le roi unique 
de la dynastie de Banyiginya, on ne peut jamais 
avoir la paix definitive avec les pays voisins.*'
Kagame 1952 p. 54)
However this situation was brought to an end firstly by the
demarcation of borders and secondly by the incorporation of
Rwanda into one administrative unit together with TJrundi, its
enemy with which Rwanda had been perpetually at war. By
coming under the authority of the colonial administration,
and thereby no longer having the possibility of taking part
in aggressive ahd defensive politics, the system lost one of
its elements making for internal social cohesion.
There is moreover the further point that before European
intervention Rwanda had so successfully cut itself off from
external influences that there was practically no contact
with people outside Rwanda. Since it was not only forbidden
under pain of capital punishment \I<3,game 1952 p.56) to leave 
Rwanda without the special permission of the king, nor were
foreign traders allowed Id enter Rwanda, Banyarwanda were 
deprived of the possibility of making comparisons with other 
social systems# By becoming a sub-system, these boundaries 
and limitations were lifted and the social system as such 
became exposed to the possibilities of external influences 
from which it had hitherto been isolated.
It is unnecessary to raise the question as to whether 
the peculiar combination of events described above can or 
cannot be seen as diachronic regularities of the system of 
political and social relationships in Rwanda. This is 
immaterial to the two points which I wish to stress. The 
first of these is that the peculiar form of the Rwandan system 
found in 1900 can only be fully explained as the result of 
certain specific historical events. Secondly, the possibilities 
of redress which were an inherent characteristic in the 
developmental cycle of the traditional system were removed 
when Rwanda became a sub-system in a wider framework. In 
this wider system the controlling authority eliminated these 
characteristics and stabilised the* peculiar form of the 
system in 1900 as it had been influenced by particular 
historical events.
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TERRI TGRIAi BIVISI OHS
PART 2
Having dealt with the historical setting and its 
importance regarding the framework of analysis, I now intend 
to make a synchronic analysis of the political and 
administrative structure of Rwanda in the precolonial period. 
In this analysis I want to draw special attention to those 
processes throiagh which forces of social cohesion operated 
and latent tensions within the system were contained. The 
administrative structure includes those institutions through 
which public affairs were conducted and decisions were carried 
out. In Rwanda these functions were performed by the king, 
his central government and the two substructures which have 
been called the administration and the army.
Within the political system we can distinguish this 
administrative structure- from political processes. These 
refer to the contest both for obtaining power in the wider 
political system and for maintaining and manipulating power 
within the administrative structure. This distinction is- 
of importance in relation to the fact that in Rwanda the 
fields of administration and politics were not identical 
since the clientage' system was not part of the administration
but formed, as we will see in Chapter III, a framework for 
political activity and as such was related to the system of 
political control. However as this is only one aspect of 
the clientage system, it will be dealt with in a special 
chapter. By excluding the clientage system, I have limited 
the scope of this chapter on the political system to the 
central government, the administration and the army.
In Rwanda the supreme political authority was vested in 
an absolute monarch called Mwami. Both the extent and 
configuration of the country and the size of its population 
demanded that in the actual exercise of his power he needed to 
delegate authority. The difficulty of rapid communication 
in "le pays des milles collines" imposed obstacles for 
centralised government and demanded effective control over 
those to whom power was delegated. The historical extension 
of centralised authority made this all the more necessary.
This resulted in an extensive and hierarchically ordered 
system of administrative officers. Moreover this elaborate 
administrative machinery required considerable taxation for 
its upkeep and resulted in a system of rewards for the 
faithful execution of the delegated power. This in turn 
created positions of economic privilege which were of special 
importance in a country which was densely populated and had
only a small margin of agricultural surplus*
These positions of power with their incumbent economic 
benefits were the object of political competition not only 
within the political system, which included the administrative 
and army structure, but also through the clientage structure.
Only the former two will be dealt with in this chapter. The
juridical apparatus w$s not independent from the administration 
but was incorporated into both the administrative and army 
structures.
Before starting my analysis in more detail one point 
must be made. The system of political control through the 
administrative and army structures did not operate throughout 
Rwanda either in the same way or to the same degree. This is 
in the first place related to the extent to which central 
government was able to effectively back up its delegated 
power and secondly to the fact that the Mwami had reserved 
certain territorial units under his own direct control.
Although these were not subject to full control by the
delegated power structure, they were all the same part of 
the territorial system created by the Mwami. The first 
qualification relates to the peripheral territories whereas 
the second relates to central Rwanda. It is to this latter 
part that I now turn in more detail.
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Central Rwanda was for administrative purposes divided 
into Provinces, Districts, Hills and neighbourhoods. These 
divisions qnd subdivisions form the basis of the description 
of the administrative structure by Maquet ~\1961) • However 
it must be pointed out that the actual boundaries of these 
territorial divisions changed frequently according to decisions 
of the Mwami. Moreover, within this territorial system, 
we must distinguish between those territories, i.e. hills 
or districts which were directly administered by the Mwami 
and those which came under the control of the administrative 
structure. Among those directly administered by the Mwami 
we can distinguish:
a^) Small freeholds, called Ibikingi Bwi Mwami which 
comprised fifteen to twentjr rugo s, the owners of which were 
all clients of the king. Hundreds of these freeholds were 
to be found all over Central Rwanda and constituted pockets 
of direct control, foci of rewards and centres of information.
The hills on which royal and princely cemeteries were 
found also fell directly under the Mwami* s control. Since 
the inhabitants were exempt from all taxation even to the 
Mwami himself, they provided an opportunity for preferential 
treatment to his favourites.
(c) The royal residences were also spread over the country.
These were MhillsM of different sizes and were administered 
by one of the kingfs wives, concubines or siblings. These 
hills were not only not subject to the normal system of 
administration but also served as centres of observation 
and reporting and as tax collection centres.
(d) Certain hills belonging to the queen mother or the Biru, j 
were exempt both from the control of the administrative 
structure and of the Mwami.
Prom the point of view of territorial division we can 
summarize the situation in Central Rwanda as follows. The 
country was divided into eight provinces (lacger 1939? P-486) 
each of which was headed by either a high chief or in the 
provinces bordering on Urundi by an army chief. These 
provinces were subdivided into districts. Sources differ 
as to the total number of districts, giving forty (Maquet 
I96I, p.102), fifty five (lacger 1939, p.86) and eighty 
(d’Hertefelt 1962, p.62). • At the head of each district
were two chiefs, the cattle chief and the land chief, who were1,
like the army chief and high chief, appointed directly by the 
'Mwami. Each district was divided into a number of hills, 
(average fifteen to twenty cf. lacger 1939 p.486) each with 
its hill chief who was appointed by the army chief. The 
hill was subdivided by the hill chief into several neighbour­
hoods, at the head of which was placed one of the rugo heads
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appointed by the hill chief.
However, within this changing pattern of divisions 
and subdivisions were interspersed the hills and neighbourhoods 
directly dependent on the Mwami, the queen mother or the 
Biru.
Every office holder had his own ^hill1 to administer 
apart from possible wider responsibilities. Ihus the cattle 
and land district chiefs each had their own hill. Assuming 
a hypothetical example in which there are twenty hills in 
one district, the distribxition of hills under the various 
administering authorities might be as follows:
1 6 9 9
2 7 9 9
3 8 9 ’ 9
4 9 9 9
5 9 9 9
1. Hill of the District land chief appointed by Mwami.
2. Hill of the District cattle chief appointed by Mwami.
3. Hill of the Chief of the Province managed by his
representative•
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4* Hill of the army chief managed by his representative.
5. Hill of the royal residence: chief appointed by Mwami.
6. Hill of the queen mother: chief appointed- by queen mother.
7. -Hill of the royal cemetery: chief appointed by Mwami.
8. Hill of the Biru: chief appointed by Biru.
9. Hill chiefs, representatives of the district chiefs, 
appointed by army chief.
N.B. (a) The Biru, the army chiefs and high chiefs lived 
at the court and therefore needed local representatives.
\b) 3*- 8 all these subdivisions would not have been
found in the same district.
Outside central Rwanda, where the above mentioned 
divisions were organised by central government, the same type 
of division was not possible, as central government did not 
have the effective power to implement it. However, neither 
were these regions totally independent. They recognised in 
one way or another the authority of the-King of Rwanda and in 
a sense could be considered as protectorates. Here again 
we can make some distinctions within the field of non fully 
integrated areas which is not without importance in relation 
to the extent to which Rwanda can be considered as a plural 
society.
Firstly, within Rwanda as a whole there existed not only 
the Kingdom of’ Central Rwanda but also the kingdom of Gisaka
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^Kibungu Province). Gisaka had been a completely autonomous 
Tutsi kingdom with its own administrative structure and up 
till 1853 had managed to avoid paying tribute to the King 
of Central Rwanda. In that year it had been conquered and 
the royal drum captured. The Gisaka royal family had been 
almost exterminated and a brother of the king of central 
Rwanda had been appointed high chief of Gisaka. The 
rebellion of igQO against the usurper was put down by German 
troops and central government appointed and maintained its 
own officers.
Secondly, there were regions such as Biumba which hs.d 
for some time been militarily subject to Central Rwanda and 
which were forced to pay tribute but which had managed to 
different extents to escape full integration into the 
administrative structure. (Yansina I962 p.60)
Thirdly, there were more or less autonomous regions in 
the Horth and Rorth-last under Bahutu lineage heads, called 
Bahinaa, most of whom paid tribute to the king of Central 
Rwanda but who. had successfully, resisted incorporation into 
the administrative systems of Central Rwanda (Yansina p.9b).
• Fourthly there were the Hutu kingdoms in Shangugu, whose
/
ritual kings paid regular tribute, but which were not part 
of the pattern of divisions and subdivisions headed by officers
appointed by Central- Government. Their kings were also 
called Bami.
It is within this territorial framework of Central Rwanda 
and the peripheral areas with its pattern of different areas 
subject to and exempt from delegated power that we must further 
consider the institutions of political control in Rwanda.
The pivot and centre of all power in Rwanda was the Mwami, 
whose allegedly divine origin was the justification for his 
power and at the same time the basis of his absolute sovereignly 
over all the land, cattle and people of Rwanda.
The position of the Bahinza however needs to be further 
examined. In a sense they were more than Hutu lineage heads, 
since their authority extended over a wider area than their 
own lineage and included a number of other lineages. Backing 
further evidence, we could accept de I»aoger*s suggestion 
that these chiefdoms were the result either of a confederation 
of lineages or an institutionalised instrument of arbitration 
between the often feuding lineages (de Lacger 1939 p.75-76). 
like the Mwami of Central Rwanda, the power of a Bahinza was 
absolute and the heads of different lineages in his territory 
paid annual taxation to him. He had likewise several 
residences spread over his territory each of which was managed 
by one of his wives. His council consisted of the heads of 
the different lineages in his territory. He did not however
delegate his power to other lineage heads, who were only 
intermediaries between him and his subjects. ^Vansina 1962 
P*. 78).
■ Fext to these autonomous chiefdoms comprising several 
lineages we find in Bugoye, Kibale and Bubereka completely 
autonomous lineages ruled by their respective lineage heads, 
who were also called abahinza \Kagame 1959 P*27)* Iheir 
territory was often very small, comprising only a few hills. 
Phey did not possess a political structure other than the 
internal lineage structure. Pauwels ^1967 p.210) gives 
them the name of sbakonde to distinguish them from the abahinza, 
which avoids confusion. Most of the abahinga and abakonde 
paid tribute to the Mwami in token of their acceptance of 
his sovereignty and in exchange for his protection not only 
against attacks from outside Rwanda but also in case of 
interbahinza or bakonde conflicts. Pages ^1923 p.6g0) gives 
the names of twenty one autonomous' abakonde chiefs who 
traditionally paid annual tribute to the Mwami of Central 
Rwanda. Moreover he describes an e$esrvitness account of 
Rwabugire’s visit to Bushiru and Bahinza in 1894 during which 
he obtained cattle from the Bahinza and Abakonde to replenish 
his decimated herds. The political power of the Mwami over 
these areas was very fluid.
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Myth of Origin
(a) The- Mwami
The first King of Rwanda, Fkula, lived in 
heaven with his wife Fyagasani, their two sons 
KLgwa and Tutsi and their daughter Hyampundu.
One day the three siblings fell from heaven and 
settled on a hill in Rwanda. There Kigwa 
married his sister and their descendants are the 
Fyiginya clan, which have since constituted the 
royal line. Mututsi' married one of his nieces 
and their "descendants are the members of the Bega 
clan, who by tradition most often provided the 
Queen Mother.
After an invocation by Kigwa and Mututsi,
Cod sent them a cow and a bull together with sheep, 
goats, hens and all the seeds needed for agricultural 
produce.
Moreover Cod taught them how to make fire and 
forge iron objects.
This myth not only upheld the sovereignty of the kingship 
in Rwanda and gave it the support of divine approbation but 
also implied the king's intimate connection with the country 
and the people as a symbol not only of the country's security 
in relation to the outside world but also of the well-being 
and fertility of its inhabitants, cattle and agrarian 
produce.
This relationship was brought out in the word Mwami
which in derived from the verb Kwama, being fertile. He 
was Rwanda personified and this mystical identification was 
further expressed in a large number of avoidances and rituals. 
According to myth the first 'known* king of the Hyiginya 
dynasty was Gihanga* His sons became the founders of the 
different royal lineages existing in Rwanda. Kanyadorwa, 
Kanyagisaka and Gafomo inherited Hdorwa, Gisaka and Bushubi 
respectively (Pages 1933 p.204). Kanyarwanda was the father 
of Gatutsi,- Gahuti and Gatwa (d'Hertefelt I96O p.126). The 
king therefore was neither Tutsi, Hutu nor Twa, he was Umwami 
(Kagame 1954 p.50). However he belonged to the Hyiginya 
clan and was the issue of a Hyiginya father and normally a 
Mwega mother, but at the moment of accession to the royal 
drum he changed his Tutsi name for a new name according to 
the following four fold cycle in which the first king of each 
cycle was alternatively Cyirima and Mutara. (d'Hertefelt and 
Coupes I964 p.51). Thus the sequence wass 1. Cyirima or 
Mutara * 2. Kigeri; 3 * Mibambwe j 4• Yuhi.
The first and last Mwami of each cycle of four Kings 
were 'peaceful* kings and were moreover obliged by tradition 
to execute special rituals relating to the well-being of the 
kingship and the country.
The incorporation of the burial rituals into the 
accession ceremony underlines the relationship between
the sacredness of the kingship and the continuation of the 
royal lineage. This is also emphasized in certain texts 
taken from the ceremony {.d’Hertefelt I964 p.225 and 261;262). 
fhe heir to the royal drum was chosen by the king, generally 
one of his younger sons was selected. I'he name of the-heir 
apparent was however kept secret even from the one who was 
chosen. It was revealed only after the king’s death by the 
three ’Keepers of the Secret1, two of whom were abiru and one 
army chief {.d’Hertefelt, Ooupez I964 P*5) to whom the Mwami 
had confided his decision.
However the sons who were not chosen together with their 
mothers, did not always acquiesce in the decision of the 
Mwami and sometimes challenged the appointed successor to 
the drum. Ihis happened in 1895 izi the case of Rutalindwa 
(ref. p.91). Although we cannot say that wars of succession 
were virtually institutionalised, as in Ankole, nevertheless 
from the accounts of the court historians we gather that 
they occurred frequently. Yansina, (1962 p.2) in his study 
of the history of. Rwanda, concludes that a war of succession 
occurred about every other reign. In practice this would
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have eliminated the likelihood of a revolt against the 
person of the Mwami during his reign and hence these violent 
competitions over the possession of the royal drum, the 
, had a stabilising influence. -at the same time
they constituted a testing ground for the loyalty of the 
Icing’s followers.
Although in theory the Mwami was an absolute monarch, 
whose supreme powers were divinely sanctioned, in actual 
practice his powers were limited, not only by customary 
limitations but also because he had to delegate his powers. 
This he did through office holders of the administrative 
and army structures, within the framework of the territorial 
divisions we have mentioned. The royal enclaves and 
especially the royal residences which were both dispersed 
throughout the country, constituted centres of control over 
the office holders of both structures. At the time of 
Rwabugire there were twenty one of these royal residences 
with a further three belonging to the (Jueen mother {.Kagame 
1952 p.124)* Apart from his personal clients, the abanyi-
bikingi, or holders of ibikingi land, the Mwami had at his 
personal disposal an extensive array of court personnel, 
court historians, judges, spys, bodyguards, dancers, 
executioners and palape retainers.
The most important members of the court were however the 
abiru. These were a group of men belonging to certain 'Tutsi 
lineages who were charged with preserving the continuity of 
the tradition in its entirety. In contrast with all other
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offices, their status was ascribed*
a-biru, together with the high and army chiefs, who 
nearly all lived at the court, formed a kind of council, 
called Inama, which the king could consult at his own 
discretion* One of the members of the council was appointed 
by the Mwami as ’favourite counsellor* who fulfilled a 
function comparable to that of the E^tikii^o or prime minister 
to the Kabaka of Uganda.
In the magic0-religious field the king kept at the court 
the keepers of the sacred drums and the ancestor shrines, 
the healers and the official diviners. D-*Hertefelt {I962 
p.87) gives an enumeration of the- 1Spfecialistes de 1*invisible*. 
fhe great variety and number of these specialists have been 
the subject of detailed description by lacger (,1939 p.234-252 
and 3O4-52I); Overschelde (,1947 P*321-369) and Bourgeois 
(,1956 p *104-567) •
fhe Mwami exercised his political and administrative 
power through delegation, using these channels at the same 
time to obtain from his people the taxes needed for the 
upkeep of his very extensive court* Ihis meant that the 
king had at his disposal a large1 number of sought-after 
positions for distribution, especially as all these with 
the exception of the abiru, were non hereditary. In this
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way the system made it possible for the king to publicly 
demonstrate his absolutism. It also constituted a framework 
for political manoeuvring to obtain the favour of the king.
In this way his supreme power was not only not dimished 
through delegation but further, since the whole system of 
delegated power and the multiplicity of offices found its 
apex in the king, it formed an instrument enhancing the 
actual exercise of his powers.
Without any obligation of further consultation, the 
Mwami decided on policies of war or peace and he appointed 
the army, provincial and district chiefs. He made new laws, 
which were publicly announced throughout the country (Bourgeois 
1957 p.66), fixed the boundaries of provinces and districts, 
established new army units and appointed the court magicians. 
]?urtkermore he was not only the supreme • commander of the 
armed forces, head of the civil administration and law maker, 
but he was also the chief justice. He constituted the final 
court of appeal. In this he was assisted by a series of 
judges, both futsi and Hutu who were appointed by the king. 
Moreover he could overrule any court decision and condemn 
anyone without trial to capital punishment or on the other 
hand commute a verdict of capital, punishment by the courts 
into material compensation. In the latter case the
compensation was kept by the Mwami except in the case of
murder. Pages (,1939 P.I9O-I92) gives a list of thirty four
important Tutsi who were condemned to death by Mwami Rwabugire.
The fact of having obtained important status in no way
constituted a protection against royal suspicion or vengeance.
This point is brought out in the early missionary reports
e.g. Save I9O7:
”11 n Ty a pas de grande famille qui n'ait plusieurs 
de ses membres tues par le roi. Hares sont ceux 
qui conservent jusqu*& la fin de leurs jours les 
bonnes graces du roi”
and the reporter adds the commentary:
"Dans le Rwanda plus d1ailleurs1 la fortune est 
fragile11.
Although kingship was sacred, the king himself was not a
ritual specialist as e.g. a rain maker. He stood over and
above the official rain makers as a controller of their
activities. This absolved the Mwami from possible blame.
The king would punish those ritual specialists whose efforts
had not succeeded. The same report of I9O7 states:
!,le roi fait tuer entre autres la chef esse de la 
colline de Imaza. Bile appartenait & la famille 
des Bashara qui ont I1apanage de faire la pluie. 
Maintenant que la pluie refuse de tomber, quelques 
uns le paient de leur t§tesn.
Moreover although the nature of the kingship in Rwanda 
cannot be described as a divine kingship, the king had an
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important ritual role which was complementary to his political, 
military and judicial functions. The hierarchical 
stratification of. the power structure in Rwanda has lent 
itself to neat functional analysis within the framework of 
cross-cultural comparisons. However since Rwanda kingship 
had dual political and ritual functions, consideration limited 
only to the political aspect must result in inadequate analysis.
The explanation of the role of the Mwami in purely political 
terms must be 1 imited to those areas where his political power 
was sufficiently established to allow for the operation of 
the delegated power structure, since it is through these 
channels that his politipal power operated.
However, it is my contention that the consideration of 
the ritual function of the king cannot be excluded from any 
adequate analysis of the nature of the kingship in Rwanda. 
Inclusion of the ritual function of the king not only adds 
depth and perspective to the analysis of kingship as a 
political force in those areas where his political power was 
fully operative but it is also significant in relation to 
the analysis of the kingship as an important factor in social 
cohesion.
Moreover the ritual function of the Mwami as a unifying 
force in Rwanda extended beyond the area of Central Rwanda 
into those regions which, although politically not fully
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part of the administrative system, were protected by the 
Mwami from external threats and domination. Hence these 
areas as well as the centre were intimately concerned with 
the king’s well-being as a protector. This protection was 
held to be divinely ordained and was not only activated in 
effective military protection but also expressed in myth and 
ritual at the court. The same can be said of the king’s 
ritual function relating to the well-being and fertility of 
people, cattle and agricultural produce.
The extension of the kingfs ritual power was thus wider 
than the territorial extent of his political power. The 
principle integrating force of the rituals performed by the 
king did not always consist of widespread participation of 
the population, although in many instances, as we will see, 
such participation did occur. The shared conviction that 
the king’s performances of the rituals protected the whole 
country against all sorts of calamities and demonstrated him 
to be a divine instrument for the distribution of supernatural 
benefits, wasr an important contributory factor in social 
cohesion. This was seen as a continuation of the divine 
plan expressed in the origins of the first kings, the founders 
of the dynasty and the country, to whom God had entrusted the 
well-being of its people, cattle and produce. Against this
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■background I will now examine in more detail both the nature 
of the rites and the occasions on which the5^ were performed, 
since they clearly expressed the nature of the kingship as 
a force of social cohesion not only in Central Rwanda but 
also in Rwanda as a whole. In I964 d’Hertefelt and H. Coupez 
published the Einyarwanda text of the rituals of divine 
kingship with a french translation. It is this text which
I use as the basis for my analysis. We can distinguish,
following d’Hertefelt and Coupez, four kinds of ritual.
(1) Accessional rituals, (2) Rituals which were periodically 
performed, (5) Rituals relating in war and (4) Rituals to 
be performed on accession to the sacred drum.
The rituals xorescribed by tradition and to be performed 
by the king on certain occasions were all related to fertility. 
The occasions were times of great calamity due to famine or 
disease. The first two rites deal with controlling the 
effects of drought or excessive rain. The king went through 
sacrificial rites and invocations to his ancestors and sent 
one of the ritualists round the country with a pot containing 
remnants of the sacrifice in order to let the people know 
and see that the king had performed the rites to stop the 
drought or the excessive rains. The third ritual was 
performed if disease struck the bees. (Honey was an
important ingredient in the making of first quality beer).
The ritual again consisted of invocations to the royal 
ancestors, "who brought the bees into the country” and 
sacrifices were made. Again messengers were sent round 
the country with potions used in the ritual with which the ■ 
hives were sprinkled. The text makes special mention of 
sending messengers to Mugamba (p.33). This is of particular 
importance as Mugamba was one of the highly independent and 
autonomous districts in the mountain region in the Worth. 
Although it was outside the direct control of central Rwanda, 
the people paid a regular tribute to the Mwami in honey 
(Pages 1933 P* 563).
The other two occasional rituals were performed to 
prosper hunting, a specifically Twa occupation, and to stop 
the ravages of rinderpest. In both rituals the text used 
in the invocation to the royal ancestors brings out how they 
had brought the skills of hunting and cattle breeding into 
the country. Sacrifices were made and ritualists were sent 
all over the country carrying pots containing concoctions 
used in the ritual which were used to sprinkle the cattle.
Apart from these five rituals which the Eing had to 
perform on certain specific occasions, he was required by 
tradition to perform four periodic rituals, two of which
were to be enacted annually while the other two were 
reserved for the beginning and the end of the cycle of 
four kings.
The first ritual took place annually in May, just before 
the start of the long dry season, and towards the end of the 
invisible moon period just before the new moon appeared. 
Through the ritual the country is in fact associated with 
this cosmic renewal of life and death. During the ritual, 
which lasted for several days, sexual intercourse was taboo 
and the beating of the drums was forbidden. The end of the 
ritual coincided with the appearance of the new moon and 
this renewal of life was expressed in great festivities and 
much beer-drinking. This ritual took place at a time when 
there was no more agricultural work to be done on the fields 
and more time was available for festivities. Moreover at 
this particular season there was a marked difference in 
temperature between day and night while at the same time 
the stock of provisions was running low. It was therefore 
the season when epidemics and disease were most likely to 
occur.
Hence the king performed his ritual of protection against 
the background of the symbol of life and death (the moon) 
which coincided with a time of increased danger and the start 
of the dry season. In the text the king is portrayed as the
as the symbol of continued fertility and well-being - a 
sign of hope. Once this ritual had been performed, there 
was national rejoicing during which the royal drums were 
beaten and echoed by drums throughout the country. It was 
at this time that those who were liable to pay taxation in 
beer had to bring it to the chief.
The other annual ritual was the rite of "the first fruit 
of sorghum”. It consisted of several parts. Pirstly a 
Hutu ritualist received hoes from the king with which to 
cultivate the sorghum destined for the ritual. later on 
some unripe sorghum was brought and the king performed a 
fertility ritual, calling upon his royal ancestors. When 
the sorghum was ripe, it was brought to the court and the 
king, together with the queen mother, the head of the Tutsi 
lineage of the Tsoobe and the Hutu ritualists, prepared 
porridge from the newly harvested crop and ate it together. 
The people had to abstain from eating the new harvest of 
sorghum until the first fruit ceremonies' had taken place. 
Moreover taxation of sorghum was paid at this particular 
time of the year.
Although there are several notions relating to social 
relationships and occupational divisions present in the rite, 
the fundamental concept underlining the ritual is the
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identification of the king with the success of the 
agricultural activities of the people. On this basis the 
ritual transcended several cleavages in Rwanda society, 
fhese cleavages were not concealed, they were expressed but 
in the context of interdependence. fhe fact that the king 
handed out hoes associated him specifically with Hutu 
agricultural occxipations. Moreover, the text of the. ritual 
"Quand le Roi Stait encore futsi*' ^d’Hertefelt p.81 vers 94) 
underlines the idea that the king is no longer pureljr futsi 
but king of all the people. In the ritual, the king and 
the queen mother together with representatives of futsi and 
Hutu, all co-operated and all ate together. Moreover the 
fsoobe lineage mentioned inhabited an area in Rwanda outside 
the confines of Central Rwanda. 1'hey lived in Bumbogo,
Kibari and Rukiga districts. ^Delmas I95O p.106. ICagame 
1947 P.367).
Another periodical rite was performed during the reign 
of every King called iuhi, one of the peaceful kings, who 
was the last of the cycle of four. Ihe ritual concerned 
the renewal of the perpetual flame which was kept burning as 
a sacred fire at the court. It was believed to have been 
started by the first king of Rwanda, Gdhanga. It symbolised 
the perpetuity of the royal lineage and the well-being of the 
country was believed to be magically related to the continuation
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of the fire. During the ceremony the king forged a hoe in 
the sacred fire. This hoe was heralded an a symbol of unity. 
During the ceremony the king showed the hoe to the people 
asking "People! what is this?" They replied "The hoe of 
unity", and the king said "The country is truly united under 
its king ¥uhi" (p.67 vers 258-261). The king then offered 
a sacrifice to his royal ancestors, who first received fire 
from Imana and promised his people increase in population.
The last ritual in this category was performed at the 
beginning of the royal cycle1by Cyirima or'Mutara alternatively. 
Like Yuhi they were peaceful kings. The xuhis were called 
Bami of the fire while the Cyirimas and Mutaras were called 
cattle Bami and had to.perform the,important ritual called 
"The watering of the cattle". Maquet states that the kings 
named'Cyirima, fuhi and Mutara were called peaceful Bami,
"They were not allowed to cross the river Nyabarongo, a river 
which runs in the centre of the country" (Maquet. 1961 p.125), 
and this symbolised the fact that they should not send their 
armies abroad. The•Hyabarongo approximately divided the 
central from the northern, districts of Rwanda. "Abroad" in 
this context therefore included the peripheral areas. Maquet 
further remarks that "this rule very wisely allowed the 
country to recuperate and to assimilate new territories
during a preceding war-like reign ^1961 p.125). The text 
of the ritual however does not support this conclusion. It 
not only entablishes the fact that there was a cycle of only 
four and not of five kings but also states that only Xuhi were 
prohibited from'crossing the river Ryabarongo. Maquet*s 
interpretation of Yuhi’s position can readily be accepted 
as.he succeeded two war-like kings, but this' cannot apply to 
Mutara or Cyirima. The point made here may seem trivial at 
first sight but the interpretation of the ritual at the 
beginning of every royal cycle and the obligatory ritual 
crossing of the■ Hyabarongo is significant in relation to 
the nature of the kingship as a force of social cohesion, 
especially in the context of spatial divisions between central 
and peripheral areas. As we have said the kings of Rwanda 
followed a fourfold cycle beginning alternately with Mutara 
and Cyirima. In the ritual we find, corresponding to these 
alternating periods of the cycle, a ritual division 
corresponding to the spatial division of Rwanda made by the 
river Hyabarongo. as we have already mentioned the last 
king of the cycle, iuhi, had to stay inside central Rwanda 
and this might well have been related to the factors indicated 
by Macquet.
The first king of a new cycle also had to stay within 
central Rwanda until the moment during his reign when he had
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to perform the ritual of the "watering of the cattle". The 
appointed time for the ritual was decided by the abiru or 
traditionalists. On this occasion the king had to make a 
ritual crossing of the river and thereafter live until his 
death outside central Rwanda, since he was not permitted to 
return across the river. At his death a Kigeri succeeded 
him and was invested with the royal power at the place where 
his predecessor had died. Kigeri then ritxially crossed the 
river into central Rwanda and took with him the mummified 
body of his predecessor. This mummified body was1not buried 
but was kept in a special sanctuary near the royal palace 
throughout the reigns of Kigeri, Mibambwe and iuhi. The 
successor to ruhi again crossed the Nyabarongo dxiring the 
ritual watering of the cattle and took with him the body of 
his fourth predecessor who was only then buried there and 
the cycle was renewed*
The fundamental idea expressed through this ritual and 
its associated movements is that every reigning king shared 
his authority with the initiator of each cycle. This king 
was, through special rites, identified with the good fortune 
of having cattle and was the protector of all cattle. Ror 
this reason every initiator of a new cycle was called a 
eattle king. The fact that every cycle started with a name
different from the former one emphasised the beginning of 
a new cycle. Moreover through the ritual crossing of the 
Hyabarongo and the burial of the king outside central Rwanda 
each cycle renewed the mystical identification of the kingship 
with Rwanda as a whole. Moreover the cyclical element gave 
an opportunity of periodically expressing a rejuvenation of 
the kingship. It is of special importance that this 
rejuvenation in the reign of the first Mwami of the cycle 
coincided with the cattle ritual which involved the crossing 
of the river and was hence associated with the unity of Rwanda 
as a whole. At ithe time of the ritual, the skins of the 
royal drums were renewed. The people were also associated 
with this rejuvenation of the royal drums, the kingship and 
therefore of Rwanda, through the obligation to change and 
renew the skins of their own drums.
The rituals relating to war all express a fundamentally 
identical idea. The strength of the kingdom and its 
invincibility depended on the strength of the king. This 
idea was particularly well expressed in the ritual called 
"The king in hiding". This ritual was performed when a king 
of Urundi died, except when he died in battle with the Rwanda. 
At that moment Rwanda was believed to be threatened by the 
spirit of the deceased king, the eternal enemy of Rwanda.
In practical terms the king was most likely to be succeeded 
by a more youthful and vigorous king. To avert the threat 
of attack and to strengthen the king of Rwanda, the Mwami went 
through an elaborate sacrificial ritual and went into hiding 
for eight days during which sexual intercourse was forbidden.
He was held to be in intimate contact with his royal ancestors 
who gave him new strength. In him the country was revitalised 
and strengthened in opposition to any possible threat from 
the new and young king of Burundi.
The three rituals associated with royal succession 
demonstrated how the Mwami of Rwanda was superior to all 
other heads of administration and the head of the army. In 
the ritual he presents himself as a powerful master and an 
aggressive warrior, a man to be feared because he is the 
master of everybody and everything by virtue of being the 
rightful successor.
Prom this analysis of the royal rituals several 
conclusions seem justified in relation to the ritual function 
of the king as a factor of social cohesion. The status quo 
of political power of the king is related to his position as 
rightful successor within the Hyiginya clan. The 
identification of his kinship with divine ordering is
concomitant with the identification of the Mwami with the 
country as a whole. Pollowing from this both the Mwami* s
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personal welfare and his actions are held to coincide with 
the well-being of the' coimtry as a whole and of all its 
members* The king and his ritual are necessary for 
protection against outside domination. Other aspects of 
the royal ritual emphasize the legitimacy of the-Mwami* s 
position in transcending ethnic cleavages. The king, 
although a Tutsi, is king of all Banyarwanda. He ceases 
to be a Tutsi and becomes Mwami, he is a successor to 
Kanyarwanda, the father of 0a tut si, G-ahutu and G-atwa (ref. p. 17). 
This is expressed in his dynastic name and in the actual 
performance of the rituals as well as the texts. The first 
fruits ritual and the ritual of the new moon specifically 
underline the point■ that he transcends ethnic cleavages.
The king is* not only successor to the first Mwami who brought 
cattle, agricultural seeds, bees etc. into the country, but 
also the link between fertility and the royal ancestors.
This is brought out in the rituals concerning drought, 
excessive rain, bees, cattle and first fruits. In all these 
rituals he is shown to transcend occupational cleavages.
He is the king of the whole of Rwanda. The symbolism 
of the ritual of the watering of the cattle, the war rituals, 
the ritual of the bees, the first fruit rituals and the new 
moon ritual, all refer to the king as also transcendental
to spatial cleavages in Rwanda as a whole.
This unifying transcendental character of the kingship 
is not only ritually expressed and mythically upheld, it was 
also externalised and expressed by all Banyarwanda through 
joining the Mwami in certain avoidances e.g. the ritual of the 
new moon. Moreover the rituals performed at the court were 
further publicised by the ritualists who went to all parts 
of the country to sprinkle the cattle or the bee hives.
In other rituals the people were not only aware of the 
Mwami*s performances of the rituals relating to fertility 
but also took an active part by beating the drums, renewing 
the skins of the drums or eating from the new sorghum* harvest. 
Another way of emphasizing the rituals was that certain taxes 
had to be paid in connection with them. The Mwami was unique, 
the centre of the universe and the direct link with God's 
ordering of things. He was the symbol of all things good: 
Rwanda, cattle, agricultural produce, health and fertility.
He was Rwanda personified. "Son foyer couvre tout le pays" 
(po&me dynastique - Kagame I95I P*53)* His uniqueness was 
further expressed by the use of special words for every day 
activities of the Mwami such as walking and sleeping (Pages 
1933 P.491).
nil these aspects of his ritual function are eomplementaiy
to his political function as the absolute monarch, issue 
of the*Hyiginya Tutsi clan and free to-favour whomsoever 
he wants to favour.
The total effect of the impact of colonial rule on the 
nature of the kingship in its political and ritual capacity 
will be discussed in the last chapter. Through becoming 
dependent on foreign military force which at the same time 
restricted his powers, many aspects of the traditional function 
of the kingship and its traditional image were changed. The 
end of traditional Rwanda kingship did not come when in I96I 
Rwanda was declared a republic, but in 1931* In that year 
ruhi Musinga, the last of the*cycle of four kings, was deposed 
by Belgian Colonial rule and sent into exile. One of his 
sons, Charles Mutara, succeeded him. Yuhi Musinga, before 
he died, instructed his faithful followers to bury him in a 
secret place, because he feared that his son, Mutara, was not 
going to continue the ritual of the " watering of the cattle".
Maquet and d’Hertefelt (1959 P*14)> referring*to the 
appointment of Charles Mutara III as successor to Yuhi Musinga, 
note that:
"Ceux qui I'ont design^, c*est& dire les autoritfes 
administratives et religieuses europlennes, ne I’ont 
choisi de la manidre traditionelle".
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In the preceding years other economic, political and 
religious factoids had already undermined the function of the 
traditional kingship in Rwanda. However 1931 brought the 
end of traditional kingship*not only because Mutara was not 
chosen in the traditional way but also because he was a 
Christian and as such no longer combined the political and 
ritual functions of the traditional kingship in his person.
It was especialljr through its ritual function that the kingship 
was a strong force making for social cohesion in a country 
with many cleavages. when the king no longer fulfilled his 
ritual function one of the major principles of social cohesion 
was lost and with, it occasions for a> demonstration of the 
king's identification with Rwanda and its’people.
The total effect however of this developmental process 
can only be assessed in relation to a complex of other 
processes. The two central points I want to make are firstly 
that the king's complementary ritual function was a significant 
force for the unity of Rwanda as a whole and secondly that 
with the departure of Yuhi Mutara the traditional kingship 
came to an end and with it an important principle of social 
cohesion disappeared..
(b) The Queen Mother
Although the Mwami *s powers were absolute he shared his
prerogatives with the queen mother. She ruled with the 
king, had her own court and her own personal clients on 
Ibikingi land. She had her own herds and she could intervene 
in court cases and pass judgement. Hot only did she have 
her court close to the king's but she always accompanied 
the king wherever he went, even on his military expeditions. 
She was given the same honours as the Mwami and was called 
Mugabekazi. It may be noted that the king of Ankole, who 
claimed to be of the Bega clan, was called Mugabe. The same 
wor& mugabe was used in Rwanda for the head:bull of the royal 
herd and for the four royal drums.
The king and the queen mother were referred to jointly 
as the Bami of Rwanda which indicates that she really shared 
in the kingship. However in this partnership the king 
retained a dominant position and in fact the role of the 
queen mother depended on the king. This personal dependence 
became especially evident when the king died. At that 
moment she lost all her powers and became a normal subject. 
When Musinga was sent into exile, the queen mother went with 
him. If the queen mother's husband died, she could not 
remarry. Although the Hyiginya clan had the prerogative 
of endogamy, sons who were issues of endogamous unions were 
excluded from succession to the royal drum. The successor
had to have a mother from a different elan. In practice 
the-Bega clan had most often provided the queen mother.
However within the Bega clan several lineages competed for 
this important privilege. Moreover five other clans had 
at different times provided the queen mothers. These six 
clans with the royal clan and the abashambo and abahondogo 
constituted the nobility of Rwanda.
The abashambo - and abahondogo however could not provide a 
queen mother as they were regarded as brother clans of the 
*Hyiginga clan-(Pauwels I965 P-273)* This possibility, open 
to a number of clans, of providing the queen mother implied 
a plurality of concomitant potential avenues of favour in 
relation to the king and.the queen mother. This situation 
led to continuous competition among the important Tutsi 
lineages of the clans from whom the queen mother could be 
chosen. It also constituted a framework for divisions among 
possible opponents to the king's power.
Bike the Mwami, the• queen mother dropped her Tutsi name 
and received a dynastic name, the same as that of the king 
with the prefix Hyiras thus Hyirayuhi, Nyirakigeri. If 
his mother died the king had to be given another official 
"mother". But in that case she had to be of the same lineage 
as his real mothex* (Kagame 1952 p.65). In c.ase> the real
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mother of the heir apparent died, the reigning Mwami had 
to give him a new official mother who could not in this 
case already have a son sired by the reigning Mwami.
fhis shows that it was the lineage that had the right 
to produce the queen mother. The first rules made for 
stability in as much as they were a safeguard against the 
assassination of. the queen mother being rewarded by giving 
the office of the queen mother to a different lineage.
The second5rule made for stability in as much as it 
prevented conflict between the king and the real son of the 
official queen mother. The wisdom of this rule was made 
evident when Ewabugire ^1853-1895) transgressed it and 
appointed Eutalindwa as' his successor. His mother, who was 
of the IComo lineage of the Bega clan, had died and Ewabugire 
had given him a new "mother1 from the Kagaara lineage of the 
Bega clan. However she was Ewabugire* s wife who had a son 
by him called Musinga. Soon after Eutalindwa*s accession, 
the Kagaara lineage saw an opportunity not only to have one 
of their lineage as queen mother but also to have as king 
Musinga, issue of the queen mother. The obstacle was 
Eutalindwa himself. He was attacked and he committed 
suicide with his family. Only one son Mdungutse escaped 
to the Horth and challenged Musinga in a bloody revolt.
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Musinga obtained the help of the German troops and quelled 
the rebellion. However, the legitimacy of Musinga remained 
a matter of dispute, especially in the North and North-East, 
which had supported the person who pretended to be Ndungutse.
It is against this background of intrigues related to the 
position of the queen mother, that we must see the introduction 
of the Tutsi chiefs and the imposition of the pattern of the 
administrative structure with the aid of German and Belgian 
military power in the peripheral areas of the North and 
North-East.
Pauwels ^1967 P *230-233) gives details of the dates and
places where for the first time Tutsi chiefs who had been
faithful to Musinga and his mother were inti*odueed into these
areas and were supported by the Belgian forces. He concludes
1 XT est done incontestable que l fest aux Beiges 
que le roi du Rwanda fetait redevable de la 
stability de ses representants dans ces regions.
Comme’ d!ailleurs aussi du remplacement des 
Bahinaa par des chefs Batutsi1'.
These facts not only show the importance and power of 
the position of the queen mother but also shed light on the 
actual relationship between the North and North-East and the 
court.
It was the first king of each royal cycle, Qyirima or 
Mutara who determined in which lineages their successors had
to find their wives who were to become queen mothers. This 
information was however kept secret even from the Biru and 
official councillors and was confided to a neutral ritualist 
(d’Hertefelt I964 p.334).
This institutionalised mechanism of rotation involved 
fluctuation in the possibility of political influence as 
between the various lineages of the nobility and resulted in 
a longer-term balance of power. It was both the element of 
secrecy and the pre-arranged pattern of lineages set at the 
beginning of the cycle which set limits on competition 
between the lineages, thus making for stability. The actual 
operation of this in reducing the extent of political 
competition would obviously be least effective at the end 
of a cycle, as for instance at the time of Musinga.
Within this context of the distribution of power and 
the uncertainty in the pattern of rotation, the Tutsi lineages 
concerned were however all foci of possible power positions 
and ties with them were important in the search for protection 
within the Rwanda system of social relationships. The 
division in the royal power structure inherent in the special 
position of the queen mother, constituted a check on the 
king*s absolutism in his relations with the nobility. On 
the other hand it reduced tensions between this absolutism
and these lineages by creating both a sense of and actual 
avenues of participation in his kingship.
Moreover it constituted a framework of hierarchical 
ranking of the nobility, based on actual and possible 
participation in the king*s power through the queen mother. 
The changing power positions of the lineages, resulted in a 
certain amount of flexibility in the system since the actual 
status of the competing Tutsi families was precarious and 
their ability to distribute favours while holding their 
favourable power positions was accordingly temporary. The 
whole system of power-relations culminating in the queen 
mother constituted another avenue to obtain favour or 
justice and as such was a factor both in promoting and in 
containing tensions by' being an alternative focus of power.
However when the Belgian Government deposed Yuhi Musinga 
and appointed Charles Mutara, the first of a new royal cycle, 
this traditional pattern was upset. This was further 
finalised when Mutara married a member from a clan which 
had never provided a queen mother. Moreover the mother of 
Mutara was no longer allowed to live near the court but was 
forced to live in Kakanzi in the Marangara district.
The role of the queen mother had come to an end and 
with it went some of the flexibility in the political system.
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Moreover the reduction of the power of some of the lineages 
had the effect of increasing the power of the king.
(c) The Biru
The next highest authority in the kingdom was the "body 
of traditionalists, or royal councillors who were referred 
to collectively as the Ubwiru. Around igOO there were ten 
abiru ^Kagame 1947 p.366) (,d*Hertefelt 1962 p.71). They 
were dignitaries holding different offices relating to the 
safe keeping and continuity of tradition* They were 
hierarchically ranked and all belonged to certain Tutsi 
lineages. The offices were ascribed and although the Mwami 
had the power to dismiss an uhwiru for neglect or forgetfulness, 
the office stayed within the lineage. The office holder 
appointed his own successor within the lineage. Their office 
was rewarded not only by outstanding prestige but also by 
numerous privileges, the most important of which were their 
independence of the normal pattern of administration and their 
exemption from taxation. Because their office was hereditary 
within the lineage, the kingfs power over them was very'limited.
The nature of their office and the fact that theirs- was 
an ascribed status and one which was economically independent, 
made it one of the stable institutions in the political 
system of Rwanda. They v^ rere the ritualists necessary for
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the execution and timing of the royal rituals related to 
the well-being and fertility of the king and the country.
They moreover constituted the group of wise men, holding 
the body of knowledge required for the right behaviour of 
the king in the light of tradition.
They were the holders of tradition and the secret 
knowledge relating to ritual succession and the interpretation 
of events. They kept the king’s will. In order to prevent 
them from divulging this secret knowledge the abiru were 
obliged, at the time of initiation, to drink a potion which, 
it was believed, would automatically kill them if they told 
a part of the secrets to outsiders.
The total body of knowledge however was only held by 
three members of the ubwiru. The others knew only parts 
of it. To prevent the knowledge from being forgotten or 
from being lost in case of accidental death, the abiru were 
allowed to have some of their lineage members as assistants 
whom they themselves chose and who again were put under the 
seal of secrecy by being administered the potion with its 
automatic sanction. Their function insured the continuity 
of the royal lineages and prevented the king from maiding 
too many innovations. They could effectively control the 
king because he needed their knowledge and assistance for
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his ritual function. Their economic Independence moreover
prevented the king from exerting direct material pressures.
Because their function was hereditary within certain Tutsi
lineages end not only unassailable by the king or the queen
mother but, by necessity, complementary to the kingship, it
was a stable safeguard of the interests and power position
of the important Tutsi descent groups. On the other hand,
because of the hierarchical ranking and the complementary
function of each of the lineages, and because of the stable
power position of the' ubwiru as a-group in relation to the
king, it formed a focus for political manoeuvring and the
seeking of alliances. As such it was one more important
channel for ’politics1 in the wider political system.
In 1931, when Charles-Mutara III Rudahigwa was appointed
king, he was given a council of four men of important Tutsi
lineages to replace the ubwiru. Maquet and d’Hertefelt
(1959 P*l4) write:
"a cette 6poque, 1 1 intervention des autoritfes1 beiges 
se manifest© plus par des decisions de la sorte que 
par des reformes structu^elles,,.
The official function of the ubwiru came to an end and with
it went another element of constraint on the king’s power and
another avenue of political mobility.
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• PART 4 DELEGATED POWER - WITHIN
THE POLITICAL •SYSTEM
In the previous section I have analysed the Rwanda 
political system as it existed at the court. The system 
through which the king delegated his powers must be seen as 
an extension of the royal power, particularly as the king 
had ultimate control over the distribution of offices within 
the delegated power structure. The Mwami administered the
country through two structures: the army and the administration, 
headed by army and high'chiefs respectively. Moreover the 
king had at his disposal for consultation a council composed 
of these chiefs.
This section deals specifically with these three 
institutions which can however only be understood in relation 
to the previous analysis of political organisation at the 
court.
(1) The Council of Paramount Chiefs
This council ha.d neither a fixed number of members nor 
was it called for consultation on certain occasions or on 
fixed issues. Eeither was the council in any sense 
representative. The king consulted his council mainly in 
times of crisis or on occasions of special importance.
He would summon some of the high and army chiefs although 
he was in no way bound to accept their advice. Nevertheless 
the council acted as a screen between the king and his 
subjects, since blame resulting from any miscarriage of 
the king’s policy could be diverted from his person on to one 
or more individual members of the council. It also 
constituted an instrument of ranking within thebody of'high 
and army chiefs as not all of them would be summoned.
Through it, the king’s pleasure was expressed and competition 
for the king’s favour took place.
The function of the council as a screen and as a focus 
of competition largely determined the actual choice of the 
council members. The greater the support and popularity 
of the chiefs chosen as council members vis a vis their own 
direct subjects, the less damage was done to their image by 
being used as scapegoats. The weaker their support, the 
greater was the danger for them of being relieved of their 
position. Although membership of the council enhanced 
their status and increased their power position within the 
system, the hold on their office of chief became more 
precarious as the result of the potential role of scapegoat 
which membership of the council involved. This risk could 
only be offset by strong and extensive support from their 
subjects.
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Concomitantly the institution of the council of the high 
chiefs acted as a brake on possible abuse of the powers of 
the high chiefs vis a vis their subjects since this would 
result in discontent and loss of support. Eurther the 
element of competition for the king's favour, involved in 
membership of the council, again made for dependence of a 
chief and for building up support amongst his subjects.
In 1931 this council was replaced by a four-member 
council and another process of competition among the Tutsi 
chiefs for the king's and the subjects' support went out of 
the system, thus removing one of the checks on the power of 
the chiefs.
?/ithin that part of the political system which constituted
the delegated power structure, we can distinguish two
complementary structures, the administration and the army.
Maquet (,1961 p.l0G-120J has given a detailed description and
functional analysis of each of the two structures separately,
*
interpreted on the basis of his "premise of inequality".
He concludes:
"to sum up, this political system was a means of 
maintaining a certain social order in which the 
group of rulers and their caste appropriated to 
their consumption a considerable part of the 
country's goods without having to use their 
labour in the productive process".
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In my analysis of the delegated power structure I will 
concentrate more on ths interrelation and complementary aspects 
of the interlocking structures. I want, moreover, to under­
line the fact that the system not only contained elements of 
inequality and tension but that the nature of this inequality 
and these tensions must be further qualified. The system 
contained major elements making for social cohesion. Some 
of these can be seen in the checks and balances in the 
manipulation of power, the various alternatives for power 
support and different avenues for the seeking of justice.
Others concern a certain redistribution of wealth and a 
complex pattern of cross-cutting ties.
(2) The Army Structure
Every male, independent of his age or whether he was 
Hutu, Tutsi or Twa, was’ by birth a member of one of the dozens 
of armies, ingabo, existing in Rwanda. At the beginning of 
his reign the n ew Mwami started to organise a new army unit.
The original nucleus of recruits for the new army unit were 
some one hundred and fifty to two hundred sons of important 
Tutsi families, most often the king's personal clients, who 
had not as yet received any military training. They were 
called intore and received an extensive and prolonged 
military training under the army chief called Chief of the
royal palace. Every five or seven years a new group, 
recruited on the same basis, would be organised and added 
to the ingabo. These different units formed the warrior 
section of the army and consisted exclusively of Tutsi, whose 
families were mox^eover sufficiently rich to give the Chief 
of the royal palace a cow for every member incorporated 
into the new army. Byf being recruited into the new army 
they were detached from the army unit to which they belonged 
by birth.
.after the formation of a section of warriors the king 
would call all his army chiefs and withdraw from each of 
their armies a certain number of lineages, Tutsi, Hutu and 
Twa, who were to be detached from their original army and 
incorporated into the new army. These comprised the herdsmen 
section. In this way the warrior section was recruited on 
an individual basis and the herdsmen’s section on a lineage 
basis, normally on the inzu level. The army continued its 
existence through the descendants of the original recruits, 
with the exception of those who would in turn again be 
recruited into other army units under a new king.
At’ the death of the king, the Ghief of the royal palace 
became one of the army chiefs, head of his particular army.
His office however was not only not hereditary, it was' not
necessarily for life either. however the king could give 
the office to the army chief1s son. as soon as a new army 
unit was formed the warrior section became the army on active 
duty and the warriors belonging to the army organised by the 
previous king were withdrawn from active service. From the 
recruitment it is clear that the warrior section is entirely 
Tutsi but that like the rest of the army it is recruited 
without reference to territorial division; unlike the rest 
of the army however recruitment was on an individual and not 
a lineage basis. In the army the inzu was incorporated as 
a group under the inzu-head and constituted the smallest unit 
within the army structure.
The king was the commander-in-chief and all army members 
were in this respect his direct servants owing individual 
loyalty to him. By virtue of his role in the army structure 
every male had the right of access to the king and the right 
to be tried by his court. However the normal representative 
of the king not only in the field of command but also in the 
field of appeal was the army chief whom he had appointed. It 
was a crime meriting capital punishment if the army chief 
tried to prevent one of his army members from having direct 
recourse to the king in lodging complaints or seeking justice 
 ^Kagame 1959 p.279 a&d d'Hertefelt 1962 p.67)* The inzu
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was taxed for the upkeep of the army structure, including 
the training of new recruits, outfit of the army, etc,
The inzu-head apportioned this tax among the different rugos 
of the inzu.
However the army was not only a fighting unit, it was 
in the civil sphere also a unit of jurisdiction and protection. 
0?he army chief was not only a commander hut also a protector 
of its members in inter-army disputes and in disputes with 
the administration. He was judge between members in inter­
army disputes. fhe right of the army members to lodge a 
complaint against him or demand his removal from office 
provided a sanction to ensure that' the army chief fulfilled 
his obligations towards members. fhis was of special 
importance as the office was not hereditary nor did it 
necessarily remain within the army chief1s lineage. Kagame 
provides evidence that the replacement of army chiefs was 
not uncommon. He gives three names of army chiefs who were 
relieved of their function by Rwabugire, following complaints 
of the army members, and one instance during the reign of 
Musinga \Kagame 1953 p.38).
Just as every Rwanda was a member of an army unit, so 
was every head of cattle associated with and incorporated 
in the army,structure. All cattle, regardless of the basis
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of their possession, were attached to the army of the 
possessor, except in the case of cattle held in usufruct 
by a client in which case the cattle were attached not to 
the client* s army but to the lord*s army. We must however 
make a distinction between the cattle owned by the army as 
such and cattle attached to the army because they were held 
by the army members.
fhe chief.of the army was in charge of the official army 
cattle but these cattle were public property under the Mwami
i
in the sense that the chief of the army could not use them 
for his private property. Among these public cattle under 
the charge of a particular army we must still distinguish 
between royal cattle and army cattle proper.
(,1) Koyal cattle. In this category a distinction, necessary 
for the understanding of the role of the army and the 
importance of the army chief, must be made between cattle 
belonging to the king and cattle belonging to the dynasty.
(,a) fhe king*s cattle. In principle all cattle- 
owners customarily gave one cow to the king on 
his accession. fhese were called indabukirano 
^the same word as used for the cow given by the 
lineage head to his successor as an external 
sign and public registration of his will).
Ihese head of cattle plus those obtained by 
him as his share of possible war or raiding 
booty constituted the king’s personal herd, 
fhese cattle he cotild use for the building- 
up of his own private circle of clients.
(b) Ihe cattle inherited by the king from his 
predecessors however became not his own but 
dynastic property and could not be used for 
his private purposes. fhese inherited cattle 
became public property inasmuch as they were 
given to a particular army unit or units.
(Kagame 1952 p»330) 
fhe dairy products from these herds were used by the herdsmen 
caring for them and by army members who were sick. Young 
mothers needing milk for their babies or girls needing butter 
to oil themselves before marriage could also claim these 
products*
(ii) Army cattle. futsi who were incorporated into a new 
army unit had to give the army chief, who was called Chief 
of the royal palace, one cow (indabukirano) while non-futsi 
gave him a sheep or one or more hoes. Kagame remarks,
,f0n appelle futsi en droit pastoral, quiconque poss§de 
plusieurs tfites de gros b6ta.il1 (1952 p.96). Ihese cattle 
formed the army chief’s personal herd to which could be added
his share in the war booty. Ihese cattle could be used by
him to build up his following of personal clients. But the 
clientships thus formed were related to his office and not to 
his person or to his lineage, which is of special importance 
as his office was not hereditary (Kagame 1952 p.3l).
Among all these cattle a distinction was made between 
pedigree cattle, i.e. heads of cattle which were light-brown 
with long curving horns called Inyambo. All cattle of this 
kind were king’s property and much of the breeding and rearing 
techniques were directed towards producing these cattle. A 
chief called Umuzware w finyambo was 'placed in charge of the 
long-horned pedigree herds, while the chief in charge of the 
other herds was’ called Umuzware wfinka. fhese latter herds 
were sub-divided into smaller groups of thirty five to forty 
five head of cattle and the army chief appointed an official 
herdsman called umutahira in charge of these- smaller herds*
• Hone of these positions were hereditary and the man in charge 
could*not use the cattle to create a following of clients as 
these herds were not allowed to be further sub-divided. 
Products from the herds accrued partly to the herdsmen 
themselves and partly to those in need of them (cf. p.151).
.among the cattle attached to the army but which were 
privately possessed we must distinguish between those cattle
of the warriors which they had received as part of the war 
booty or .as a reward for special military bravery and the 
cattle of all the army members, whether warriors or herdsmen, 
which were their private property (imbata) acquired through 
exchange, gift or bride-wealth. The private cattle of the 
members of the army were not grazed communally but individually 
by their owners or by those to whom they were given in usufruct 
The official army cattle herds had their own grazing ground.
Although, as we have seen, the army structure was a 
supra-territorial one and recruitment was based on lineages 
and not on the neighbourhood or hill, the structure was in 
different ways related to and integrated with the system of 
territorial divisions. In all parts of Rwanda where the 
army had efficient control, the land was divided into pasture 
districts equal in number to the army units, which we will 
call zones. Every zone had at its head one army chief.
With the creation of a new army unit the borders of the zones 
were redefined. The hills within each zone were administered 
by hill chiefs appointed by the army chief. These hill 
chiefs were nearly always Tutsi, although either a warrior 
or a herdsman could be appointed. The territory for which 
a hill chief was responsible was called igikingi (plural 
ibikingi) which should not be confused with the Ibikingi by’i
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Bwami, which were crown domains outside the normal-pattern 
of the administrative and army structures* Ibikingi land 
referred specifically to pasture and the hill chief was the 
guardian of the pastures of his hill* The public herds were 
given special hills but the inyambo herd had to be grazed in 
the hill of the army chief* fhe function of the hill chief 
was to ensure that all those who had cattle in the area, 
whether belonging to his army or not, had sufficient pasture 
for their cattle. It was the hill chief who allocated 
rights to pasture on unoccupied land. rJL*o add to the 
confusion a concession to pasture was also called ibikingi.
Once granted, a right to pasture could not be withdrawn 
as long as the dues were paid. Ihe extent of the pasture 
granted as a concession was in relation to the number of 
cattle to be grazed. If the number diminished the hill 
chief could reclaim a pro rata portion and could give it to 
somebody else whose herds had increased. 0}hus a cattle 
owner could be given a new piece of pasture hitherto not used 
or by extension of his grazing rights he could obtain a piece 
which had already been in use as pasture.
Having obtained pastureland the holder could reserve a 
part of it for agriculture and give it to his clients, 
thereby obtaining the products which he needed in exchange
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for the usufruct of cattle. In this case the owner of the 
ibikingi kept his right to graze his cattle on the cultivator's 
land after the harvest, but as long as the cultivator paid 
his prestation he could not force him to leave or to leave 
his lands fallow. If a cattle owner obtained, through extensior 
of his pasture rights, an ibikingi which already had culti­
vators settled on it, these * cultivators did not owe the new 
holder any prestation.
According to Kagame (1952 p.100) the hill chief - could 
not prevent settlement of Hutu cultivators on land’not 
reserved as pasture and not as yet occupied. A1 though the 
hill-chief was the administrator and judge responsible for 
the pastures of his hill, the actual distribution was done by 
the chief of thenyambo and the uinutware w'inka.
fhe basic unit of organisation of the army was the inzu.
She inzu head was the link between the descent group and the 
army structure and he determined who, in case of war, was to 
go on active service. He also determined the contribution 
of each rugo to the total tax demanded from the inzu. If 
a member refused to obey the inzu head's orders he was liable 
to be deprived of his possessions but this was not kept by 
the inzu head but became official army property. The normal 
way for an army member in need of protection of the army
chief was to make his demand through the inzu head.
However in case of dispute with the inzu head, the 
individual member could approach the army chief without 
passing either through the inzu head or the hill chief.
It was only at the inzu level that the two structures 
interrelated.
Apart from military organisation, bovine administration 
and jurisdiction, the army structure was also a channel of 
taxation. The army had to have some cattle near the court 
in order to provide the court or other royal residences with 
a traditionally fixed number of jars of milk. Moreover the 
army had to provide the court with a number of young steers 
for sacrificial -rituals. Bourgeois states that in 1926, 
one hundred and twenty two steers were provided to the court 
for this purpose (1959 P*B8). However the cattle acquired 
by warriors as war booty were exempt from all taxation. 
Taxation in milk and butter was also paid to the army chief 
and the hill chief. Moreover the aattle owners had to help 
in exercising the official herds of the dynasty and of the 
army in building their kraals and in their general upkeep. 
Members of the army who were not cattle owners had to pay 
their taxation in agricultural produce. However inhabitants 
of certain regions, especially those which were more distant
from the court or which produced specialised products, paid 
their tax in tobacco, mats or ironware such as spearheads, 
etc. These products were partly used by the king and the 
court and partly by the army units, either those in training 
as for example the ntore, or those on active duty in the 
different camps along the border. The Batwa paid their tax 
in pottery and in hides used for ritual and royal ceremonies 
such as the leopardskins for the dancers. The king, however, 
always made a return gift to the Batwa in a form which they 
highly appreciated, i.e. bullocks which were not kept by them 
but eaten.
It is clear from this description that through the army 
structure the king had a powerful instrument in the control 
of cattle and chiefs and that it constituted a charnel of 
taxation. The description also shows how the instrument of 
coercive power was exclusively recruited from among the Tutsi 
lineages. However, the fact that recruitment of warriors 
disregarded normal territorial divisions and that it was on 
an individual basis, meant that warriors on active duty were 
all members of army units different from the units of the 
lineages to which they belonged.
An analysis of those forces and processes making for 
social cohesion in both the army and the administrative
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structure is not only related to the structures separately 
but must also be made in terms of the complementary function 
of both structures. It is for this reason that the analysis 
of the processes of social cohesion will be dealt with after 
the description of the administrative structure.
\5) The Administration
Independent of but complementary to the army structure 
there existed what has been called a system of administration, 
which was based on the territorial division of Rwanda.
The chief of the province who was not uncommonly also an 
army chief was, like the district chiefs, appointed directly 
by the Mwami. The administration of each district was 
generally committed to the two chiefs who were independent 
of each other: the chief of cattle, and the land chief.
As one of the major functions of the district chiefs was 
the levying of taxes, the fact that generally the cattle 
chief was a Tutsi and the land chief a Hutu was of added 
importance in relation to the dual administration at this 
important level. The duplication acted as a check on the 
activities of both chiefs and increased the king*s control 
over his officials when they attempted to become too powerful 
or overstepped their rights. The land chief, in contrast 
to the cattle chief, also had judicial powers in disputes
over arable land but not over pasture as this was reserved 
to the army chief. However each of the hills which made 
up the district had- only one hill chief and he was not the 
district chiefs representative because he was appointed by 
the army chief. The hill chief chose the neighbourhood 
chiefs called abakoresha from among the inzu heads of his 
hill. Taxation for the king was levied on agricultural and 
dairy produce but the province, district and hill chiefs had 
the right to keep a portion of it for their own use. This 
taxation, like that for the army, was demanded from the inzu 
head who had to apportion the amounts due from the various 
lineage members. It is very important to note that the 
amount to be paid was not fixed and that it was left to the 
discretion of the hill chief to strike the balance between 
the demand of the court for regular supplies and overburdening 
his people. It is especially against this background that 
we must see the importance of the mechanism of control 
resulting from the fact that the hill chiefs were not represen 
tatives of their immediate superiors, the district chiefs.
The organisation at the local level was left to the omu 
koresha and the inzu head neither of whom could claim a 
portion of the tax collected. The products themselves 
were sent to the royal residences in each district from
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where the king claimed whatever he needed. The timing of 
the levies coincided with the harvest and at no other time 
of the year could demands he made. Hext to this taxation 
in dues, the people were obliged to work a certain number 
of days for the administration either in the local area or 
at the royal palaces. This taxation was not demanded from 
the inzu but from the rugo. Maquet states moreover that 
labour prestations were exclusively demanded from the Hutu 
stratum of the population 1,1962 p.105). The prestations 
demanded from the Tutsi were more in the form of acting as 
advisers and companions to the different chiefs.
Gutting across this pattern of administration were those 
territorial units which were directly controlled by the king 
and which were given by him to his personal clients or close 
agnates. Here we must also include the enclaves administered 
by the queen mother and the abiru. Those who held these 
areas were exempt from normal taxation and paid their dues 
directly to the king, the queen mother or the abiru. In this 
and other ways they did not fit into the normal pattern of 
administration.
Hov/ever they were incorporated into the army structure 
as far as membership was concerned. But as long as they 
were direct clients of the king, the queen mother or the
abiru they were exempt from direct army taxation. Recruit - 
ment for office holders in both the administration and army 
structures was largely based on kinship. Chiefs were 
recruited largely from the king*s consanguineal and affinal 
kin, and therefore often changed from one reign to another, 
especially as these offices were not hereditary. d'Hertefelt 
estimates that the total number of office holders involved 
only some thousands of individuals ^1960 p.116). However - 
most of them belonged to a limited number of lineages 
relatively close to the king (d’Hertefelt I964 p.426). The 
fact that there were unequal rewards attached to the' different 
offices led to competition for office between and within 
those lineages. The nature of this competition is described 
by the same author as Mune jungle politique ou les plus 
pufssants menacaient et annihilaient les plus faibles*1 
(,1962 p.69).
The monopoly of political power was held by:
1. The Nyiginya clan which provided the king;
2. The different clans which provided the queen mother;
3* ^ e  abiru lineages who were the repositories of
tradition and the safeguards for the continuity 
of the power structure.
Together these formed the stable power-holding group.
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On this basis we can sa3?- that power was the monopoly
of the Tutsi, although this does not mean that all Tutsi
were rulers. Pauwels sums this up:
r,0r parmi ces 16fo {fo Tutsi sur la population) 
les tr£s grand nombre n*etait gudre plus fortun§ 
que les Hutu. Ge n'est done qurune tr&s petite 
minority des Tutsi qui faisait au 'Rwanda la pluie 
et le beau temps" (,1967 p.^Ol).
However the full extent of the ruler s*- power position cannot
be expressed in numbers as their sphere of influence,
emanating from their office, must be assessed in the light
of the clientage system.
This description of the two structures as instruments
of political oontrol brings out two main elements. On the
one hand we find clearly a premise of inequality while on
the other hand we find inbuilt mechanisms for practical
limitations on benefits accruing from this unequal access
to power. The political system formed a "network of
reciprocities in which power carried obligations and lack
of power had its real compensations". (Lemarchand 1966 p.51?)
We find tensions but also counterbalancing mechanisms
containing these tensions. we find divisions and cleavages
but also mechanisms operating for social cohesion. It is
this element of social cohesion that I will now examine in
more detail.
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1. Ideological framework and social cohesion
An ideology has been defined ass
*'a more or less coherent system of beliefs held
in common by the members of a group or collectivity
and which, through an interpretive evaluation
(weber) of the situation in which the group is
placed, explains and’ justified its existence and
contributes to its integration" ^d'Hertefelt 1967 p.217).
When speaking about the court, as distinct from delegated
power, particularly in the case of the king (ef. P.I29-I5O)
I;have pointed out how the sacredness of the king and his
ritual function expressed his identification with Rwanda as
a whole and at the same time provided an explanation and a
justification for his position in the overall political
system* fhis body of beliefs was knowito all the members
of the society and was regularly and publicly expressed in
ritual and ceremonies. fhus it contributed to the integration
of; Rwanda society because of the common dependence of all
members of the king for their individual well-being,
fertility and occupational success and for the prosperity
of the community at large.
Moreover, as we have seen, the body of beliefs, basic
to the ritual and to the kingship, embodied a concept of
common rights in the kingdom inasmuch as the king transcended
ethnic and occupational cleavages. Q)o this transcendence
of the kingship corresponds a subjective role expectation
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by the people. As in all societies with a centralised 
government, the king delegated his powers. In Rwanda this 
was done through the administrative and army structures.
As such they were accordingly extensions of his kingship 
since it is through them that the powers of the king flowed, 
not only in demands, e.g. for taxation and army recruits, 
but also in the administration of justice and the provision 
of land and pasture.
d'Hertefelt has explained how;
"an abundant court literature (dynastic, genealogic, 
pastoral and martial), was directly or indirectly 
intended to glorify and exalt the dynasty as well 
as the existing social and political structure".
(i960 p.128)
Independent as to whether it was indeed "intended", the 
fact that the structure was mythically and*historically 
sustained, served' not only as a rationalisation and 
explanation of the status quo but gave it the sanction of 
being a link with and an expression of the kingship of 
divine origin. This mythical sanction constituted a 
justification of existence of the kingship and contributed 
to the integration of all groups in Rwanda society.
In relation to this some points should be made concerning 
the superiority of the Tutsi. These have been classified 
according to the following themes;
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(a) The celestial origins of the Tutsi
(b) The fundamental and natural differences which 
exist between Tutsi and others
(c) The superior civilisation of the Tutsi 
(dfEertefelt I964 p.221)
d*Hertefelt further remarks that these inegalitarian myths 
were on the whole not known by the Eutu and Twa and that some 
were only known at the court as a great secret. Important 
as this ideology might have been for the cohesion of the 
power-holding'lineages it does not detract from the ideology 
as expressed in the kingfs ritual and as seen by the ruled.
The existence of opposing ideologies constituted however 
a weakness in the system. It led to a conflict between the 
role expectancy expressed in the body of beliefs of the 
rulers assuming inegalitarianism and the role expectancy 
corresponding to the body of beliefs held by the ruled. It 
is in the office of the chief that this latent conflict is 
focussed. The nature of the power of the king and the nature 
of the delegated power structure enabled the expression of 
conflict to be confined to the field of inter-personal 
relations. Conflict could be solved by the king in removing 
the chief.
2. The system of delegated power and social cohesion
We have noted that the total body of office-holders 
within the administration and army structures were largely 
drawn from lineages related to the king. However within 
this limited sphere of recruitment, access to individual 
office was largely through achievement, in the sense that 
particular offices were not the monopoly of certain lineages 
nor was there any guarantee of retaining an office within 
the lineage through succession or direct appointment by a 
predecessor. Moreover there was no necessary security in 
office. An appointment for office was not for life but its 
retention depended on an individual’s ability in holding 
office. a chief could be either promoted, demoted or 
removed from office altogether. In this respect there was 
a greater element of achievement as opposed to ascription 
in the recruitment to and retention of office within the 
delegated power structure than in the system of offices at 
the court.
A direct result of this characteristic of the delegated 
power structure was to encourage competition for the king1 s 
favour, since a position in the power-holding group depended 
ultimately on the king. as a result of this internal 
struggle and competition among potential and actual office-
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holders, the lineages holding 'a monopoly of power did not 
present themselves as an unified group vis 'h vis the non­
power-holding section of the population. This was all the 
more important as the non-power-holding section was drawn 
into this personal struggle for the king’s favour.
One of the factors determining the king’s favour was 
related to the amount of support which a chief could muster. 
This was demonstrated by the quantity of the taxation obtained, 
especially as neither the amount nor in all cases the times 
for payment were specified. Another way in which the extent 
of a chief’s support or lack of support was demonstrated was 
the number of complaints made at the court' not only by his 
subjects but also by competitors for office. The force of 
the charge made by competitors was often related to the actual 
following which could be mustered by the office-holder and 
his competitor respectively. nil these processes made for 
a sense of participation by the ruled in the values underlying 
the holding of office.
The transcendental character of the kingship was 
concomitant with a role expectancy on the part of all his 
subjects that the king had the obligation to protect them.
This expectation by the ruled was potentially threatened in 
the monopoly of office by close relatives of the king. It
was the element of achievement and insecurity in obtaining 
and retaining office which enabled the king to prevent 
conflicts presenting themselves in a structural form between 
rulers and ruled. On the contrary by removing and replacing 
individual chiefs who no longer commanded the support of 
their subjects, the king reduced conflicts to the level of 
inter-personal relationships.
This emphasis on the inter-personal nature of conflicts 
between chiefs and subjects was given further emphasis in the 
fact that tension was not only confined to chiefs and Hutu 
subjects but also occurred between chiefs and Tutsi subjects, 
especially in relation to competition for office.
Thus the values embodied in the kingship together with 
the effective control of power by the king prevented 
grievances from taking the form of protest against the 
system of office-holding. Protest was rather directed 
against the evidently personal exercise of power by individual 
chiefs. Related to this is the fact that the instrument of 
coercive power, the warrior units of the army, were under 
the direct control of the king. This was ensured through 
the individual recruitment of warriors from different areas 
of the country in contrast to the rest of the army which 
incorporated lineage groups on a territorial basis.
It was further ensured through the demobilisation of
warrior units at the accession of a new king who built up
his own personally selected army unit. The recruitment of
warriors by the king from lineages related to him through
ties of kinship or clientship ensured that the active
military force was a reliable instrument for protecting
the power structure. Nevertheless its personal control by
the king prevented its use by locally powerful chiefs or
lineages as a threat to the Mwami and his control over the
distribution of power.
3. The complex pattern of the political system
The complex pattern of the political system resulted
partly from the large number of office-holders and their
stratification in hierarchical ranking and partly from
duplication of certain offices and the overlapping and
interlocking of the two structures.
In dealing with "delegation and centralisation of
political power" Maquet has stressed that
"the main factor which prevented local authorities 
from asserting their independence from central 
government, was the plural character of the 
political and feudal organisation" 3^-962 p.156)
"Engendered by the hierarchic plurality, the 
mistrust which prevented the subordinate chiefs 
from uniting against the central government, which 
led them to spy on each other and to inform the king 
of anything suspect, was the main check against 
tendencies towards local autonomy in Rwanda." ^p.157)
Maquet is here emphasising the effect of these elements 
on the cohesion of Rwanda society within a horizontal 
territorial framework. These same factors of competition 
in the struggle for power operating within the complex and 
overlapping hierarchies of office also made for social 
cohesion within the framework of social divisions in Rwanda 
society as a whole. The duplication in the system of 
offices in the delegated power structure have been described. 
Here we have the two parallel hierarchies of the army and 
administration which interlocked at the level of the hill 
chief. There was also duplication within the administrative 
structure in the institution of two chiefs at the district 
level - the land and cattle chiefs.
• This duplication of offices not only allowed for checks 
on the abuse of power but also opened up alternative avenues 
in the search for justice or favour. In this context it is 
of importance to consider the dual role of the army chief, 
not only in his military capacity but also in his role as a 
protector. Although in no sense can we speak of a separation 
of judicial power from the administrative power as a whole, 
jurisdiction over matters relating to cattle lay not with 
the cattle chief of the administrative structure but with 
the army chief. Direct jurisdiction over matters relating
to land disputes however lay with the land chief of the
administrative structure who was regularly a Hutu, hut
even in these matters an individual could have recourse
to his army chief. Moreover as d'Hertefelt has remarked,
"since the military structure skipped the 
territorial divisions of the administrative 
organisation, an army chief was able to 
assume his role as protector in a very 
efficient manner, for the members living 
in any district of the country were authorised 
to invoke his protection against their 
administrative chief" (I96O p,117).
Furthermore, if an army chief consistently failed to
fulfill his obligations towards army members, complaints
could be made and the king could dismiss or otherv/ise
^discipline him.
The fact that the army chief’s position could be
threatened by his subjects was of the greatest importance
in relation to the execution of his role as a protector and
judge. It is evident that it was moreover essential to
the prosperity of a country as aggressive as Rwanda that
the king could count on his army chiefs having the support
of their army members.
It is against this background that we must consider the
integration of the kinship structure into the wider political
system. With the exception of the Ntore, the lineage formed
1 7 2 .
the basic unit of administration within the army. The
lineage head apportioned the taxes incumbent on the lineage.
The king and his court were the main beneficiaries of their
products and labour which were needed for the royal household,
the king’s ritual, ceremonies, his government and his army.
On the other hand it was through the lineage head that was
channelled the redistribution of protection, resulting
from the king’s ritual, military, judicial and administrative
functions and the re-channelling of cattle and their produce.
Furthermore integration into a single system restricted
the authority of the lineage head. In inter- or intra- inzu
disputes, the individual member had other avenues open to
him in seeking justice. It is the army structure, into
which the inzu and its members was incorporated which
constituted an alternative way, open to all members, of
seeking justice in dispute with the administration. This
is of special importance in relation to the way judicial
procedures operated in Rwanda.
Sandrart- notes of the Rwanda,
"On ne peut concevoir que celui qui dfetient 
le pouvoir, ne puisse en meme temps puiir'1 (1939 p.118)
This concept is related to the fact that any individual
invested with authority could dispense justice among those
over whom they had authority, Thus not only did lineage 
heads at different levels have authority over their lineage
members and patrons could settle disputes among their clients
s
but also political authority, wherever existing, superseded 
the kinship structure as loci of jurisdiction. Courts were 
therefore hierarchically ranked and ran parallel with the 
political structure but anyone could have access to a higher 
court without passing through the lower ones* However some 
specialisation existed at the-lower levels of political 
authority in that land disputes were dealt with by land 
chiefs and that cattle chiefs were competent only in matters 
of taxation and not with regard to rights over cattle or 
pasture* Ho political authority could pass'the death 
sentence without reference to the Mwami, Moreover the king 
could overrule any decision of the courts and could stop 
feuding. When he forbade further vengeance his decision was 
publicly announced by one of his personal special messengers* 
Disobedience of the king’s will in this regard was punished 
by extermination of the rebellious family. Kagame gives 
several instances of this ^1952 p.133).
As the judiciary was linked with political authority, 
judicial processes constituted a testing- ground of socio­
political power in the continuous competition for a place in
the political structure. This led to seeking the support 
of sufficiently important chiefs and patrons in defending 
onefs case in order to demonstrate one’s strength. Similarly 
chiefs and patrons would show their position Toy being 
accompanied and supported by their following when attending 
court. This was moreover related to the fact that the 
judiciary had no coercive power at their disposal for the 
implementation of their verdict and thus the verdict was 
directed towards a. compromise, i.e. consensus. The greater 
one’s support the more favourable the verdict was likely to 
be, the weaker the support the less was the likelihood of 
a favourable verdict and the easier it was 1d bring pressure 
to bear in the implementation of the verdict.
The importance of the army chief, with his local 
representative the hill chief, as an alternative avenue for 
justice must be assessed in the light of the overall pattern 
of judicial processes in Rwanda. The fact that the two 
district chiefs had only one subordinate chief constituted 
an instrument of direct and effective control in the hands 
of the army chief.
The duplication of hierarchies and offices thus made 
for checks on the exercise of power not only from the point 
of view of central government but also from the standpoint
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of the ruled in the maintenance of their rights. The 
complex pattern of the system containing:
(1) A multiplicity of hierarchically ranked and 
unequally rewarded offices, which made for 
competition and strife;
(2) duplicated structures which interlocked at 
different levels;
(3) the nature of the role of the army chief, as 
a warlord and as a protector,
formed a framework for mobility within the power-holding 
group and made for flexibility in the system. we can 
describe the system as flexible in that it allowed for 
considerable manoeuvering of relationships with office­
holders through the exercise of pressure and the access to 
alternative channels of power. The flexibility therefore 
relates to the manipulation of relationships by persons 
lacking power.
The processes related to this mobility within and 
flexibility of the political system constituted an element 
of social cohesion in maintaining a degree of control over 
the power of the office-holders and in allowing and encouraging 
participation in the system at all levels through the exercise 
of pressures or the offering or withholding of support.
(The system which provided this mobility and flexibility 
profited by these built-in mechanisms for its own protection 
for,
♦'the political and clientage structure protected 
them ^the ruled) against an exaggerated pressure 
which could have had disastrous consequences for 
the upper caste*1 (Maquet I96I p. 155)-
c X ( '
This observation does not distract from the conclusion I have
arrived at as the one does notv necessarily exclude the other.
However they conflict with Professor Coders1s hypothesis
according to which,
**the more powerful oppressed the less powerful or 
or powerless,1 power was used to the hilt by those 
who* possessed it1
and
"the brutal and relentless struggle for power among 
the (Tutsi kept them harsh and undistracted in their 
use of power1
and fir the r comparing the "protection * element with the 1920 
Chicago "protection racket", (,1962’vp.85).
as we have seen when dealing with the Mwami, the queen 
mother and the biru the impact of certain measures introduced 
by the Belgian administration disrupted much of the function 
of central government. Against this background we must now 
turn to a short survey of those measures affecting the 
administrative and army structures.
Shortly after the arrival of Belgian troops at the 
time of a great famine and widespread disease, Musinga 
was forced to sign a decree by which the lower parts of 
the slopes and the marshes, which had hitherto been reserved 
for grazing, especially in the dry season, were to be used 
for agriculture. In 1929 ibikingi land was abolished and 
so was the army structure including the position of army 
chief. The duplication of offices was abandoned being 
replaced by a single hierarchy.
In 1930 a beginning was made with reorganising the 
boundaries of the chiefdoms and sub-chiefdoms with the aim 
of drastically reducing the number. The same year also 
saw a reorganisation of the tax system imposing universal 
adult male taxation which was no longer administered through 
the inzu head. Taxation due to the Mwami in goods and labour 
was replaced by an annual payment of money. In 1953 councils 
to the various chiefs were established. However at the level 
of the suhrchief the electoral college was appointed by the 
sub-chief. The chief*s council was elected by the sub-chiefs 
and some members of their council.
Prom what has been said of the army structure it is 
evident that the abolition of the army structure and the 
position of army chief constituted an important change in
the total system of social relationships relating to mobility 
within and flexibility of the system. Moreover the army 
units' had provided a framework in which Tutsi, Hutu and Twa 
had a common membership. In times of war this involved 
active co-operation and although each group had specific 
but complementary duties, e.g. in plundering, herding or 
fighting, it formed a context in which common loyalties in 
face of a common enemy and sharing a common danger were 
involved. It moreover constituted a context in which division 
of labour effectively operated and in which the instrument 
of coercive power demonstrated itself as a means of protection 
for the whole community. Although there is insufficient 
evidence to assume that common membership in army units 
involved active co-operation between Tutsi, Hutu and Twa it 
might well have been that on the conceptual level, divisions 
of labour and co-operation operative in times of war on the 
basis of protection might not be unrelated to the easier 
acceptance of the same patterns of division of authority 
and labour in times of peace.
The conclusions arrived at in this chapter differ 
substantially from observations made by Codere t^ ref. p. 176) 
and de Heusch, who describes the army as:
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"une arm6e entierement vou&e aux conquStes 
Tutsi et au maintien de la domination Tutsi 
sur le Hutu." (1966 p.134)
However it must be noted that these authors have left out
of their analysis the whole complex of the army in its
administrative and judicial aspects.
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C H A P T E R  I I I  
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPEEX
In the previous chapter I have analysed the political 
system in Rwanda. The king clearly occupied a central 
position in the political structure. For the maintenance 
of his court and hits army, for the execution of his orders 
and for support against potential rival groups he depended 
on the chiefs whom he had appointed and who were not 
necessarily bound to him by ties of close kinship. Moreover 
we have seen that there was intense competition for the 
various offices' contained in the political system. The 
clientage system in Rwanda was closely related to this 
competition for political office. This has been described 
by lemarehand (,1966 p,3ll) mainly in terms of the protection 
secured by the client in exchange for economic goods and 
services rendered to the patron. 1. Mair (I96I) has analysed 
clientage relations in East Africa in broader terms of the 
mutual advantages gained by'both, although unequal, partners 
in the relationship. Dr. Mair*s analysis is in the context 
of the development of political systems. while I shall not 
be considering this developmental aspect of clientage relations 
I propose to analyse the clientage system in Rwanda in these
broader terms of mutual advantage and to further determine
the nature of these advantages within the wider context of
the political and economic systems.
The clientage structure in Rwanda is called ubuhake
and has been described by Maquet (I96I). Ubuhake denoted
"the relationship between a person called 
garagu (client) and another called sjebuja 
(patron). That relationship was created 
when an individual, Hutu or Tutsi, who had 
an inferior social status and who was less 
provided with cattle, offered his services 
to and asked protection from a person of 
higher status and whose wealth in eattle 
was greater." (p.129)
"The ubuhake relation could be ended when 
both client and patron or only one of them 
wanted this" (p.131)
Gravel describes the ubuhake system as
"the institution through which an individual, 
be he peasant or herder, commended himself to 
a'lord. The lord gave protection and support; 
he also gave the vassal rights to exploit a 
certain amount of land and he gave him a cow or 
cows. The vassal on the other hand, swore 
fealty and recognised unto himself.duties of 
homage, payments in dties and kind, labour and 
service in general," (1968 p.24)
• Gravel disagrees with
"European scholars of Rwanda who have generally 
seen the cow as the sole benefice and completely
distinct from land tenure...... The benefice,
land, was the measure of service and the cow 
recorded the grant of benefice" (p.82)
However both descriptions imply the common factors of a
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personal relationship, an exchange of economic'goods and 
mutual support* On the other hand, Maquet (p.138) and 
d!Hertefelt 1,1962 p*69) call chiefs of the administrative 
and army structures clients of the king, "Les grands chefs 
fetaient les garagu du monarque". Others go still further: 
"lorsque un hhef fetait fetabli sur une colline, tous ses 
sujets devenaient par le fait m£me ses clients1 ^Hothombe 
1Q65 p.155).
Against this background of what has been said of the 
political structure it is clear that the word client, as 
used by the different authors or by the same author in 
different contexts, applies to different relationships and 
is therefore ambiguous* Maquet has designated as feudal 
all the relationships expressed in the ubuhake. 1. de Heusch
has taken exception to this: "les autorit&s-politiques sont 
les repr6sentants du roi avant d*£tre sen clients11* In 
this thesis I do not intend to participate in this discussion 
as to whether Bwanda should be classified as feudal or 
nonfeudal. I shall follow L. Strauss 1,1964) ^ a n d
to)
Beatie 1,1964) in avoiding the use of the "feudal terminology,!
A
(1) "qu’une grande circonspection est requise dans lfemploi 
pour dfecrire des soci§tes tres diff&rentes, de termes qui ont 
une sens trds precis au regard des historiens"(,Bcole Pratique 
des hautes 6tudes 1964 p.52).
1,2) I consider it to be more useful and illuminating. * *. to 
describe the political institutions of Bunyor£°and other 
African Kingdoms as far as possible in their own termsf(,1964 p.23
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^Gravel I968) with its inevitable implication of* cross- 
cultural comparison. We have to consider the institution of 
ubuhake in Bwanda in the wider context both of the political 
system and of the economic complex. In this chapter I 
propose to deal with: *,1) Bights in land, (2) Bights in
cattle, (3) Ubuhake, (4) Ihe clientage structure and its 
development.
part i RIGHTS IN LAND
Cultivation and cattle-rearing formed the basis of 
the Rwanda subsistence economy. Rights in land related 
to both i.e. cultivation and grazing. while pasture rights 
excluded cultivation, cultivation rights did not exclude 
grazing on farmland after the harvest. Maquet and 
Sv Naigisiki (,1957) have categorised the various rights in 
land according to whether land was recently cleared from 
the bush or forest or had been under cultivation for some 
time. The former are called forest regions, the latter 
rural regions. Although this distinction based on an 
indefinite time-period is not very satisfactory it will be 
used in this discussion as a basis for further interpretation.
Rural areas were distinguished as either ibihutu, 
ibitutsi or ibikenke. Ibihutu were predominantly agricultural 
land and were denseljr populated by cultivators who were 
either Hutu or' "poor Tutsi" v,°P* cit. p.342). The 
administrative officers living in these areas herded their 
cattle on the land of the cultivators after the harvest and 
on the uncultivated valley marshland. Ibitutsi were less 
populated areas and were largely pasture land although 
some cultivators lived there as well. Ibikenke were very
sparsely populated areas in which, anyone who had cattle 
had free access for grazing except in certain parts which 
were reserved for "official cattle". The areas referred 
to as forest regions consisted of recently cleared hush or 
forest-land which were called ubukonde.
A. RURAL ARRAS
(,a) Pasture
Rights to pasture were called ibikingi and sometimes 
referred to land which was exclusively pastureland and at 
other times referred to the seasonal grazing rights on 
agricultural land. These ibikingi or rights to pasture 
were given by the political chiefs, who acted as representative 
of the king. The institution seems to have been introduced 
not long before the arrival of the iuropeans. The Rwanda 
attribute the introduction of ibikingi to the grandfather 
of Rwabugire, Yuhi, who reigned at the end of the last 
century. Before the ibikingi rights were introduced there 
was only common pasture to which all cattle owners had access. 
The cluster of rights and obligations associated with 
ibikingi are related to political power not only because of 
its introduction by the Mwami" but also in as far as the 
distribution of these rights lay with the political authorities 
Ibikingi primarily refers to rights to graze cattle on a
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certain area granted by the political authorities in 
exchange for cattle and an annual payment of dues, the 
amount of which was related to the spatial extension of 
these rights. But he did not need to pay these goods or 
render these services himself but could use the labour and 
goods due to him by his tenants.
However the term ibikingi also referred to the actual 
area of the concession. When we dealt with the duties of 
the hill chief (,p.l53) we touched upon these rights.
Although the holder of ibikingi land could reserve a part 
of it for the settlement of cultivators, the concession 
could neither be subdivided among his heirs nor could he 
sell parts of it. Those who were thus settled had to x^ ay 
in regular goods and services and had to allow the ibikingi 
landholder to graze his cattle on the stubble after the 
harvest. Normally tie se cultivators settled on ibikingi 
land’ were the holders1 clients. If the holder no longer 
exercised his rights either because he had no cattle or 
because he had left the hill, the rights reverted to the 
political chief, who could allocate these rights to whomsoever 
he wanted including his own kin.
These rights differed according to whether they operated 
in ibihutu, ibitutsi or ibikende areas.
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ibitutsi zones the concessions involved exclusive 
rights on certain pastures.
In ibihutu zones,, the political chief reserved any 
pasture still available for himself and his kin and distributed 
grazing rights only on the cultivators’ land after the harvest, 
ibikende zones the chief reserved certain grazing 
grounds for himself but the rest was free grazing ground for 
whoever had cattle; no ibikingi rights were needed.
At the death of a person holding ibikingi, the rights 
passed to his heirs. At the death or replacement of the 
political chief, rights to hold or allocate ibikingi and the 
income from already allocated rights passed to his successor 
who was not necessarily his heir. If an ibikingi land 
holder who had personal clients settled on his land, left 
the area and the ibikingi rights were redistributed to 
somebody else, the cultivators settled on the ibikingi l
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land did not ipso facto become clients of the new holder 
nor did they owe him any dues.
(b) Agricultural land
Lineage holdings were called ingobyi. fhese referred 
to land which was exploited communally under the direction 
of the lineage' head who allocated any land still available.
If land became vacant either through lack of heirs or because
of departure of the current holder, the land returned to the 
general lineage holding and fell under the authority of the 
lineage head. He then parcelled out the land to each 
household according to its need.
fhe land holding of an individual household was called 
umunani. Although each household (rugo) had its own well 
defined land, no visible boundary marks were drawn. Ihe
lineage head, as holder of the ingobyi land, paid tribute to
the Mwami* but neither the amount nor the time for payment 
were fixed. If an individual member of the lineage had a
dispute with the lineage head over rights to umunani land,
he could have recourse to a political chief to act as an 
arbitrator. fhese disputes were often related to reduction 
or division of umunani land ordered hy the lineage head, due 
to population pressures. In such cases of dispute the 
lineage head was forced to accept the judgement of the 
political chief. through this action however the discontented 
umunani holder cut himself off from his lineage and the land 
rights* he held were henceforth considered as falling under 
the political authority. It was to the chief, as office 
holder, that the umunani holder and his descendants thereafter 
paid in goods (ibihunikwa) and services tubuletwa). fhe 
chief could transfer these rights to a third party. He
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could for instance direct that the services due to him 
should he rendered to a widow or allocate these rights 
to his personal clients. These holdings resulting from 
political intervention were called isambu.
There were several advantages to be gained by the 
political chief in intervening on behalf of an individual 
member of a lineage in land disputes.
1. More land came under his direct control which 
resulted in him obtaining goods and services;
2. If for one reason or another isambu land became 
vacant, it no longer reverted to the lineage 
but to the political chief who could re-allocate 
rights over it in whole or in part, e.g. rights 
on a banana plantation to one and arable land
to another;
3. The individual concerned had from then on to pay 
tax directly to the chief and no longer through
the lineage head as in the case of ingobyi land <
when it was only the lineage head who was taxed.
The general process of turning ingobyi land into isambu 
land was gradual and related to the establishment of 
effective political control by official chiefs who had 
sufficient influence to implement the transfer. In densely
populated areas where no land was available it constituted 
the only way open to the political authorities to extend 
their effective control over agricultural land.
If somebody wanted a plot of land in the less densely 
populated areas where land was still available, the political 
chief had the exclusive right to grant rights in land and 
to determine the boundaries, again in exchange for goods 
and services. Moreover if the land became vacant it . 
reverted to his authority. Bights in land granted in this 
way were also isambu holdings. However in very sparsely 
populated areas, e.g. Bugesera, a man could simply occupy 
a plot without asking and there were no dues attached to it. 
However if a neighbour installed himself, the political 
authorities had to be called upon to indicate the boundaries. 
Brom that moment onwards the holding became isambu land and 
the holder had to pay ubuletwa, i.e. two days' of work per 
week and ibihunikwa. This taxation for all isambu holders 
was different from the taxation to the Mwami (ikoro), which 
was due twice a year.
By I9OO <,in Central Rwanda) the political authority had 
established its control over land with its concomitant 
economic benefits for the office holders and the pattern 
of isambu land had become widespread and was indicative of
1 9 1 .
the influence of the political authority and the lack of 
lineage influence as regards rights in arable land.
An isambu holder could sublet all or part of his land 
either 011 a temporary or permanent basis. Onljr in the 
latter case could he build a homestead on the land but this 
right was only granted to him if he became the holder's 
client. It was the isambu holder however and not his 
settled client who paid the ubuletwa and the ibihunikwa to 
the chief, but he did not need to pay these goods or render 
these services himself but could use the labour and goods 
due to ham by his tenant to discharge himself of these 
duties. The client himself could again sublet the whole 
or part of his land but could not allow his tenant to settle 
on the land nor could the tenant retain rights over a banana 
plantation if for instance he left the area. Payment by 
sub-tenants was exclusively in goods to the Mwami (ikoro)
Because the income of the chief was directly derived 
from taxation and hence depended on the number of taxpayers, 
he was not inclined to give too extensive plots of land,’but 
welcomed as many, settlers as possible and tried to provide 
conditions such that few wanted to leave. This relates to 
the situation of the land holder of which Maquet remarks: 
ffIl jouissait d'une grande stability de fait" 1^957, p.353) •
Somebody desiring igikingi would approach the chief and 
make him a gift of a cow. This cow became the chief's 
private property and he could use it within the ubuhake 
system to make a client. Therefore this chief was also 
quite often the'patron of some of his subjects. In this 
case it was'not only to the benefit of the chief that both 
functions were'held by him but also to the advantage of 
the client inasmuch as the total of the client-subject 
obligations were reduced and his political chief was also 
his protector. Thus the political function allowed office 
holders to extend the circle of their reliable clients while 
the clients helped them in upholding their position and were 
instrumental in the implementation of the chief's decisions. 
If the chief was replaced he remained the patron of his 
clients but the igikingi holder had to give the new chief 
a cow (indabukirano) as a gift.
B. "BOREST RESIGNS"
The boundaries of -Rwanda had been gradually expanding 
towards the-North-East and East through clearing of the 
tropical forest which was the domain of the Twa. Through 
payment of an often small fee to the Twa lineage head, 
somebody who wanted to cut down the forest for cultivation 
was granted a concession which could be quite extensive.
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The boundaries were clearly marked and the land within 
these boundaries was called ubukonde land while the holder 
was called umukonde. .^s more forest was cut down and
family numbers increased, the land obtained was parcelled 
out by the umukonde, or lineage head, to his lineage members. 
In some cases several lineage heads were -united under one 
head, the Muhinza. The lineage members did not pay tribute 
to the umukonde nor did the umukonde pay to the Muhinza.
Most of the abakonde and Bahinza paid tribute to the Mwami, 
although they remained the heads of autonomous corporate 
groups. The umukonde or the Muhinza allowed non-lineage 
members to settle in his domain, but this was not on a 
clientage basis but on a basis of co-operation. No dues 
in goods or services were demanded but gifts were given, 
especially by newly arrived settlers. If the holder of 
ubukonde land left no heir or abandoned his land, the plot 
returned to the lineage and could be re-allocated by the 
umukonde or Muhinza. we find some cases in whbh patrons 
had sent their clients from central Rwanda to cut down a 
part of the forest to turn it into pasture. These too 
were ubukonde land and constituted the first infiltration 
of Tutsi from central Rwanda into these areas. However 
this was on a personal and not a political basis.
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Prom this description it is clear that there was a 
close similarity between ibikingi and isambu land in that 
both were granted by the political authority* However 
they differed in that cattle had to be paid only for obtaining 
ibikingi land* Ubukonde and ingobyi land were similar in 
that they were both lineage land, generally belonging to 
Hutu lineages, but differed in that ingobyi land was situated 
in those areas where the political authority of central 
Rwanda was established and where there was pressure to turn 
ingobyi land into isambu land. Until 1900 ubukonde land 
had escaped these pressures. The holders of both types of 
land had escaped ubuletwa and ibihunikwa taxation although 
both paid inkore to the Mwami. In the case of inkore the 
ubukonde paid directly whereas the lineage heads of ingobyi 
land, insofar as it still existed, paid through the chiefs.
It is unfortunate that there are no details as to the extent 
°£ ingobyi land in Rwanda around I9OQ.
The different patterns of rights in land as held either 
on the btisis of allocation by the lineage or by the political 
authorities ikd a geographical distribution in Rwanda directly 
correlated with those areas in which the influence of lineage 
v or political authority were respectively dominant. These 
different ways in which rights to land could be acquired
resulted in tensions when political authorities exerted 
pressure for the extension of their powers. The peripheral 
areas had succeeded in resisting these pressures up till the 
arrival of colonial rule.
It is against this background that we must see the 
following measures taken by the government.
1. The instalment of Tutsi chiefs in the peripheral 
areas as part of a unified system of administration. 
This meant that any land available came- under 
political control, and that land which became 
vacant no longer returned io the lineage head
but to the political chief. This in turn meant 
that the chief could and in fact did (Pauwels 1967 
p.297) install his relations and their cattle or 
their Tutsi clients and their cattle on the land 
in terms of occupation by Tutsi.
2. In 1932 the granting of further ubukonde rights in 
the forest was forbidden and rights already held
.could no longer be used for turning the forest 
into arable land.
3. In 1932 universal adult male taxation for the Mwami 
was imposed. Thus rugo heads who in the ubukonde
ingoybi system had never paid tax were now
obliged to start paying. The tax, which required 
from all adult males three days of labour for the 
chief and ten days for the sub chief tubuletwa and 
ibihunikwa*), also affected those who had hitherto 
succeeded in avoiding this taxation which was 
formerly reserved for isambu holders. Clients 
settled on ibikingi land who had so far been free 
of ubuletwa and ibihunikwa but who had to work for 
their patron and give him goods, now had to render 
both goods and services twice over. Those who had 
obtained ibikingi land in exchange for a cow had 
never paid in goods and services as the cow was 
supposed to be in lieu of this., The government
accepted the continuation of this exemption. as
a result, many rich Tutsi, who held ibikingi land, 
in fact neither paid in goods nor in services. 
Contrary to the actual situation, ibikingi rights 
were held to be of a private nature as was ubuhake. 
However since 1924- no new ibikingi land could be 
granted and all available pasture was to be held
4* for chief 1 kg of small peas
2 kg of sorghum 
for sub chief 2 kg of peas or beans
■ 4 kg of sorghum
communally under the direction of the chief.
In 1952 ubuletwa and ibihunikwa were replaced by 
payment in money, viz. Art. 20 of the decree of 
14.7.52,
"Les prestations dues coutumiBrement, en nature 
ou sous forme de travail, aux bami, chefs et 
sous-chefs sont remplacfees par des contributions 
en argent a leur profit." $
$ in 1953* ibihunikwa; 1 P. for the chief and 3 P. for
sub chief
ubuletwa: 13 P.. for the chief and 40 P. for
sub chief.
7 P. = 1 shilling
PART 2 RIGHTS IN CATTLE
Parallel to the system of land tenure with its competing 
lineage and government spheres of interest, we find in 
Rwanda a complex of rights and obligations in cattle which 
similarly differ in the context of individual and government 
control. In practice rights in cattle cannot be divorced 
from rights in pasture.
Before dealing with the rights in cattle themselves 
some attention should be given as to the total extent and 
the incidence of cattle possession in Rwanda especially in 
relation to the concept that Tutsi are pasturalists and Hutu 
agriculturalists. The data available are inadequate in 
many respects. Por instance figures are given for the 
"possession" of cattle in which it is not clear whether 
"possession" refers to ownership or usufruct rights. 
Nevertheless some useful conclusions can be inferred from 
the data. According to one source (^ van Neessen, 1953 p. 1027) 
39.6 per cent of all Rwanda households possessed cattle in 
1952. In areas with an above-average incidence of Tutsi 
in the population, i.e. between 15 &nd 25 peu cent, the 
extent of cattle possession rises to 55 per cent. as for
other parts of Rwanda, Bourgeois notes of the provinces 
Shangugu, Usenyi, Biumba and Ruhengeri, that the cattle 
generally belonged "en toute propriety a la population 
autochtone Muhutu et d des 6leveiirs Bahama" (,1958 p.58).
The latter groxip refers only to the province of Biumba, 
which had 7*5 per cent of all the cattle of Rwanda.
According to the Plan JJ^cennal moreover 30 per cent of all 
the cattle of Rwanda were to be found in these four provinces 
outside central Rwanda (195^ P*392).
.although these numerical data relating to cattle 
possession do not allow for too definite conclusions, they 
permit us to raise certain points which are of relevance 
to the extent of the ubuhake system and the classification 
of Putsi as pasturalists and patrons and Hutu as agricultur­
alists and clients,
Eirst of all 30 per cent of all the cattle were in those 
areas where there was no clientage system. Either the 
cattle were held in these areas 1 en toute propri6t&,f by 
the Hutu population or by the Hima who f1,. .n1 off rent aucun 
contract de servage aux agriculteurs.H {Ruanda-Urundi I959 
p.234)* This contrasts with -Maquet's observations:
"those who have the final control of cattle were 
always Tutsi, as the Hutu had been granted only 
usufruct rights over cattle which were different 
from those enjojred “by the lords who were Tutsi,
there was no chance that the group of cattle 
owners could be invaded by Hutu" (,1961 p.139)
or
"the feudal system permitted the Tutsi to keep 
control of all Rwanda cattle" (1961 p.148),
or
"By that agreement (ubuhake), almost any Hutu 
was linked to a Tutsi" (.1961 p. 150).
< r 
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These quotations seem to infer firstly that all- Hutu were 
clients of Tutsi, who were lords. However this classifi­
cation of the population of Rwanda would assume universal 
participation in the ubuhake system. This division is 
clearly not an adequate classification as it leaves out 
those areas where we find approximately 50 per cent of the 
population. Secondly these quotations infer that only Tutsi 
owned cattle. However, as we have seen, in these areas we 
find 30 per cent of the total cattle population in Rwanda 
in the hands of those who v/ere neither Tutsi nor lords. 
Moreover in the centre of Rwanda, where we find an above- 
average incidence of Tutsi we know that 55 per cent of the 
households 'possessed1 cattle (,ref. p.198). If we take 
'possess* as meaning ownership, we must infer that as many 
Iiutu as Tutsi possessed cattle as in these areas the Tutsi 
constituted only 25 to 30 per'cent of the population. If
If we take it as meaning ownership and/or holding cattle 
in usufruct, we must infer that the great majority of the 
Hutu did not have the usufruct of cattle and therefore were 
outside the ubuhake system. However we could still possibly 
reserve the term pasturalist for Tutsi if they were exclusively 
the herders of cattle. . Maquet himself however notes that 
the actual herding was often done by Hutu who were then 
entitled to some of the milk. Me notes: "les Tutsi sont
experts en 6levage mais ils confient le soin de leurs 
troupeaux d des Hutu, n (,1957 P*58). Herding itself cannot 
therefore be used for distinguishing Tutsi from Hutu on this 
occupational basis. Thus classification of Rwandese as 
patrons or clients or generalisations by which Tutsi are 
identified with pasturalists and Hutu with agriculturalists 
need reservation and further specification.
In the previous chapters we have already mentioned some 
of the uses to which cattle were put. These included the 
context of ritual, marriage alliances, accession to political 
office, succession to family headship, rewards for services 
or valour, gifts, indemnity and taxation. The economic 
role of cattle was limited. Cattle were not used for 
ploughing and manure was not used as a fertiliser. The 
animals did not produce much meat not only because they
they were'not heavy hut also because only about 40 per cent 
of the animals was usable for food (^Adamantidis 1956 p.20).^ 
Toung bulls were slaughtered for meat and hides but the
majority of cattle were female. Despite this the total
milk production was very low. Only one in seven cows were 
in milk at any one time (Plan D&cennal I95O p.417). (These 
figures compare very well with G-ravel*s observations in 
Remera in 1960-1961. ’’Most of the cattle are female. In 
the herd of thirty one cows never more than four or five at
a time give milk. When there is milk it was to be shared
with the calf,ft (The best cow may produce an average of 
one quart a day during its time of lactation, which is 
constantly interrupted by pregnancy (P. Mar chi 1939)'.
However the economic importance of cattle cannot be 
measured exclusively in terms of the foodstuffs produced, 
but must also be seen in relation to its place within the 
total subsistence economy of Rwanda. we have already touched 
upon the fact that cattle constituted a reserve in times of 
famine when blood was consumed. Moreover access to milk 
is related to the well-being or even the survival of small 
babies since it was given to nursing mothers to feed their
$ In the U.S.A. 60 per cent is usable as food vGravel 1968 
page 94).
children, (Furthermore cattle were a preferred form of 
payment in marriage alliances. Moreover the economic 
importance of cattle cannot Toe divorced from the fact that 
we are dealing with a non-money economy where techniques 
for storing perishable goods were severely limited and where 
there were no markets for trading outside Rwanda. Cattle 
however provided a means of storing wealth in that they 
were only perishable through disease and old age and at 
the same time they produced calves as interest. Moreover 
cattle were clearly visible and constituted an external sign 
of wealth. In comparison with land the successful 
exploitation of cattle is not related to input in hard labour. 
Here again, whereas surplus land was unproductive, any 
number of cattle could be made to produce against a time 
of need.
In the chapter on kinship we have seen how cattle were 
used in relation to the registration of new relationships 
such as in marriage and in the designation of an heir. In 
the chapter on the political structure we have seen how the 
king and the army chief in the institution called umurendo 
were presented with cattle and how the ntore gave cattle 
to the king when he recruited them into the army. Gravel 
^1967 and I968 p.168) gives several more instances of
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transfer of cattle as gifts and notes that cattle moved 
not only down but also up the social scale, in both cases 
’♦recording new relationships”. He sees them as recording 
devices but excludes their economic value. ,fIn the light 
of what is known of them as recording devices, their 
production utility and exchange value becomes insignificant” 
t^ p.168). He considers cows as tokens and not symbols 
inasmuch as "cows are tokens which concrete an existing 
situation whether it is a situation of friendship or 
vassalage”. However it is my opinion that because of the 
economic value attached to cattle this aspect cannot be 
divorced from the transfer of cows. G-ravel has thrown new 
light on the significance of the transfer of cows by drawing 
attention to the fact that they moved not only down but also 
up the hierarchy. However the upward movement constituted 
a transfer of property while the downward movement 
constituted only a transfer of usufruct rights. G-ravel 
has moreover the merit of seeing the transfer of cattle as 
a testimony or proof of a new relationship. But this does 
not necessarily, as he does, exclude the economic significance 
of cattle. Because of its economic value, the transfer of 
cattle not only bears witness to a relationship but is also
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part of that relationship and this is not unrelated to the
fact that cattle handed down the socia.l scale remained the
property of the giver. Cows were economically valuable
signs or tokens. We can look upon it as a symbol °as far
as it expresses something else1 ^M. Banton 1965 P • 69) i.e.
a particular relationship. However the important point is
that even outside the context of receiving cattle in a
marriage transaction, receiving or accepting cattle does not
necessarily mean in other Rwandan contexts that the receiver
becomes the giver’s client.
Before passing on to the transfer of usufruct rights,
rights of ownership must be considered. Official cattle
which have been called ’’veritable s monuments historiques"
will here not be considered. transfer of rights of ownership *
over cattle could occur through bridewealth, dowry, compensatim
after murder, reward for valour, in exchange for goods or
labour, as a gift and through inheritance. (These cattle
were referred to as imbata. Of these rights Maquet notes,
’’the king kept the preeminent rights over all 
Rwanda cattle. Bven if he did not use frequently 
his rights against Hutu, they were not forgotten: 
the very cows which were not received from a lord 
but acquired by one’s own efforts and over which 
the possessor had usufruct plus bare ownership 
were called ’King’s cows* (inka 2 ’umwami) as 
often as imbata0. (I96I p.148)
However this name refers to the fact that these cattle, 
in case of lack of an heir, became the property of the king 
and indicates that the rights the owner held were as good 
as the king’s, i.e. nobody could toxich them. Musinga in 
1926 said of these rights, ”Hul, pas m£me moi, n ’a le droit 
d ’en contester la propri6t§ absolue” (Rapport annuel sur 
1 ’administration du Ruanda-Urundi, p. 64). Oattle outside 
central Rwanda were generally imbata. Usufruct rights in 
these cattle co^lld be given to other people in exchange for 
goods and services. In Rwanda we find three different 
institutions relating to this transfer of usufruct rights.
1 . Ubugwate. Example: A. owns an imbata cow and needs
other goods urgently and has no other way of obtaining 
them than through ’’selling” his cow but he does not 
want to lose his cow. a . would exchange his cow 
for B ’s male calf. A. would then exchange the 
male calf for whatever he needed and later receives 
from B. either the first female calf born from A*s 
former cow while B. keeps the cow or B. keeps the 
female calf and returns A ’s cow. Other details 
as to who gets the milk and who gets a male calf 
which might be born from a ’s cow are negotiated 
beforehand.
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2. Ugushega, In the South-West we find this contract 
between Rwanda Hutu and Mushi from the Congo*
Example: the Rwanda a , gives five goats and one
male calf in exchange for a cow belonging to the 
Mushi B, i’he cow becomes A's full property but 
A. must render services for a certain period to B* 
and return to B. the third female calf born from 
that cow. If it should die before being returned, 
any other calf has to be given and if there is one, 
a female calf.
3* Ubuhake. Since this institution covers a wider field
it will be dealt with in greater detail in the next 
part of this chapter.
PaM  5
THE CLIENTAGE SYSTEM, "UBUHAKE”
In *the beginning of this chapter we have already 
introduced the institution of clientage called ubuhake, 
denoting the relationship between garagu (client.) and 
sjebuja (patron). This relationship was initiated by 
the person in the inferior position. Before a patron wotild 
accept somebody as his client, the person seeking this 
relationship had to serve a time of apprenticeship lasting 
from six months to two years. Baring that time he was 
called umuhange. At the end of that period, the patron 
would let his future client know that he accepted him as a 
client. The client would assemble with his family in the 
homestead of the patron and in the presence of witnesses or 
other clients of the patron, the client would, with one knee 
on the ground, place his hands, palms together, in the open 
hands of the patron and say something like "I shall be forever 
faithful to you1’ (Gravel I968 p. 165)* patron would
then give him a cow in usufruct and thus the agreement was 
sealed. The ubuhake relationship was perpetuated between 
the heirs of patron and client, subject to the approval of 
the patron.
In material terms the client had the full usufruct of 
the cow’s products including the meat and skin when she di'ed. 
Male increase 136081116 the olivet's private property while 
female increase remained the patron’s although the client 
had full usufruct of the female increase. The client had 
the right however to use the ubuhake cow or its calf for 
bride price and in this case the patron could not reclaim 
it for whatever reason, even if the ubuhake agreement ended. 
In that case it was completely lost to the patron because 
it had become "imbata” of the bride’s lineage. The cow 
could be used again by the client to become the patron of 
somebody else. Further the ubuhake agreement extended to 
all kinds of other material advantages for the client 
resulting from the patron’s position as his protector and 
benefactor. The client in need of a hoe or clothing, 
additional supplies for a feast or meat and milk for a sick 
person, would ask his patron who was expected to give 
whatever was needed. In practice such gifts depended mainly 
on the strength of the relationship which had been built up, 
which was related to the client’s support of his patron.
If the client’s widow or children were not taken care of 
the patron would do this. In later years it was the patron 
who paid the poll-tax imposed under Belgian rule. Moreover
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the patron was supposed to support and help the client in 
all contexts and when a client had committed an offence the 
patron was expected to help or even pay the whole of the fine 
or the compensation. In these contexts the patron would 
accompany his client, he himself surrounded by all his clients. 
In case the client was murdered, it was the patron who 
demanded justice from the Mwami. nil these instances of 
help or protection of the patron must be seen not as part 
of a prearranged detailed agreement but as an expected 
consequence and part of the relationship.
The client on the other hand had to support his patron. 
The nature of this support is related to the particular needs 
of the patron and the capabilities of the client. a s  in the 
client’s case, we can distinguish two kinds of obligations, 
one of which is expressed in economic terms and one which 
refers to the field of power.- In economic terms the client, 
if he was an agriculturalist, would help in cultivating the 
patron’s field or provide him with some of the products of 
his own fields, collect firewood and act as night-watch.
If the client was a cattle owner himself he would be 
required to help in milking, herding, accompanying the 
patron on his travels, etc. Moreover the patron had the 
right of umurundo, that is to say that once in his lifetime
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he could review all the cattle of his client and choose one 
of them for his own private property. Imbata cattle were 
excluded from this. The extent of the support demanded 
was related to the status of the client as this status was 
part and parcel of the relationship between the two partners. 
The higher the status of the client the more support he 
could expect in case of need. Neither the type or frequency 
of labour nor the type and quantity of goods were pre-arranged 
in the agreement 5 it all depended on the support which the 
patron needed just as the support the patron gave depended 
on the needs of the client.
There were special sanctions against excessive demands 
from either side. Moreover this was contrary to the essence 
of the agreement since it was opposed to the "moral” support 
which was part of the relationship. Moreover in the 
subsistence economy, which lacked external markets and 
storing techniques, hoarding of agricultural products was 
impossible and in no way profitable. Although economic 
benefits definitely entered into the agreement on both sides, 
the ubuhake from the patron’s point of view was primarily a 
personal relationship in which he could count on the loyalty 
of his clients, who were bound to him more closely than to 
anyone else outside his immediate kin. Therefore no client
could- have two patrons, even if materially he could afford 
to satisfy both their needs. Moreover in effectively 
protecting his clients the patron had an opportunity to 
show and to test his strength. The support of his clients 
was’ not only of importance to the patron in court eases but 
had special relevance in the competition for and the 
protection against political power. In this, he depended 
on a wider circle of relationships than could be relied on 
through kinship.
The patron coifLd be a sufficiently wealthy private 
citizen, who wanted to prove his status. Often, however, 
the patron was a political chief and all political chiefs 
were patrons. Office, as we have seen, while describing 
land tenure, gave his access to cattle (e.g. ibikingi).
These cattle he could and did use partly to build up his 
own herd and partly to establish relationships with clients. 
The- ability to strike the right balance was not unrelated 
to* being1 a suceessftil chief. In the political structure 
cattle were passed up the social scale and in the ubuhake 
structure cattle were passed down but with the reservation 
that in a downward transfer ultimate control rested with 
the' patron who kept the property rights over his 
cattle. In more than one sense the ubuhake system
is related to and conditioned by the political structure
although it is not a direct part of it. Although one’s
patron could be one’s political chief the nature of the
ubuhake relationship, including the way it was entered and
maintained, was essentially different from the relationship
between chief and subject.
ubuhake relationship, contrary to the chief-subject
relationship, could be ended by either of the parties
concerned. If the relationship was ended by the patron
because the client did not fulfil his obligations, the
patron would sue his client for damages. The client, being
without a patron, would then be in a highly vulnerable
position. However it was'normally a stable relationship
which if it was ended resulted in the patron taking his
cattle back. Since 1920 however, when political chiefs and
even other patrons broke off their ubuhake relationship, the
patron would take all the client’s cattle, including his
private imbata cattle.
"Administrative chiefs who were important' lords 
are said....to have modified the custom to their 
own advantage by establishing the principle of 
merging cows received from a lord with those 
acquired independently of any shebuja"
(Maquet I96I p.132)
In this context it is however important to note that 
clients cannot be identified with Hutu, sinee both Tutsi
and Hutu were clients in the ubuhalce system. Neither did 
being a client of one person exclude the same person from 
being patron to another. Categorisation as to clients and 
patrons cannot therefore be used as a basis of stratification 
of Rwanda society. Neither was the fact of being a patron 
or a client necessarily an index of higher or lower rank in 
that society. Respective rank depended less on the status 
of patron or client per se than on the actual social ranking 
of the person who was one1s patron or the persons who were 
one’s clients. The actual status of a patron depended also 
on the number of his clients. Nevertheless being a client 
but not a patron denoted a lower status in the system of 
distribution of power and authority than being both a client 
and a patron.
Ubuhake is therefore an interpersonal and normally 
hereditary relationship. It was freely entered into by 
two partners of unequal status and resulted in mutual support 
in matters relating to ’politics’ and power. In its 
formation the patron gave a cow to the client as a proof 
and external sign of the relationship and as a part of the 
exchange of economic benefits in goods and services which 
differed in kind as between patron and client. Essentially 
therefore the relationship between patron and client is one
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of mutual advantage. without further attempt at analysis 
as to whether or in what way this advantage was unequal,
I intend to further define the nature of this mutual 
advantage in terms of political inter-dependence and economic 
exchange, by setting the ubuhake system as such in the 
framework of the social system of which it was a part. My 
intention is to bring out the nature of this interpersonal 
relationship between patron and client by analysing the 
nature of the ubuhake institution as a part of the social 
system around 1900.
In Rwanda political power rested with the king who 
delegated his power to more or leas close affines and 
traditionally important lineages. within these lineages 
struggle and* competition went on for the actual holding of 
power positions. Support in this contest could not be 
limited to the lineage as, firstly, in central Rwanda the 
lineages were not localised. Secondly, competition went 
on within the lineages and, thirdly, actual power not only 
extended over but involved the support of a wider group 
than the lineage. This meant in practical terms that 
official authority extended not only over pasturalists but 
also over agriculturalists, the persons in these two 
occupational categories being dispersed over the area of a
chiefdom. Those chiefs who remained sedentary had an 
evident advantage in the complex manipulation of support 
necessary in the Rwanda political system. By sharing out 
his cattle, the chief obtained a following on a local and 
not necessarily kinship basis, although it was possible to 
have close kin, e.g. siblings as clients. He also obtained 
the agricultural products he needed. Others having cattle 
and aspiring to political power also profited from becoming 
sedentary so that they could build up their following and 
assure agrarian products through sharing out their cattle 
in the ubuhake system. In both cases sharing out of cattle 
and support from the clients is clearly related to obtaining 
or maintaining political office. Other cattle owners who 
remained sedentary for whatever reason rather than being 
semi-nomadic, were necessarily drawn into the competition 
for power, through the need to protect their cattle from 
those who wanted them as an instrument to build up a following. 
This protection they had to obtain by becoming clients of 
the political chief, that is by receiving a cow from the 
chief in exchange for their support. This I will call 
primary clientage. The client could again establish his 
own client relationship with the same cow. This I will 
call secondary clientage.
The more widely a man managed to extend his own circle 
of clients the more support he would have in the locality. 
Moreover his own patron would benefit from this support and 
therefore he would receive in turn greater support and 
protection, from his own piatron. Thus the small cattle 
owner was almost unavoidably drawn into the power struggle 
and power structure and felt that he played an important 
role in distributing his own and his clients1 allegiances.
From the point of view of political support it was evidently 
more profitable to bestow cows through ubuhake on those who 
were already cattle owners and likely contenders in the 
political competition since it was these men who would be 
likely to hand on the cows in creating secondary clientage 
relationships and thereby build up support for the original 
owner. If a cow was given to an agriculturalist or, more 
generally, to a non-contender in the power struggle he would 
be more likely to keep the cow for his own use and not extend 
the circle of clients through secondary clientage relationships 
Thus the clientage system worked in favour of the cattle 
owners as they cotxld rely on preferential treatment.
Those who had cattle, but did not participate in the 
political struggle, protected their cattle by leading a semi- 
nomadic life and did not have clients. It is in this
context that we should see the semi-nomadic owners of 
extensive herds in Eastern Rwanda, the Hima. Against 
this background we must see also the relationship of patron 
and client in as far as it enters the political field. It 
is a relationship of mutual advantage, but containing 
advantages of a different kind for patron and client and 
in the case of primary and secondary clientship. In the 
case of primary clientship cattle, from the point of view 
of the patron or chief, were an instrument for obtaining 
or maintaining power which was related to the fact that 
he had no coercive power at his disposal. From the point 
of view of the client, cattle were an instrument of 
protection and of obtaining power. In the case of secondary 
clientship, cattle were, from the point of view of both 
patron and client, a means of protection against abuse of 
political power. But in both cases obtaining or maintaining 
power and protection against that power depended on the 
support which the patron obtained. It was a two way street.
The- ubuhake system was interrelated with the political 
structure just as the political structure was interrelated 
and partly depended on the ubuhake system, but this inter­
dependence was effective mainly because the systems were 
not identical. Mobility within the political structure
219-
made the working of the ubuhake system possible. As soon 
as the mobility within the political system was no longer 
operative the ubuhake would lose its fundamental meaning 
of inter-dependence, as holding office would no longer 
depend on the support gained through clientage. It would 
become a one way street. This is exactly what happened in 
the years of colonial rule as noted in the conclusions of 
chapter II.
To this must be added that the chief had from then on 
not only coercive force at his disposal but also that the 
checks and brakes operative through the army structure and 
the function of the army chief were no longer a part of the 
social system. Because of the ubuhake system, the ruled 
participated in the power structure and this made for 
integration, which was of special importance since chiefs 
did not have any institutionalised councils. Through the 
ubuhake system the cattle owning lineages who were in the 
power-holding group could control the instrument of power 
and through the institution of primary and secondary clientage 
eliminate the smaller cattle owners while allowing them a 
limited part within the power structure. In doing so thev 
kept them within but not an effective part of the structure.
'abuhake system also served as a channel for the 
distribution of wealth and a means for the exchange of 
specialized labour. Although ultimate control of cattle 
remained with the patron in primary clientage and to a lesser 
degree in secondary clientage, cattle, as we have seen, was 
only a part, although an important part, of the material 
goods which were transferred from patron to client.
Political office was a way of obtaining cattle which were 
redistributed among the supporters, without the patron 
losing Control, except in the case of cattle used for 
bridewealth by the client. The amount of material support 
for the cattle owning patron must be seen in relation to his 
diet, which was largely limited t> dairy products, to the 
number of clients which the patron had and to the fact that 
a surplus of agrarian products could not either be stored 
for long, sold or exchanged. The normal amount of services 
demanded and given by the client were limited by these 
factors.
Moreover in traditional Rwanda society the army chief 
provided an important means of protection against possible 
abuse. The inherent weakness of the system in which the 
patron would protect his clients against outsiders, was 
that within the ubuhake system itself the client had nobody
to avenge M m  against an unreasonable patron.
Breaking off the relationship was possible but left the 
client in a very vulnerable position. The main sanction 
against abuse was thus the patron’s own dependence on his 
client’s support and the client’s possibility of appeal to 
and protection of the army chief. To prevent his private 
cattle (imbata) being taken by the patron when the client 
broke off the ubuhake relationship, the client could place 
them under the protection of the army chief. However both 
these checks disappeared from traditional Rwanda society after 
the impact of colonial rule. Firstly, there was no longer 
need for support from below either to obtain or maintain 
office nor for the implementation of the chief’s orders as 
he now had coercive power at his disposal. On the other 
hand, the need of clients for protection remained and even 
increased due to greater competition for available resources 
resulting from population increase following the new health 
measures, control over famine and the cessation of warfare. 
Moreover with the introduction of a money economy labour and 
agrarian products could be converted into cash which was both 
non-perishable and which opened up new avenues for spending. 
Secondly, the army structure and the function of the army 
chief had been abolished, thus removing another check on 
possible abuse.
PART 4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE UBUHAKE SYSTEM
So far we have been analysing the ubuhake system and 
we have indicated some of the effects of the changes that 
took place during the colonial period so as to demonstrate 
from these effects the nature of the ubuhake relationship 
and the function it served in the framework of the social 
system of Rwanda. In 1952 the ubuhake system was abolished 
in the sense that no new ubuhake relationships could be 
established. Two years later all existing ubuhake 
relationships had to be ended and cattle held within the 
system had to be divided between patron and client. An 
analysis of this development demonstrates the wider changes 
that took place within the system. My contention is that 
the ubuhake relationships were abolished because they had 
already ceased to function effectively and this in itself 
is indicative of profound changes which had occurred in the 
society. The underlying factors which made the' ubuhake 
system redundant are of relevance to the conflict situation 
which arose in I96I rather than, as is often thought, the 
clientage system itself, because this had already been
effectively abolished over a period of several years.
By extension and analogy, because of certain similarities 
and despite obvious differences, superior - inferior 
relationships have been referred to by previous authors 
in clientage terminology. For instance: "The army chiefs
are the clients of the king" and "Subjects on the hill are 
the clients of the hill chief” (ef*. p. 182)* Indeed the 
army chief could be the client of the king and the Mwami 
often would appoint one of his clients to this office.
However this appointment, although it brings with it certain 
relationships of dependence and service, was not identical 
to ubuhake relationship. Equally the subject on the hill 
could be the client of the hill chief and so could the tenant 
of the ibikingi holder, but these relationships were 
additional to and not a necessary consequence of the 
relationship resulting from political office or landholding. 
This is born out by the fact that the client’s patron could 
be somebody who was not his political chief or landlord.
From the description of the ubuhake system in this 
thesis it is clear that the superior - inferior relationship 
expressed in the hierarchically ranked political power 
structure or the landholder and tenant relationships are 
not only different from one another but also both are
different from the relationships expressed in the ubuhake 
system. Moreover both have little hearing on clientage 
despite certain similarities either concerning loyalty or 
concerning dues in goods and services. It is important 
to note that these obligations were not the result of a 
personal relationship of inter-dependence and mutual support 
but pertained to the realm of taxation or a payment for 
rights in land. Confusion might well have arisen because 
the kinds of goods and services rendered to the hill chief 
or landlord were similar to those rendered to one's patron. 
However it must be realised that the bases of these 
relationships were different. In case of landlord - tenant 
and chief - subject relationships the amount of dues was 
pre-arranged and fixed while in the case of patron - client 
relationships these were neither pre-arranged nor fixed.
A further possible source of confusion was that a tenant on 
ibikingi land was not liable to pay dues to the chief but 
the obligation which he owed to his landlord might be used 
by his landlord to discharge himself of his own obligation 
to his chief. t^ ref. p. 186 and 191) This may have led to 
the assumption that all the inhabitants of the hill were 
clients of the chief. In the case of one person being in 
the position of both patron and chief or landlord, obligations
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were not duplicated but those due to him as patron had 
priority. In account of the impact of the introduction 
of xmiversal adult male taxation, which was intended to 
replace the complex customary system of dues and services, 
demonstrates the actual distinction between ubuhake 
relationships and those between chief - subject and landlord - 
client. One of the effects was that ?/here a tenant1 s land­
lord had been at the same time his hill chief, after the 
reorganisation of the system of taxation, the chief collected 
the official tax while at the same time continuing to demand 
the dues and services owed to him as landlord. Similarly, 
where the client’s patron was also his chief, the client 
continued to fulfil obligations to his chief as patron as 
well as paying the official tax now due to him as chief.
The first move to abolish the ubuhake system came from 
the important cattle owners who proposed it in a meeting 
under the chairmanship of the king in 1945* The Mwami 
publicly announced his intention to abolish the system by 
the first of January, 1946. The Belgian colonial government 
however refused to let it go ahead because it thought that 
on the ubuhake system ureposait la structure politique du 
pays” \Bourgeois I958 p.11). After lengthy discussions 
and consultations the government decided in 1951
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"I1elimination progressive de l'ubuhake" (Plan Dkcennal p.401). 
Because the government was convinced of the problem of 
overstocking, it was hoped that those who would newly 
acquire cattle, would be obliged to sell them owing to 
lack of pasture (op.cit p.401). This concern about over­
stocking may well be related to the fact that no proper 
measures were taken with regard to the redistribution of 
pasture.
In 1952 further ubuhake contracts were forbidden by the 
Mwami and in 1954 he gave details of the obligatory division 
of cattle held under the ubuhake system. Application for 
the division of cattle could be made either by patron or 
client or by both. Excluded from the division are "official 
cattle" which belonged to the country as a whole and personal 
cattle; i.e. those belonging to the lineage or those under 
private ownership. The division of cattle had to take 
place before appointed judges in such a way that one third 
of the cattle went to the patron and two thirds to the 
client but if the patron had already exercised his right of 
umurundo ( p.210-211) the patron had only a right to one 
fourth. The cattle were classified on the basis of quality 
and colour and were evaluated by the judges in money if the 
two parties concerned could not come to an agreement. The
client received two thirds of the money value of the cattle 
and the patron one third. If cattle were divided in kind 
the client had the first choice. Mi example may illustrate 
this5 (cf. Bourgeois 1958 p.35)
Patron; Bahaya 
Clients Sehuhaya
Cattle to he divided; 4
Total value 8,600 fr.
1st cows
000K
\ fr.
2nd cow: H V>J O O fr.
3rd cow: 1500 fr.
4th cow: 2800 fr.
8600 fr.
l/3 patron = 2867 fr.
2/3 client = 5733 fr.
1st choices client; cow no. 1 =
2nd choice; patron: cow no. 4 =
3rd choice: client; cow no. 2
2800 fr
* 1300 fr.
4th choice: client; cow no. 3 = 1500 fr.
5800 fr. 2800 fr.
The client has to pay to his
patron 67 fr. 67 fr.
5733 fr. 2867 fr.
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If there were only one or two oows to he divided it wag up 
to the client to decide whether he wanted money or the cow. 
Payment had to he made on the spot and if one was not ahle 
to provide the money the cow was sold hy public auction and 
the money divided between patron and client.
Between April 1954 and the first of January 1957 we find 
that 224,420 head of cattle had been divided or 40 per cent of 
all the cattle in Rwanda including cattle which were excluded 
from the division. Unf ortunately no figures are available
as to what was the percentage of ubuhake cattle in the total 
national figure. But here we must refer back to the notes 
given on p. 200-201 as regards the extent of the ubuhake 
system in Rwanda. The conclusion seems justified that by 
far the greater part of the cattle in the ubuhake system was 
thus divided. It is indicative of the interest of both 
parties concerned that 40 P®r cent of divisions were demanded 
by the client and 41 per cent by the patron while 16.5 per cent 
were demanded by both parties. Only 2.5 per cent had to be 
arranged through a court case. The vast majority 197*5 per 
cent) were arranged fd l famiable1 duly registered but not 
settled after dispute.
The first public move to have the ubuhake system 
abolished was started by the rich cattle owners themselves.
229*
This can Toe correlated with the following factors:
1^ ) Mobility had gone out of the political system 
and appointment to office was no longer based' on 
support but on educational achievement. The 
ubuhake system could no longer operate as an 
avenue of political mobility.
(,2) The demand for abolition of ubuhake was made 
in 1945, that is just after the great rinderpest 
epidemic which had shown the economic weakness of 
cattle in the new context of the money economy.
^3) Because the protection of the client had 
become largely a responsibility of the administration 
and no longer depended on the support he gave to the 
patron, the clients gave little service ana were 
moreover often absent through labour migration or 
employment.
^4) Because, although having ultimate control over 
cattle, patrons could not exploit them for financial 
gain, whereas clients could, e.g. through the sale of 
milk, butter or hides. Thus patrons were largely 
excluded from new avenues of economic gain from cattle, 
status and prestige was no longer solely determined 
by the amount of cattle owned and the consequent number 
of clients but by office and access to money.
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for the clients, acceptance of the termination of the 
ubuhake relationship had also many advantages, concomitant 
with the following changes:
1^ ) The flexibility had gone out of the system and 
they no longer had the protection of the army chief 
against the possibility of excessive pressures by the 
chiefs and patrons in their demands for goods and 
services.
^2) access to money through wage labour and the 
production of cash crops meant that the customary 
rendering of goods and services appeared as a heavy 
liability and a financial loss. This was all the 
more so as there was a greater demand for money for 
payment of taxes, school fees, etc. Moreover 
government’s pressure to extend cultivation in order 
to prevent further famines demanded more labour time 
on clients* personal plots. All these factors had 
resulted in clients not giving the patron the goods 
and services which he expected. This in turn had 
resulted in friction and bad relations.
^3) Clients in regular employment coiild be legally 
compelled by the patron to compensate in cash for 
non-fulfilment of their clientship obligations. The 
amount fixed for redeeming their obligations was
450 fr. but insistence on monetary compensation often 
caused disputes.
(4) Cattle were no longer needed for bridewealth 
as this could now be paid in cash.
Because of fundamental changes in the principles of 
social organisation related to the political structure of 
Rwanda, to which the clientage system was linked and on 
which the working of the system depended, the ubuhake system 
was no longer relevant for either of the parties concerned. 
To this must be added the economic changes which made the 
system burdensome for both parties. The “suppression de 
la coutume ubuhake1' was no more than a winding up of the 
system which had already become redundant. Hence this 
winding up took place in complete calm and with hardly any 
disputes or contests.
However one of the effects of the division of cattle 
was that the rulers no longer had ultimate control over 
cattle. ill though cattle were no longer instrumental to 
power, the abolition constituted a clear and evident sign 
of change in the system of access to office or land. Many 
of those who received cattle were obliged to sell them, as 
they had no access to pasture. This was particularly 
evident in the case of clients of ibikingi landholders,
who had cultivators settled on their land. Tenants who 
wanted the right of pasture, even on their own holding 
e.g. to have cattle graze on the stubble after harvest, 
had to pay for this to the ibikingi landholder as he 
possessed the right to pasture on all the ibikingi land.
If the tenants, who had acquired cattle through the division, 
wanted to keep their cattle, they had either to pay cash or 
render services and provide goods. Hence many decided to 
sell their cattle. Although no figures are available as 
to how many ibikingi landholders there were in Rwanda, they 
were very numerous and widespread and all the rich cattle 
owners had ibikingi land. Thus the rich cattle owners 
stood to gain and the already hard-pressed (of. p. I9 6) 
tenants, suffered.
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C H A P T E R  I Y  
THE RELIGIOUS COMPLEX
The scope of this thesis, which includes analysis of 
the impact of new opportunities on the traditional system, 
requires that the complex of religious and magico-religious 
beliefs and practices be included. This is for two reasons.
In the first place they are related to the pattern of social 
relationships among living members of the community and 
support the social order. Secondly, Christianity spread to 
a very considerable extent in a comparatively short time, 
replacing, in the younger generation, the traditional beliefs 
and practices. Although this widespread adoption of 
Christianity does not imply necessarily that traditional 
practices were abandoned, it does mean that new opportunities 
had arisen. The published data on many aspects of the 
organisation of the traditional religious system in Rwanda 
is inadequate for complete sociological analysis. Nevertheless 
some of the basic beliefs and practices are important in the 
context of the present analysis.
Independent of social cleavages or regional variations, 
all Rwanda recognise a supreme being, Imana, the creator.
Although. Imana figures widely in the different myths regarding 
the origin of the world, of men, of Rwanda, its Icing and its 
inhabitants with their different occupations and skills, he 
is'not the object of an organised cult. His name is often 
used in greetings and his association with life is recognised 
in the names given to children. Imana, although closely 
linked in myth with the origin of Rwanda, is not a national 
God, hut every night he returns to Rwanda, the place he 
entrusted to the Mwami, his visible representative and the 
guardian of his creation. In this way the concept of God 
entered the pattern of traditional social relationships in 
as much as it gave the seal of Godfs approbation on all the 
Mwami's words and actions* Rwanda was linked with God 
through the person of the Mwami. However there was1 no cult 
to Imana either through the Mwami himself or at the level of 
the lineage or individual. Since the social order was 
believed to be maintained by Imana, both its form and the 
Mwami1s administration of it was sacrosanct. Since Imana 
gives life and is therefore good, there was no need to 
appease him through cult offerings.
Life itself is the linking by Imana of an invisible 
icuu to the body at the moment of conception. For this he 
needs a little water, to mould the two together. It is for
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this reason that the Rwanda pours a little water in a bowl 
and places it next to his bed. while this cannot be 
interpreted as an offering to Imana, nevertheless the 
concept had a definite place in daily life. This was 
particularly important in that Imana was closely related 
to procreation and thus put men continuously in the presence 
of the supernatural.
Death occurs at the moment when icuu leaves the body 
and is transformed into a spifit, muzimu (plural bagimu).
The body has served its purpose, that is to say it has 
contained the icuu and procreated a new bodily form for the 
icuu, i.e. the next generation. The body, having served irfcs 
piirpose, is rather casually disposed of. Thus life is what 
has been received from one*s parents to be passed on to one's 
children. The concept of icuu was directly related to the 
actual form of the lives of forebears, including the 
observance of customary patterns of behaviour. It therefore 
constituted a sanction supporting the observance of customary 
norms. Non-observance of customary norms was liable to 
punishment by the bazimu during the life of the transgressors.
A state of happiness in the afterlife was not related 
to life on earth neither did it depend on offerings made to 
the bazimu. All - Rwanda, with the exception of those who
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are initiated into the Byangombe cult, go to the same place 
of abode of the bazimu, where there is no further distinction 
as to status, rank or any other differences. The fact that 
punishment of infringements of tradition was not postponed 
to the afterlife but was always immanent constituted another 
sanction supporting observance of the traditional social 
patterns. Thus concepts of God, life, death and punishment 
were all directly related to upholding the established social 
system..
P ART 1 GULP OP (THE DEAD
Against this background we must now see the cult of 
the bazimu which constituted the most universal part of the 
religious practices of the Rwanda. At death the icuu was 
transformed into a muzirnu whose existence was neither pleasant 
nor unpleasant. The Rwanda did not restrict the cult 
rendered to the dead i.e. bazimu, to their deceased ancestors, 
neither was it, where ancestor cult was rendered, restricted 
to father, grandfather or lineage heads, in this otherwise 
patrilineal society.
The Rwanda distinguish two categories of bazimu who have 
separate cults. These are the bazimu of the ancestors and
those who are strangers to the lineage. However the cult of 
deceased relatives included both agnatic and cognatic kin of 
both sexes. A second distinction was made between the 
benevolent and malignant bazimu. Benevolence implied that 
no harm was to be expected from them as long as a person 
observed tradition, which included offerings to certain 
categories of deceased persons. The offerings themselves 
were more in the nature of a token than in the nature of 
deprivation of an economic good. The bazimu were transformed 
icuu and did not need any material goods for their well-being.
They only wanted to be remembered. Therefore some grains 
were offered or even a sheep but it was believed that it 
sufficed to- kill the sheep so that the sheep's icuu could 
be received by the muzimu while the people who made the 
sacrifice or offering kept the meat. Birth's observations 
on the nature of sacrifice as necessarily entailing economic 
aspects do not seem applicable in the Rwanda context.
(Birth I963 p.l)
As soon as a person built his homed;ead he needed an 
ancestor as protector to whom he would regularly make 
offerings. Bazimu protectors could be either father, 
grandfather, mother, grandmother, father's brother or father's 
sister. There was however no definite pattern or system as 
to which ancestor within this group should become the 
protector of a particular homestead. The principal protector 
was not chosen by the householder nor by the lineage but by 
the diviner, who was not necessarily a kinsman and who was 
most often a Hutu. However there were Tutsi diviners. It 
is unfortunate that no data are available as to possible 
patterns In resorting to a diviner. The diviner might 
appoint any. of the deceased close relatives, male or female, 
as the muzimu protector of the new homestead. In the case 
of polygynous marriages a new and different ancestor was
appointed by the diviner for the new homestead of each wife.
All were chosen from the husband's relatives. a  small hut 
would be built as an ancestral shrine and gifts were 
regularly made. Normally the head of the household had 
exclusive rights of access to the shrine. The rugo head 
would also participate annually in the cult rendered to the 
ancestor at the inzu level or in the peripheral areas at the 
unruly an go level,
Next to this principal protector, the diviner, when 
asked in times of special adversity, might indicate that 
another muzimu protector was needed and would again indicate 
to whom of the ancestors cult should be regularly rendered.
All these ancestors within the cognatic descent group 
were considered to be benevolent, since they were concerned 
with the well-being of living members, but they could be ill- 
tempered and were supposed to cause trouble if the person had 
had disputes with that particular ancestor during his lifetime. 
Now that he was a muzimu he could argue from a position of 
strength unless submission was shown through special and 
frequent offerings'. It was particularly and most frequently 
to these ancestors, who had to be appeased, that cult was 
rendered. This constituted a continuous reminder to the 
living of the advantages of living in peace with one's
2 4 0 .
lineage members and those who had married into it. It 
also enforced the authority of the older generation who 
were closer to becoming bazimu and might be appointed as 
the protector ancestor by the diviners.
Ihus the descent group ancestor cult generally reinforced 
and strengthened good relations firstly and most importantly 
among that' group of close kin who were eligible to become 
^ e’ raugiimi protector and secondly, among the wider group of 
lineage members, and their wives. In this sense the beliefs 
and practices of the bazimu cult reflected the areas of 
relative intensity in relationships between kin. It moreover 
strengthened the authority of the rugo, ihzu or umulyango head, 
as he? had control over access to the principal aneestor- 
protector. However on the other, hand the potential 
retribution of the bazimu limited the exercise of his 
authority within the bounds of what was accepted or customary. 
Regional' differences as to the level on which ancestor cult 
* was1 rendered1 are correlated with the greater depth of the 
kinship structure in the peripheral areas*
J.D. McShight 11967) has noted that in some cases one 
can build a strong case for explaining the character imputed 
to- the' descent group ancestor on the basis of ritual, jural 
and economic dependence of living members on him, i.e. in
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terms of succession and' inheritance and has stated that this 
approach is not applicable or successful when applied to 
extra descent group ancestors. He illustrates this with 
several examples*
In Rwanda the form taken by the ancestor cult seems only 
to be related to patterns of succession and inheritance in a 
negative way, First of all there is no systematic pattern 
in the appointment of the ancestor by the diviner, who is 
himself not a lineage member. This conforms to the absence 
of any fixed pattern in succession in that the father would 
appoint one of his sons as successor on the basis of personal 
choice. secondly, the pattern of behaviour of the muzimu 
is related to previous good or bad relations towards the 
person before he was transformed into a muzimu, and as such 
served to promote good relations and to check competition 
between members of the lineage. This was of particular 
importance because of the lack of a fixed pattern of 
succession, resulting in competition and friction, into 
which certain persons married into the lineage might also 
be drawn. In this way we can say that in Rwanda the nature 
of the ancestor cult, relating to this particular group of 
bazimu, is concomitant with the system of succession to 
authority in Rwanda. Inheritance does not seem to be a
relevant factor as all male heirs received equal shares 
except for the successor who received an additional share 
if he still had special charges, e.g. the care of unmarried 
brothers.
However the cult of the dead was not confined to the 
above mentioned categories of close kin. The diviner could 
and often would indicate, when consulted in times of special 
misfortune, that a particular extra descent group muzimu 
needed to be placated. This could be a deceased affine with 
whom a person had had a quarrel, a neighbour or a patron or 
client, with whom a person had had an unsettled dispute when 
he died. This would be especially if he had died in abnormal 
circumstances and * abnormal * were considered to be all 
circumstances except at home in old age. If something went 
wrong with the cattle and their owners had had clients whom 
he had not treated well, and who were now bazimu, the diviner 
would tell the cattle owner that the clients were now being 
revengeful and demanded to be appeased. This was a 
sufficiently well established pattern to have resulted in a 
special name given to a client*s muzimu, Rwiru. If cattle 
were x*eBtless or were fighting one another, the cattle owner 
would say "Hi Rwiru* - Rwiru excites them - and some offering 
of cattle blood had to be made to avert greater disaster.
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However tile categorization of bazimu as friendly and 
unfriendly was not directly related to intra and extra 
descent group bazimu. All ancestors were supposed to be 
protectors unless one had had quarrels with them. Extra 
descent group bazimu had to be feared if one had not treated 
them well during their lifetime. All other bazimu did not 
enter the cult of the dead, they were neither friendly nor 
unfriendly. Hence the behaviour pattern of the bazimu 
seems primarily related to good or bad relations between 
agnates, cognates and affines, between patrons and clients 
and between neighbours.
■ Thus the cult of the bazimu supported the maintenance 
of co-operation in social relationships at different levels 
and sanctioned the socially accepted patterns of behaviour 
of which the bazimu were thought to be the pre-eminent 
protectors, not onlv within the lineage but in all face to 
face relationships. Thus the cult of the bazimu reflects 
the relative importance both of ties within the kinship 
structure and of other social relationships in Rwanda.
There are variations related to differences between Central 
■Rwanda and the peripheral areas where, for instance, no cult 
to Rwiru was rendered as there were no patron - client 
relationships.
The missionaries forbade all forms of ancestor cult.
The missionary reports mention that reported or confessed 
transgressions were punished with public penance and that, 
before being accepted as a catechumen, the ancestral shrines 
had to be demolished. Access to specific data, which 
unfortunately do not exist, would be required for an 
evaluation of the impact of Christianity on the cult of the 
dead and on its function in upholding the traditional patterns 
of social relationships. However the conclusion seems 
justified that the cult'of the bazimu was directed towards 
preservation of traditional patterns of behaviour while
i
Christianity was not. Moreover punishment was no longer 
based on transgressions of traditional patterns and effective 
during one!s lifetime but based on transgressions of a new  ^
code and postponed into the afterlife.
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PARI1 2 THE RYATCOMBE G U M
Cult of the dead was not restricted to these spirits 
called bazimu. At a different level we find the Ryangombe 
cult in Central Rwanda, and the•Nyabingi cult in the peripheral 
areas.
In Central Rwanda about thirty spirits were considered 
to be especially powerful. These were called Imandwa or 
heroes, whose Mwami was Ryangombe. They were considered 
to be able to control the malevolent activities of the 
bazimu. The cult rendered to them was very widespread.
To come under the protection of Ryangombe and his Imandwa, 
a person had to be initiated in a trancelilce initiation 
ceremony. Those who were initiated could nount not only 
on a greater protection while living but also on a more 
pleasant after-life than that attained by the normal bazimu.
The initiated were supposed to live, after death, on the slopes 
of the ICarisimbi, a volcano in northern Rwanda, spending their 
time pleasantly drinking, gambling and smoking.
The cult had no other rite than the initiation ceremony 
and there were no regular officials. It was up to the 
diviner to determine whether a person, male or female, 
should be initiated. Eor the ceremony itself it was
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required that someone should act the part of Ryangombe and 
the person to be initiated needed a male and female sponsor. 
All these persons were appointed by the diviner, who did not 
assist at the ceremony himself. The ceremony took place 
within the context of the lineage in that only initiated 
lineage members were allowed to be present and to participate. 
The cult was secret in the sense that no non-initiated were 
allowed to be present at the initiation ceremony and no 
initiated was allowed to tell others the secrets of the 
initiation, but a person’s membership was publicly known and 
a subject of public boasting.
Maquet has noted:
"The cult of Ryangombe has importance as a force 
of social cohesion. Batutsi, Bahutu and Batwa 
may all be initiated. Ihis function is quite 
overtly stressed: Ryangombe has said himself
that he should be called upon by everybody.’*
(1954 P.171)
However its actual importance in relation to social cohesion 
must be measured against the fact that initiation took place 
within the initiant’s own lineage and moreover that there 
is no evidence that common membership resulted in special 
face to face relationship on an inter-lineage basis. But 
one can conceptualize that common membership alleviated 
tensions in as much as these tensions would disappear in
the after-life and only comradeship of all the initiated would 
remain on the slopes of the Karisimbi. It would he difficult 
to establish any evidence as to the impact of this concept 
on actual relationships just aw it would be difficult to 
establish whether and if so how much, future shared heavenly 
bliss in other cults affects face to face relationships and 
is a factor of social cohesion.
It Is my contention however that the Ryangombe cult 
constituted a factor of social cohesion in as much as it  ^
constituted an escape from realities by making light of 
these realities including whatever cleavages existed, and 
secondly, in as much as it was a ‘national* cult although 
in fact limited to Central Rwanda. Ryangombe and his 
f r i e n d s Phrbsi, Hutu and Twa, are depicted in the myth as 
heroes in that they, on their own without the king!s support, 
defeated the king of Karagwe, the neighbouring kingdom to the 
East. As such Ryangombe is a national hero, defeating a 
common outside enemy. .although the king of Rwanda was not 
an official of the cult, nor could he even be initiated, he 
always appointed somebody to represent the cult at the 
ceremonies at the court. King Rwabugire had for instance 
appointed his son, the full brother of Musinga. Banyarwanda 
were constantly reminded of- this national hero and his abode ,
as the mountain could he seen on a clear day from all over
Rwanda. In this way the Karisimbi was like the spires on
our churches. Ihus the cult had definite national overtones
and as such was a constant reminder of common values in the
face of common enemies.
ffhe Myth of Ryangombe
Ryangombe, who is the youngest son, grows wg playing, 
drinking, gambling and hunting. He gambles away all 
he has including his cattle, and leaves his parents' 
home. Roaming around he rapes several girls and 
leaves them with their illegitimate children. at
last he is accepted as a guest by a friend but 
violates his daughter, A. He is allowed however 
to stay on and marry her but he does not pay any 
bridewealth. He leaves his wife before childbirth 
and returns home to his parents. a son is born 
from wife a . (The child, barely a month old, kills 
his grandparents and sets out to find his father.
On the way he kills everybody he meets, all the 
cattle he sees and several lions and leopards. At 
last he finds his father who is gambling and losing.
He declares himself his son, Binego, and tells his 
father what is wrong with his gambling and orders 
him to play differently. In this way his father is 
saved from defeat. Binego is now in charge although 
he recognises Ryangombe as his father. fhey spend 
their time hunting with their friends, Hutsi, Hutu 
and Iwa, and all share a great comradeship in danger 
and in feasting. One day Ryangombe's mother tries 
to stop him from going hunting but Ryangombe refuses 
to be restrained. She puts her charms across the 
entrance of the hut in an attempt to prevent him 
from leaving, but Ryangombe refuses to be stopped 
and goes hunting. During the hunt he is killed 
by a buffalo and his friends in despair throw 
themselves on the horns of the buffalo to be killed 
with him.
The myth of Ryangombe totally reverses the social order.
Rape is not punished, he marries matrilocally, he does not 
pay bridewealth, he does not work: and has no regard for 
cattle. lie takes over the role of the king in defeating 
the royal enemy. he keeps the leopard skins for himself. 
However he perishes because he lacks respect for the taboo 
of his mother. His son is still more savage and kills 
whomsoever he wants witbl^ut\ impunity, he gives orders to 1 
his father. Rurthermnre there is great comradeship between 
Tutsi, Hutu and Twa.
In the initiation ceremony, in which the initiated 
becomes an imandwa himself and is mystically married to 
Ryangombe, this reversal of the social order is re-enacted. 
The initiated is thus separated from the profane, i.e. the 
social order and starts a'new life with a new name. This 
life will become fully effective when at death he is trans­
formed into an imandwa and joins the joyful companions who 
are not bound by any law or order and in whose abode there 
is no authority and no cleavages of any kind.
The Ryangombe cult was widespread and very many people 
were initiated. It acted as a form of sublimation, 
involving a conceptual escape from realities without 
upsetting these realities. Comparison between the function
of joking relationships and the function of the Ryangombe 
cult is very tempting. The Ryangombe cult was not a 
revolutionary movement but made light of the stratification 
in the social order by projecting deliverance from all 
cleavages and distinctions, in the spheres of political 
authority, kinship, generation, sex and occupation, into 
the after-life. Expressions such as !tWe are all Twa,f and 
• f,I don’t like cattle" or "nobody is going to order me about" 
and "I am not responsible for anybody" (Arnoux 1912 p.871), 
used in the initiation ceremony, illustrate this. In the 
same vein were the shameless ritual actions which the 
initiated went through such as symbolic ritual incest and 
homosexuality. however to assess how the Ryangombe cult 
eased tensions of the reality, in what ways and to what 
extent this escape from reality was an alleviating factor 
making for easier acceptance of these realities is a task 
outside the scope of this thesis.
PART 5 THE - Ni.aBING-1 CULT
In the Northern peripheral areas we do not find the 
'Ryangombe cult but the Nyabingi cult. Gravel mentions 
that the' Nyabingi cult spread from the North to Gisaka in 
the East shortly after the advent of the Europeans (1 9 6 8  
p.147). The Nyabingi cult is however not restricted to 
Rwanda as it is also found in Klgezi, Uganda (Edel I957 p.1 4 8) 
In Rwanda there are different versions as to the identity 
of Nyabingi. Summarising the different versions; •Nyabingi 
was a daughter of the king of Ndorwa, belonging to a Tutsi 
lineage. She somehow managed to succeed her father to the 
kingship. But she is killed by a cousin who connived to do 
so with the co-operation of the king of Rwanda. After her 
death the Mwami of Rwanda forcibly occupied Ndorwa but never 
managed to establish proper administrative control.
Nyabingi, who was killed with all her servants, supposedly 
‘never died but remained with her people, however she remained 
invisible.
Yarious points in the organization of the Nyabingi cult, 
which contrast with the Ryangombe cult, shows how it was able 
to, and in fact did, constitute a force opposing further 
annexation of the North by central Rwanda. The Nyabingi
cult had official priests a m  priestesses, who were believed 
to be able to intercede with Fyabingi in order to gain her 
protection. Phis protection could be given to anyone,
protection only to those who had been initiated. However 
Fyabingi priests demanded substantial payment in goods for 
their services as intermediaries. Hence they were often 
extremely wealthy and had extensive powers. Phey further 
surrounded themselves with an armed retinue of servants for 
protection who could also be used in extorting any payment 
due to the priest.
Phe organization of the Fyabingi cult, which was wide­
spread in the Forth, thus provided both the means for physical 
resistance of central government in the Forth and a religious 
rallying point against external threat to the area. On 
several occasions it has been recorded that tie Fyabingi 
cult was in fact used in revolts. (dfHertefelt 1962 p.86, 
Pauwels 1957 p*245)*
Phe central government also realised the potential 
threat of the Fyabingi organisation in the Forth. For 
instance, during the invasion of the Forth by Rwabugiri, 
several of the priestesses were put to death. Contrary to 
the Ryangombe cult in central Rwanda, the Fyabingi cult can
contrary to the Ryan^gombe cult which offered a general
be seen in some sense as a revolutionary movement both, in 
its myth of origin and in the uses to which its actual 
organisation could be put. Pauwels gives several names of 
priests and priestesses who were in recent times either put 
to death or put in prison. (1957 P*255) Phus the 
organisation of the cult provided a framework for expressing 
opposition to the encroachment of authority in the Forth.
Phis anti-authoritarian tendency carried over into the 
colonial era.
When the colonial powers introduced Central Rwanda 
administration into the Forth, it became a centre of opposition 
against all the recently introduced forms of authority. Phe 
Fyabingi cult was officially forbidden in 1922 and the 
movement went underground. Phus the Fyabingi cult was an 
element of social cohesion in the Forth in as much as it was 
a force, expressed in religious terms, which opposed the newly 
established authority. It provided a focus for common 
identity in the face of the same authority through which 
Fyabingi had perished and which now did not allow expression 
of the cult rendered to Fyabingi. Whether the spread of the 
Fyabingi cult into G-isaka, after the arrival of the Europeans, 
mentioned by Gravel, is related to these aspects could only 
have been established by research at that time.
Po sum up this incomplete and summary survey of the 
religious complex in Rwanda, we may say that the cult of 
the dead was the most general and characteristic feature 
of religious practices-. It had the function of upholding 
traditional patterns of behaviour and fostering good relations 
within and outside the lineage. Phe Ryangombe cult in 
Central Rwanda and the Fyabingi cult in the peripheral areas 
had definite sectional overtones and the Fyabingi cult had 
definite anti-central government tendencies.
PARP 4 CHRISTIAN IFFIiUEHCE
With the arrival of the Jhiropeans, Christianity spread 
rapidly in Rwanda. I will not be concerned here with the 
impact of Christianity in terms of the introduction of 
egalitarian and individualistic ideas. Within the scope of 
this thesis a summary analysis of the spread of Christianity 
allows for certain conclusions as regards its impact on 
certain groups of people and on the power structure and in 
providing new economic opportunities, all of which are related 
to the conflict situation which arose.
Phe catholic missionaries were the first to arrive in 
Rwanda in I9OO. Phe king allowed them to open a mission 
station in the Forth and later in the same year one in the 
East. From the earliest missionary reports we have detailed 
evidence of the very close co-operation which existed between 
the missionaries and the (german authorities. In 1915 
permission was granted by the king to open a mission in 
Central Rwanda. Figures from the reports show that from the 
start Christianity spread far less rapidly in the Forth and 
East than in the Centre. Phis might well be related to the 
evident alliance between the missionaries and the colonial 
powers who were very much occupied in trying to establish and
maintain central government authority in these areas against
strong and often violent opposition. Phe following notes
from the reports illustrate this point. When in I9O4 the
people rebelled against the newly established authorities
and put them to flight, the German troops intervened;
,fles gens voient leur huttes flamb&es, leur 
bananeraies couples, leur~vach.es prendre le 
chemin de Rwanda central. Quelques morts 
completent le-ch&timent. La punition nous la 
regrettons guere, car les gens sont vraiment 
peu sociables. G'etait un ch&timent uniquement 
pour venger l*autorit6 mfeconnue des chefs Putsi 
........venus de la capitals*1 (Fyundo 1904) *
From the same mission we read in 1912;
"lous refusons de soigner les blessures pour 
faire perdre & nos gens I ’envoie de se battre11.
When in I907 the first protestant missionaries arrived from
Germany there were already 2,822 baptised catholics, most of
them Hutu. Shortly afterwards however, when the Baganda
catechists returned to Uganda, they were replaced by Hutu
and several Hutu Christians were given paid jobs by the
Europeans. At this point the Putsi began to see that their
adverse attitude to Christianity was doing them harm. Phey
started to join in large numbers and everywhere special
catechumenates were arranged for them. In the reports of
I9O6 we read still that Christians were recruited principally
from the Hutu stratum of the population. But in 1925,
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f,Les jeunes gens Tutsi demandent leur admission 
en grand nornbre. Ils ont des qualitfes qui en 
font vraiment une race sup&rieure1’.
In 1928 a full cousin of the king was baptised and in I929
"line reste gu£re des Batutsi importants payers11. The
number of catholics increased from 4 1 ,0 0 0 in 1929 to 2 8 9 ,0 0 0
in 1959 to 1 ,1 0 0 ,0 0 0 in 1 9 6 2, or 37*5 per cent of the total
population. In 1962 7*5 per cent of the population was
protestant. There was a very notable increase in 1949 when
the government decided that all catechumens should be exempt
from wcorv6e,f on the days they received religious instruction.
Concomitant with this measure we see that during the following
years the number of catechumens, largely Hutu,* more than
doubled from le'ss than 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 to more than 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 annually.
The protestant mission developed much more slowly, not
only because of a much later start but also because, when
in I9I6 Rwanda was occupied by Belgian troops, the german
protestant missionaries left and were only replaced in 1919
by a very small number of Belgian protestant missionaries,
later helped by the Danish mission and the C„M„S. while
nearly all the catholic missionaries were Belgian, the
protestant missionaries were largely non-Belgian. This
was of no small importance in relation to the subsidies
r
given to schools, which were, up till 1 9 4 8? reserved to
In 1958 about 160,000 children were receiving primary 
school education all of which, except one, were run by the 
missions. Primary education was divided into two kinds; 
first degree, which consisted of a two year course attended 
by 105,000 children. About half of these went to primary 
school second degree for another two years, after which 
selection was again made and 4,000 or 2.5 par cent of those 
who had started primary school went to a fifth and last 
year of primary school education. Prom this last group were 
selected those who went on to post primary education, Por 
this there were three possibilities.
In 1958 all three secondary schools were run b y  catholics 
Two of these had been started in 1955* Up till then there 
was only one secondary school with 3O5 students. This 
school was called G-roupe seolaire df.&strida and had two 
sections; ^a) a secondary school with 213 students and 
^b) a superior section for training of medical, veterinary 
and agricultural assistants and a school for chiefs. This 
last school had been started in 1929 to prepare sons of 
chiefs for their future task, which was not necessarily 
the same as the one held by their fathers. This superior 
section had in all 88 students. In 1958 the secondary 
schools had together 599 boys and 70 girls as students.
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30 per cent of these students were Hutu. Of the students 
of the superior section at the Groupe scolaire d fAstrida 
only 5 per cent were Hutu.
Up till I95O there was one teacher training school run 
by the catholics. In 1958 there were five teacher training 
schools for boys and three for girls managed by the catholic 
mission. :Apart from these there was a mixed teacher training 
school managed by the protestant mission and another run by 
the government. However no details are available as to the 
relative numbers of Tutsi and Hutu among the students. The 
first technical school was started in Kigali in 1957 although 
for some time several missions had trained carpenters, masons 
and tailors.
The missionary reports often mention the fact that 
government officials and other europeans in private enterprise 
asked the mission for suitable personnel and thus the mission 
became the most important stepping stone for material 
advancement. This close co-operation was well expressed 
by Mgr. Classe the-catholic bishop in Rwanda, in 1933? in 
his appreciation of the Mwami, who had become a catholic 
himself. "Mutara prend son role au s&rieux. II a des 
qualitys de chef chr&tien. II prend souvent conseil & la 
mission et plus encore chez moi.u
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The number of primary schools allowed about 30 per cent 
of the catholic children access to primary education.
However most of the places were given to Tutsi children.
This was related to the fact that the Tutsi children were 
thought of as belonging to a t!race sup§rieuren, and that 
the children of the rich were less needed at home to help 
in cultivation. As we have seen, places in the school for 
chiefs, leading to a position as chief or subchief, were 
solely for the sons of chiefs, meaning important Tutsi.
It is therefore not surprising to read the statistics of 
I945 relating to the number of oatholics among the chiefs 
and subchiefss
I945 Catholic Protestant Pagan To tal
chief: 43 ? ? 51
subchief: 579 59 25 643
In 1959 all chiefs and 98 per cent of all the subchiefs were 
Tutsi (.Hubert I965 p.13).
Prom the foregoing some conclusions seem justified in 
relation to the spread of Christianity in Rwanda:
1, widespread adoption of Christianity, especially of 
Catholicism.
2. Close co-operation between government and church, both 
favouring catholic Tutsi.
Infiltration of' Christianity greater in the centre 
than in the peripheral areas.
Massive conversions of the Hutu only after I95O and 
government intervention*
Political power nearly exclusively in the hands of 
catholic Tutsi.
Education, especially at the post primary school level 
largely limited to Tutsi. Post secondary education 
nearly exclusively reserved for Tutsi,
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C H A P T E R  V 
THE CONFLICT
In this thesis I have set out to establish correlations 
between changes in the principles of social organisation in 
the traditional Rwanda social system, the impact of new 
opportunities and pressures and the conflict situation which 
arose at the end of 1959* This conflict situation involved 
widespread violence and resulted in the overthrow of the 
monarchy before the attainment of independence from colonial 
rule in 1962. The violent conflict which erupted in 1959 
was the result of, and its events reflected, a highly 
complex situation. In order to understand this situation 
we should first summarise some of the most important points 
which have emerged in the data and analysis presented in 
the previous chapters.
Important regional variations between Central Rwanda 
and the peripheral areas have been demonstrated. " These 
were of a demographic, ecological, political, socio-economic, 
religious and historical nature. Following these variations 
we should distinguish at one level Rwanda society as a whole, 
united in the traditional system under the Mwami and subject 
to the same forces of political, economic and social change
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during the period of colonial rule. At another level we 
should clearly distinguish the peripheral areas from Central 
Rwanda in that the peripheral areas at all stages of 
development resisted being brought under the control of the 
political system of Central Rwanda.
At the level of Rwanda society as a whole, a diachronic 
analysis has been made of the fundamental changes which took 
place in the traditional Rwanda social system as a result 
of the impact of the Western colonial presence. Principles 
of social organisation making for unity under and participation 
in the political system and also constituting mechanisms of 
control in the exercise of political power and providing 
alternative avenues for support and the seeking of justice 
were either drastically changed or taken out of the social 
system. fhese changes were clearly correlated not with 
any developmental processes in the traditional social system 
but with changes imposed by external agents - the Belgian 
administration and the Roman Catholic Church - as a matter 
of agreed policy. 'ihere was not only concensus between 
these two powers but also between them and the favoured 
Puts! aristocracy of whose innate superior qualities they 
were convinced and found useful.
Corresponding to these two major spheres of variation 
and change, the conflict siimiation in Rwanda as a whole
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must be seen as in fact containing two distinct conflict 
situations. One concerns the more general situation which, 
applies to the whole of Rwanda but which was most clearly 
evident in the centre, fhe second concerns the specific 
issues of the peripheral areas in resistance to infiltration 
and control by the Central Rwanda administration.
It is my contention that the conflict situation as a 
whole cannot be explained wholly in ethnic terms but can 
only be understood if seen in relation to the profound 
changes in the principles of social organisation and in 
relation to the distinct regional variations. Before 
describing and analysing the open conflict situation which 
erupted in 1959 £ propose first to analyse these two distinct 
latent conflict situations.
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Pa RI 1 THE RWANDA - WIPE
CONFLICT 3I1UAIIQN
We can distinguish two principal effects of the impact 
of western administrative and Church influence on the 
traditional Rwanda social system.
Firstly a new and changed form of political power had
heen created. In the traditional system the exercise of
£
power depended on concensus and various hierarchies operated 
within the political system as a whole. Under the impact 
of colonial rule, however, administrative, judicial and 
executive powers were not separated but combined in the 
offices of the chiefs and subchiefs. Moreover these no 
longer depended for the execution of their orders on 
concensus and support but in d coercive powers at their 
command. Nor were these chiefs subject to pressures from 
councils as no measures had been taken as late as 1956 to 
broaden the basis of political power through the establishment 
of popularly elected councils to the chief and the subchief. 
Thus while the abolition of many of the old institutions 
had resulted in the concomitant disappearance of many 
channels of participation in the exercise of power,
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no new channels were created to allow for participation 
in the new system of government.
A second general effeot of change introduced by the 
external powers concerns the western selective and 
protectionist policv towards the lutsi aristocracy. In 
1 9 5 9? 100 per cent of all chiefs and 98 per cent of all 
subchiefs were still futsi. Moreover opportunities for 
advanced education were also the virtual monopoly of the 
Putsi aristocracy since both church and administration 
reserved nearly all available places for them. In order 
to understand the full implications of the way in which 
these changes in the political system operated in the 
development of the conflict situation, we have to describe 
and analyse,
1. The rigidity and frustrations which developed in
the political scene through the absence of democratic 
channels or representation and thus the effective 
elimination of competition.
2 . I'he development of political parties with the 
formulation of goals which, demonstrated the under­
lying conflict situation.
ad 1 .
Ever since I946 different U.N. commissions visiting
the Trusteeship complained about ,!the slow rate of political 
progress" {/f/2 1 7  p. 1 1) and advised that democratic 
institutions should be introduced (,p.l2) . The 1952 
commission repeated the same criticisms and stressed the 
urgency of reforms particularly as the chiefs exercised 
judicial functions in addition to their administrative 
functions (T/IO3I p.6 ).
It was in 1953 that councils for the different levels 
of administration were created and details given as to how 
members on the councils had to be elected. The council 
of the subchief comprised the subchief as chairman plus 
between five and nine members on the basis of one member 
for every five hundred inhabitants. The members were 
chosen by an electoral college, whose members were appointed 
by the subchief. The number of voters had to be at least 
double the number of members of the council to be elected.
In appendix I, I have given further details about the 
formation of councils at superior levels and the electoral 
processes involved.
The results of the first "election" can be summarised 
in the following graph:
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The councillors were elected for a period of three 
years. At the next elections in 1956, members of the 
electoral college were elected by popular vote of all adult
males instead of being chosen by the subchief as in the 
1953 elections. As a result of these 1956 elections, 
Tutsi representation on the electoral college fell by 
20 per cent, but at the level of the different councils 
the proportion of Tutsi hardly changed as is shown in the 
following comparison:
Tutsi representation in fo
1955. 1956
Electoral College 41-4 33-8
Subchief ’s Council 52.3 45-5
Chief’s Council 88.6 84.8
Territorial Council 9O.7 88.6
Supreme Council 9O.6 96.9
Closer examination of these "elections” bears directly 
011 the conflict situation.
1. In 1953 the "election”was on a highly restricted 
basis since the original voters list was drawn up by the 
subchief. It should be remembered that the subchief was 
himself a Tutsi and appointed by the administration. The 
elections of I956 on the basis of adult male suffrage shoves 
a marked decline in Tutsi representation. At the same time 
however a substantial number of Hutu voters must have
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elected Tutsi members, as Tutsi representation on the 
electoral college is twice as high as their percentage 
in the total population. Moreover in certain areas in 
the centre, such as ICibuye and Astrida, Tutsi I’epresentation 
rose by 12 per cent and 17 per cent respectively. In 
northern districts such as Ruhengeri and Kisenyi, Tutsi
/
representation fell by more than 50 per cent. In the 
northern districts therefore the results registered 
discontentment with the disproportionate presence of Tutsi 
on the council whereas the same cannot be said of the centre. 
Although the ubuhake system had been abolished, the Hutu 
leaders attributed the failure of Hutu to vote for 
representatives of their own group to continuing attitudes 
of dependency which were carried over from the traditional 
system in general and the ubuhake in particular.
2. a second and closely related point is that whatever 
popular wish had been expressed at the basis of the election, 
this was not’ carried through in the subsequent elections 
for the higher councils. Hot only was the Hutu representation 
not carried through but also the increase in Hutu represen­
tation resulting from the I956 election was in no way 
substantiated on the higher councils and there was- even a 
decrease in Hutu representation on the Supreme Council.
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In 1954 there were twenty nine Tutsi and only one Hutu on 
that council. Much of this frustrating discrepancy can he 
attributed to the particular system of electing the council 
Eiembers at the different levels, which was formulated in 
such a way that for the council of the chief upwards, the 
Tutsi were necessarily in the majority. All chiefs and 
practically all subchiefs were Tutsi and at least half of 
their councils were made up of chiefs and subchiefs, thus 
putting them automatically in the majority. However this 
does not explain the almost complete absence of Hutu on the 
higher councils. This can only explained by Hutu members 
voting for Tutsi.
Several important points can be made with regard to 
this analysis of the elections.
(a) The introduction of elections 011 the basis of adult 
male suffrage applied in the political field the same 
egalitarian principles as had been already applied in 
the abolition of the ubuhake system. The new stress
on individual achievement in the economic and educational 
fields had followed the same pattern.
(b) The actual outcome of the elections and ex officio 
nominations to the various councils showed that the 
elections did not in fact provide avenues for the
expression and redress of grievances nor did they 
constitute a means through which public opinion could 
exert pressure. From the standpoint of the Hutu leaders 
the elections had twice proved that the mere provision 
of these democratic channels were an inadequate means 
for the redress of major grievances in the political 
and social system.
(c) The failure of the majority of the Hutu population in 
the centre to elect emerging Hutu leaders to positions 
of political power forced these leaders to attribute 
it to the limitations put on the Hutu voters by their 
social environment. Although the ubuhake system had 
been abolished, its effects on people’s attitudes had 
not disappeared. More time was needed to change these 
attitudes and therefore independence needed to be 
postponed in order to have the opportunity to arouse 
greater Hutu group awareness. Concomitantly they 
were forced to formulate political and social issues 
in ethnic terms and claim support on ethnic grounds.
ad 2 .
It is against this background that we must see the
manifesto which was published by some of the educated Hutu
/
in the year after the election. In this document they
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demanded recognition of individual rights of land-ownership 
as a protection against the infringement on land, by the 
holders of political power. They further demanded the 
actual promotion of Hutu to political office, modification 
of the composition of the councils and the abandonment of 
the selection practised in access to educational facilities 
which, especially in further education, was reserved to Tutsi.
They indicated two sources of these grievances. Firstly 
they blamed the old political structure of Rwanda and especial! 
the ubuhake system. Referring to the widespread Hutu 
attitudes in the centre, they stipulated that "the fear, 
the inferiority complex and the 'atavistic1 need for a 
guardian are but surviving relics of the system". There 
is a clear correlation between this statement and the fact 
that, despite the abolition of the ubuhake system, many 
Hutu had voted for Tutsi. Secondly they blamed the way 
in which indirect rule had been applied, pointing out that 
some of the old institutions bad disappeared without being 
replaced by "corresponding institutions on a western model".
The Hutu Manifesto is basically a document complaining 
about the political and educational monopoly granted by the 
administration and the church to the aristocracy among the 
Tutsi and therefore the manifesto was addressed to the
Belgian administration. It moreover indicated that 
independence was not desired before these grievances had 
been corrected.
On the other hand the king and the Tutsi aristocracy 
were pressing for independence. The publication of the 
manifesto enabled the aristocracy to express the broader 
issues of political and social reform in terms of the struggle 
for independence. They made their appeal to Banyarwanda at 
Ictrge on the basis of traditional loyalty to and unity under 
the king, who should be supported in his attempt to gain 
early independence from colonial rule* They condemned the 
Hutu leaders for their co-operation with the Belgian 
authorities in opposing independence. They castigated 
those who did not co-operate with the aristocracy in promoting 
independence as enemies of the king and of Rwanda, However 
the formulation of their appeal by the Tutsi aristocracy made 
them lose the protection of the administration on whom their 
whole position of monopoly wa,s based.
Although the manifesto was addressed to the Governor of
A  '
Rwanda, his answer was/given^only twenty two months later.
The governor recognised the social issues formulated in the 
manifesto but restated them in economic rather than political 
terms. On' the other hand the king and his Supreme Council
rejected the Hutu manifesto as an attempt to divide the 
country and delay independence. This rejection was 
interpreted and manipulated by the Hutu leaders in terms 
of identification of the Icing with the issue of rapid 
independence, his agreement with the monopoly situation of 
the Tutsi aristocracy and anti "-Belgian sentiment. Hence 
objection to that monopoly became identified with pro-Belgian
and anti-king sentiments. It was in this climate of the
s
breaking up of the concensus between the administration and 
the monopoly-holding Tutsi aristocracy that political parties 
were formed around 1 9 5 9*
The signatories of the manifesto started to organise 
the population in the north in the Social Hutu Movement,
The initial location of this movement can be correlated with 
other specific factors elaborated in this thesis which 
differentiated these peripheral areas from central Rwanda.
It is also related to the frustration of the Hutu leaders 
due to the increase in Hutu representation on the electoral 
college, elected in 1956, but which hid no subsequent effect 
on the higher councils. The aims of the Social Hutu Movement 
were identical with those expressed in the manifesto but 
developed, through the identification of the independence 
issue as formulated by the Hutu leaders with opposition to
the king and the aristocracy, into a republican party.
In October 1959 'th© movement declared itself a political 
party, Parmehutu (Parti du movement d ! Emancipation Hutu).
In the centre a Hutu leader, Gat era, had in the same 
year started a reform movement along the same lines to combat 
social injustice and to press for economic reforms. It was 
soon drawn into politics and in 1959 proclaimed itself a 
political party, Aprosoma (Association pour la. promotion 
sociale de la masse). In July 1959 *kk© king suddenly died. 
At the grave the Supreme Council proclaimed Baptiste 
Udahindurwa king, who assumed the name Kigeri Y. However 
his proclamation was more in the nature of a coup organised 
by the Supreme Council than following the traditional pattern 
of succession. Since the members of the Supreme Council had 
rejected the Hutu manifesto, the king also became identified 
with those who had rejected it.
In September a number of important chiefs who were also 
members of the Supreme Council and some Hutu formed the 
political party, Unar tUnion nationals Ruandaise). Its 
president was Rukeba who was by origin Gongolese and its 
general secretary was the Hutu, Rwagasana. The aim of Unar, 
as stated in its manifesto, was "to mobilise all Rwandase, 
regardless of ethnic origin, for the execution of a program
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of reform under a constitutional monarchy" and for the 
rapid achievement of independence. It explained that the 
fact of Tutsi monopoly was not only due to historical reasons 
hut also to the policy of the administering authority. It 
put the problem in social rather than ethnic terms and 
proposed a solution by democratic development.
a  second monarchist party was formed by Tutsi leaders 
in September 1959 with the special aim of drawing attention 
to the majority of Tutsi who did not share the privileges 
of the aristocracy and who insisted on the dangers of the 
formation of political parties on ethnic grounds. It was 
a reform party on the same lines as Parmehutu and Aprosoma 
but demanding similar reforms under a constitutional monarchy. 
They joined the other two parties however in opposing the 
person of Kigeri V. The party was called Rader (Rassemblement 
dfemocratique Ruahdais). Unar and Parmehutu became the two 
principal political parties.
It is evident that the policies formulated by the 
various political parties overlap to a, considerable extent 
in that all expressed support for democratic reform of the 
political system. The issues between the political parties 
were not sufficiently clear to define the basis for obtaining 
support from specific groups within the population. The
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analysis of the development of the political parties will 
show how the formulation of issues of democratic reform 
had to he expressed in terms which enabled them to rally 
this support.
This links up with the particular situation of the hutu 
leaders. The traditional elite was essentially a political 
elite based on restricted membership of power holding Tutsi 
lineages. The elite is thus distinguished from the masses 
who included not only nutu but also the vast majority of 
the Tutsi who were not members of the Tutsi noble lineages.
By the 1 9 5 0 * 3 criteria for membership of the elite included 
also educational qualifications. However following the 
agreed policy between the Belgian administration and. the 
church in providing avenues for education and political 
power only to members of the traditional Tutsi elite, the 
traditional and modern criteria for elite status coincided.
However a minority of men of Hutu origin had succeeded 
in obtaining further education in Belgium and the Congo.
These Hutu leaders found themselves barred from entry into 
the political elite despite their educational qualifications, 
on the basis of not belonging to the noble lineages. The 
impossibility of realising their expectations of obtaining 
political power which had been built up through their
educational careers, forced them to interpret this exclusion 
in terms of their status as Hutu*
The first formulation of their 1956 electoral disillusion­
ment by the educated Hutu leaders was not so much expressed 
in the formation of political parties as in the starting of 
reformist movements* In the first, G-itera* s movement, the 
aim was the reform rather than the overthrow of the political 
system.
The second, Enyibanda^ movement, which developed into 
the * Parmehutu party, was from the beginning much more 
articulated in the way it was organised and in its stated 
goals. The initial Social Hutu Movement clearly formulated 
its claims for participation by the ethnic groups in political 
and educational opportunities on the basis of their numerical 
proportions in the population. This would clearly reverse 
the monopoly of these opportunities granted by the government 
and the Church to the aristocracy among the Tutsi. The 
stating of these goals was an indictment of western policy 
in that it had granted that monopoly to a specific group of 
the population and that it had removed from the traditional 
social system channels for participation and pressures 
without replacing them.
They did not simply stress tin need for corrections
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or reforms in the system but demanded a complete reversal 
of the protectionist and selective' policy. They realised 
moreover, as the 1956 elections had shown, that even if 
preferential treatment was withdrawn from the Tutsi nobles, 
the opening of democratic channels through elections, did 
not necessarily mean that, in central Rwanda, Hutu were 
going to achieve their aims through representation on an 
ethnic basis* One of the aspects of continuing Hutu 
attitudes which the leaders deplored was the general 
identification of authority with Tutsi. If the Hutu leaders 
were to count on general support among the Hutu population, 
this attitude had not only to be reformed but to be reversed 
in favour of the Hutu leaders. G-iterafs movement demanded 
reforms from those who held authority with the aim of 
developing a democratic kingdom, Kayibanda*s movement was 
revolutionary in that it envisaged a complete change of 
system to be attained by electoral process and emancipating 
the Hutu from their ‘atavistic* need for paternalistic 
protection. To realise both objectives they needed a 
framework within which the numerical strength of the Hutu 
could be rallied. They had also to provide issues which 
were sufficiently strong to overcome the tendency of Hutu 
of the centre to defer to traditional Tutsi leaders.
Their stated goals and framework of organisation had 
therefore to be expressed in reference to the largest group 
whose numerical support could be effectively manipulated. 
Reference to the widest group of all those excluded from 
positions of power, including the majority of the Tutsi, 
was too wide to provide a distinct issue on which potential 
supporters of other reformist parties could be won over.
Their issues had therefore to be framed in reference to the 
common loyalty of Hutu and set in opposition to another 
group that of the Tutsi, defined in ethnic terms. This 
coincided with the Hutu leaders* interpretation of the basis 
for their own frustration in obtaining political power.
The Hutu leaders did not however turn against the 
administering authority which had given preferential treatment 
to the Tutsi aristobracy. On the contrary they appealed 
to that authority for support in achieving their own aims.
This support could be given to them through instituting 
structural political reforms aimed at establishing a 
constitutional monarchy, elections at all levels of 
participation in political authority on the basis of 
universal adult suffrage and allowing them time for emanci­
pating the Hutu; and rallying their support within the 
framework of their political party. The latter point
meant in practical terms, a not too rapid achievement of 
independence. This appeal to the administration fitted 
well in the wider framework of the Rwanda protectionist 
value system. It also coincided with their aim of promoting 
divisions which otherwise would have been neutralised by a 
common and national attempt to obtain independence from the 
Belgian authorities in Rwanda. They dissociated themselves 
from any nationalist movement making for unity in an attempt 
to reach independence and stressed divisionary issues 
expressed in ethnic terms.
One result of this attitude was that the issue of refom 
was identified with the postponement of independence. 
Conversely appeals to national unity to achieve independence 
could be and were identified by the Hutu leaders as anti­
reformist. The Hutu leaders claimed that the Tutsi 
aristocracy y/anted rapid independence only in order to 
retain their monopoly of political power after independence. 
They claimed that the Unar party1 s appeal to national unity 
and their denial of current divisionary issues must be 
interpreted as means to this end. In this way both the 
issues of reform and of independence were translated into 
ethnic terms. By opposing claims for rapid independence, 
the Hutu leaders were in a better position to obtain the
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support of the administering authorities which were under 
attack and whose siipport of the aristocracy had for the 
moment been withdrawn.
Not only had the concensus between the Belgian 
authorities and the Tutsi nobles: broken up, hut so also had 
the concensus between the Church and the favoured aristocracy. 
Since 1954 the king had demanded a greater control for the 
government in matters of education which were almost totally, 
and on the levels of secondary and more advanced education 
totally, in the hands of the Church. Moreover whereas 
initially the Tutsi had been the largest group among the 
converts to Christianity, since 1950 the proportion had been 
reversed ana the Hutu had come into the Ghurch in greater 
numbers and-now substantially outnumbered the Tutsi. The 
Roman Catholic Mission who monopolised the local press 
through "Temps Nouveaux" and "ICLnyamateka" put this monopoly/- 
at the disposal of the Hutu leaders. In 1959 i^ L his lenten 
pastoral letter the archbishop drew attention to the fact 
that there were different social groups,
,"Il-y-a dans Rwanda divers groups sociaux.
Il-y-a des cultivateurs, des commer9ants et 
artisans; il-y-s des gouvernants et gouvern^s. 
la distinction de ces groupes provient en 
grande partie de la race. Bans Rwanda les 
differences et les infegalitfes sociales sont,
pour une grande partie, li6es axix differences 
de races. Des institutions, qui consacreraient 
un r§gime de privileges, de favoritism©, de 
protectionism©, ne seraient pas conformes d la 
morale chretienne.1
For the leading aristocracy this meant a break with the 
ecclesiastical authorities* The Tutsi leaders accused the 
Ghurch Of first granting them a monopoly position in 
educational opportunities and then holding this situation 
against them when they were no longer useful by being 
instrumental in bringing Hutu into the* Church. This break 
with the Church was inevitable since the pastoral letter 
stressed ethnic divisions, which coincided with the party 
aims of the Parmehutu and clashed with the Unar party goals.
In September'1959 the catholic hierarchy addressed a circular 
letter to all the priests working in Rwanda condemning the 
Unar party by name because of its*national-socialistic, 
communistic and islamic tendencies (C.R.I.S.F. I96I p.139).
Following the appeal of the Hutu leaders to the allegiance 
of Hutu as an ethnic group, Unar had to formulate its appeal 
for support with reference to an even wider group. This 
had to be on the basis of a nation-wide appeal. One basis 
for this was the traditional unit5r of all Banyarwanda under 
the Mwami. Another was the rallying of all Banyarwanda 
against the colonial government in the struggle for
independence. On these terms they stigmatised the Hutu 
appeal to one section of the population as betraying the 
Mwami and the national unity required for gaining 
independence.
Thus the two issues of reform and independence became 
formulated in terms whi ch were mutually exclusive and 
expressed in ethnic terms. Since claims for national unity 
and independence were interpreted by Hutu leaders as an 
expression of the aristocracy*s refusal to realise the reforms 
demanded, they were therefore at the same time anti-Hutu.
The formulation of 'an opposition against an ethnic group 
and not against a governing class resulted in greater group 
awareness among the Hutu, which was the basic aim of the 
Hutu leaders. The manifesto of the Unar, aimed at 
dispelling these fears by proposing a constitutional 
monarchy and reforms through democratic process. This 
was combined with an appeal to unity, in traditional terms, 
in order to obtain independence. The Unar manifesto was 
explained by the Hutu leaders as a device to obtain 
independence first, after which nothing would be changed.
The Mwami had identified himself with the independence 
issue and was thus thought of as being pro-Unar. This 
image could be conveyed all the more easily as the leaders
of Unar were also members of the Supreme Council. Thus 
the king became identified as both anti-reformist and 
therefore also anti-Hutu. Other factors also favoured
this stigma attached to the king by the Hutu leaders. One
was the fact that after the death of the former Mwami,
Klgeri V had been proclaimed by the members of the Supreme 
Council. Another was that the Mwami-ship had, since the 
advent of Belgian administration and Church influence, been 
emptied of its ritual unifying force. Thus the Hutu leaders 
were able to eliminate one of the bases for the appeal of 
Unar in reference to the nation at large - that of traditional 
loyalty to the Mwami.
The movement for reform, which had started as a social 
movement, turned into a political party, putting issues in 
ethnic terms and appealing to the Hutu ethnic group. In 
the process it became a revolutionary and anti-monarchist 
party, headed by Kayibanda. A situation load developed in 
which aspirations were expressed less in terms of competition 
than in eliminating opposition. This does not only refer 
to the issue which focussed on the removal of the Mwami and 
the proclamation of a republic, Hutu leaders claimed that, 
if their aim was not attained, the Hutu would be held in 
servitude forever. The whole political issue was proposed
in terms of a once and for all opportunity to lose of to 
gain everything and was expressed in ethnic terms.
lor the Tutsi aristocracy it meant that, if their aim 
was not attained, they would be eliminated from the political 
scene, Since, if the Hutu leaders succeeded, not only 
would the king be expelled but also Tutsi would be virtually 
excluded from all participation in power as issues would be 
decided by Hutu on ethnic grounds. This accounted for the 
fact that not only the Tutsi aristocracy but also the 
majority of Tutsi, regardless of their political and economic 
status, aligned themselves with Unar and the Mwami.
PART 2 THE PERIPHERAL a HEA
CENTRE CONFLICT SITUATION
In the historical data we have noted the success with 
which the peripheral areas had withstood the attempted 
incursion of the traditional power structure of central 
Rwanda up to the time of colonial rule. we have also noted 
that with the support of the colonial administration Tutsi 
chiefs were imposed on the peripheral areas. In these 
areas we have to consider not only the effect of the monopoly 
of political power by a limited number of Tutsi lineages, 
forming the Tutsi aristocracy of these regions, who have 
the backing of an external power and whose abuses of political 
power cannot be effectively checked, but also the fact that 
these powerholders had been recently introduced by force into 
areas which had hitherto maintained their political 
independence from central Rwanda.
In addition these new and alien politicalegents had, 
ex officio, access to land in these areas. This is of 
particular importance in relation to the fact that these 
areas were the most densely populated in Rwanda, that the 
land had been most recently claimed from the forest zones 
and that no new areas were available. Furthermore land­
holding was directly related to the powerful lineage 
groups. Thus political domination resulted in a slow 
hut steady movement of settlers from central Rwanda into 
these areas, the settlers being kinsmen of the political 
chiefs.
In the peripheral areas there thus arose a clear 
identification between the central Rwanda power structure, 
the comparatively recent introduction of Tutsi in positions 
of political power in these areas and the progressive 
occupation of land by Tutsi. Moreover the way in which 
the new rights over land were exercised was contrary to 
traditional patterns of allocation and occurred among a 
local population which was almost exclusively Hutu. On 
this basis conceptual categories of indigenous Hutu as 
opposed to alien, colonising and land occupying Tutsi were 
established.
The pre-existing tensions between the peripheral areas 
and central Rwanda had been controlled by the presence of 
the Belgian administration which protected the colonising 
group. However the existence of these tensions made for 
a greater awareness of common identity within each group. 
Because of the particular composition of the new power-holding 
and infiltrating group, this identity was not expressed in
categories based on a regional basis - such as northerners 
and southerners - but rather in ethnic terms referring to 
groups of people.
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PAR I 5 TfiE ERUPTION OP VIOLENCE
It is not within the scope of this thesis to describe 
and analyse all the factors which contributed to the revolt 
that took place around I96O as not only not all the data are 
available but also the assessment of factors such as the 
personalities of the leaders or the influence of the events 
in the former Belgian Congo during the period leading up to 
independence, belong to a different discipline. The period 
of violent clashes lasted for several years from November 
1959? starting with a violent anti-Tutsi revolution in the 
peripheral areas of the North and North-West. This was 
followed by a violent reaction of certain Unar leaders in 
the centre of Rwanda,
I will be primarily concerned with the first violent 
revolt of I959 and its subsequent reactions, considering 
later violence over the years I96O to 1964 reactions or 
counter-reactions to the initial revolt which set the pattern 
of violence laden climate of these years. However as will 
be demonstrated, the violence must be seen as an expression 
and culmination of the conflict situation which had arisen.
The first eruption of violence took place as a result 
of an incident which occurred on first of November 1959?
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some miles from Kabgayi in central Rwanda, Some Tutsi
youths, none of whom were armed, confronted one of the few
Hutu siibchiefs who was also one of the principal exponents
of the new Hutu political movement. Thev teased him about
his new found importance and a few blows were exchanged.
The rumour spread that the subchief had been hilled and the
Hutu of Ndisa in the North, not the local people from the
subchief*s village, took to arras, The Hutu in the North,
North-West and South-East started a campaign of driving
Tutsi from their homes, burning their huts and destroying
their plantations. Quotations from the report of the
Belgian Parliamentary commission illustrate the issues and
stress the loctis of the revolt:
nCe fut dans le Nord du Rwanda que les destructions 
op6r6es par les,Hutu furent les plus importantes. 
les Tutsi y etaient consider&s comme des intrus 
qui s!itaient appropri6 le sol et continuaient
a le faire. En Territoire de Ruhengeri les Hutu 
semblaient bien d6cid6s a n !&pargner aucune 
habitation Tutsi et a dfegodter les Tutsi & tout 
jamais de s f6lablir dans la region11.
^C.R.I.S.P, 1961 p.150)
Hp until the sixth of November the Hutu action had been
confined to the northern areas. On that day about two
hundred northerners went down ■ into Hbuye Central Rwanda)
’’br&lant purmi les cases abandonees, celles qui 
leur semblaient appartenir aux Tutsi. II y eut 
de nombreuses erreurs. les incendiaires semblent
avoir dfetruit principal ement les cases dont 
1 !aspect indiquait ime certain© aisance chez 
leur proprifetair11 (p.l5l).
The same day however the group was repelled,
t'la population hutu et Tutsi attendit les 
incendiaires et les attaqua. Ge fut un 
veritable massacre1'.
In this counter-action at least fifty eight people died,
all of whom were from the North ^Kingogo and Ndiza).
This counter-action involving the defence of the people
of Kibuye against the northern incendiarists was immediately
followed by the systematic arrest of certain Hutu leaders
in the centre of Rwanda, some of whom were killed. This
was done on the orders of certain members of the Supreme
Council who were at the same time the leaders of the Unar
party. Their orders were executed by the army and the Twa.
The Supreme Council members justified this action on the
grounds that the Belgian administration had failed to
maintain law and order ana failed to punish the instigators,
as they put it, of the revolt in the North. In the stated
opinion of the Supreme ■ Council members, the llutu leaders
had been responsible for the violence in the North.
Thus it is clear that the revolt started and spread
unopposed in one of the peripheral areas where Tutsi
political control was weakest since their incursion into
the area had been most recent. It occurred also in an 
area where a pattern of government, identical to that of 
central Rwanda, had been introduced by the colonial power.
Both the specific events and the location of the conflict 
clearly indicate that the revolt was primarily a violent 
attempt at liberation from the political and economic 
control and infiltration of central Rwanda. The fact that 
it took only a false rumour to spark off the violent revolt 
in the North can only be understood when seen against the 
background of factors underlying the specific latent conflict 
situation contained in the opposition of the peripheral areas 
to central Rwanda, the context of the wider conflict 
situation with reference to Rwanda as a. whole and the total 
absence of channels for the effective expression of popular 
opinion in political terms and of avenues for the redress 
o f gri evane e s.
The violent counter-reaction of the leaders of the 
Unar party, who were at the same time members of the Supreme 
Council, against some of" the Hutu leaders had two direct 
results. It provided the Hutu leaders with the occasion 
to close the ranks between the Hutu of the North and the 
Centre, as the arrests and killing in the Centre were explains 
as ultimate proof of anti-Hutu sentiment among the Unar party
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chiefs and the extent to which they would go, i.e. the 
elimination of Hutu leaders to prevent the reforms demanded.
The Unar party, which was the visible organisation of the 
Tutsi aristocracy, became the visible enemy of all Hutu, 
toother direct result was the imprisonment of the Unar leaders 
by the Belgian administration. Some however managed to 
escape abroad and continued their political activities from 
outside' the country. When the king left the country to as si si: 
at the independence celebrations of the former Belgian Congo, 
the minister of the Colonies in Brussels decided that he 
should stay outside the country until the people had expressed 
their wish in a plebiscite on the continuation of the monarchy. 
SUBSEQUENT EVENTS
iifter the violence, on 10th November 1959? ^he Belgian 
administration announced profound structural changes which 
were published on 25th December 1959. These introduced a 
constitutional monarchy, general elections and the separation 
of administrative and judicial powers. The first communal 
elections were to be held in June I960. The leaders of 
Unar who were abroad gave instructions to their followers 
to boycot the elections. 25 per cent abstained from voting 
and this election resulted in the Parmehutu obtaining 70 per 
cent of the votes cast or 5^ per cent of the registered votes.
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The other purty, Aprosoma, also appealing to Hutu, obtained 
5 per cent of the votes.
Although this election gave the Parmehutu a very 
strong (7 0 per cent) representation on the councils of the 
subchiefs, who were henceforth to be called burgomasters, 
at the same time it demonstrated that a substantial number 
of Hutu had not supported their leaders. This was 
especially evident in Central Rwanda, During the following 
months ofXL9 6O, the killing of Tutsi, the burning of their 
huts and plantations and expelling them from their homes 
occurred on a considerable scale in three out of four 
districts of Central Rwanda - .astrida, Kigali and-Nyanza 
(U.N. report A. 47O6 ). This resulted in another exodus 
of at least 1^5,000 people (U.N, report 5126 p.55). At 
the end of I96O the G-eneral Assembly of the U.N. passed a 
resolution postponing the date of the general elections 
and the referendum on the king, which were to have been held 
in January, I96I, to a later date. On the 28th January, 
I96I, during a convocation of all the burgomasters and 
their councillors at G-itarama a coup d'&tat took place.
The monarchy was abolished and a republic proclaimed. The 
meeting elected a president with a legislative council, 
consisting of forty four members all of whom were Hutu.
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On the same day the president presented his cabinet of 
ten ministers who were exclusively Hutu. A week later oh 
6th February, the Belgian Government formally recognised 
the' new- Rwanda Government.
The U.N, however declared the government "to have been 
established by irregular and unlawful means and not to be 
regarded as fully representative of all segments of the 
population in the absence of free elections” (.U-.N. Report 
A. 4994 p.25). It further recommended,
(a) the holding of elections and a referendum on the 
monarchy in August I96I under U.N. supervision.
(b) a full and unconditional amnesty so as to enable 
political leaders who were in exile or imprisoned 
to resume normal political activities.
(.c) the return and. rehabilitation of refugees.
It noted moreover "with regret that the administering 
authority has arbitrarily suspended the powers of the Mwami 
of Rwanda and has not allowed him to return11. A further 
request was made to the administering authority of the 
trusteeship "to facilitate his return to Rwanda".
(.Resolutions 1579 &frd 1580 Dec. A. 49994 P-8).
However the elections were presented by the Hutu leaders 
as the final contest in which they still might lose everything
The amnesty was granted but neither the Mwami nor the 
refugees were able to return. The republican flag 
continued to fly from all the public buildings all over 
the country. During the period immediately preceding 
the elections, violence again erupted resulting in another 
stream of refugees. "90 per cent of the refugees were 
members of the Unar party" (U.N. report A. 4994 p.8 6 ).
It was in these disturbed conditions that the general 
elections and the referendum took place. Parmehutu 
obtained 77 per cent of the votes while Unar obtained 
17 per cent. 80 per cent rejected both the person of 
Kigeri Y and the monarchy. The republic was proclaimed. 
During the subsequent years several armed attempts to return 
were made by the refugees. These attempts resulted in 
extremely violent reprisals against Tutsi who had stayed 
in Rwanda. a s  a result thousands perished and still more 
fled the country.
CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis I have set out to demonstrate that the 
conflict which has "been described and analysed in the previous 
chapter cannot he understood unless it is seen in relation to 
the Rwanda traditional social system and the impact of 
western influences on the principles of social organisation 
of Rwanda society. It has not been my intention to analyse 
all the factors which constitute the sum total of what 
could be called western influences but to indicate and 
analyse demonstrable changes in the Rwanda social system 
due to the presence of western authority in Rwanda.
The impact of these changes could not be measured 
unless the traditional Rwanda social system was first 
described and analysed. For this a cross-section in the 
diachronic development of Rwanda society was taken at the 
period around 19^0 when the Rwanda social system came under 
the influence of new opportunities and pressures and became 
subject of an external authority. I have analysed the 
changes that took place in the social system and have pointed 
out correlations between certain characteristics of the 
traditional social system, the impact of western authority
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on it and the conflict situation that arose, at the moment 
of independence from colonial rule.
Ihe conflict itself fits closely Ooser!s definition 
of conflict as Ha struggle oyer values and claims to scarce 
resources in which the aim of the opponents are to neutralise, 
injure or eliminate their rivals.” Conflict is focussed on 
the removal of opposition. A twofold conflict situation 
had arisen, one concerning Rwanda as a whole and the other 
concerning the peripheral areas and central Rwanda.
iis regards Rwanda as a whole the king was traditionally 
both the focus and the apex of the Rwanda social system.
His' position was upheld and given value in myth and his 
transcendental kingship was expressed in unifying ritual. 
Struggle for the kingship was kept within the bounds of 
personal challenges and did not develop into a struggle 
for independence from it. Y/e have analysed in some detail 
the importance of the Mwami's position in relation to the 
overall cohesion of Rwanda society and have examined how 
this important principle of social cohesion lost its 
effectiveness. fhe kingship had been emptied of those 
elements making for unity and no longer constituted a symbol 
of Rwanda or of the well-being of its people.
On the level of delegated power, the whole complex of
501.
social relationships tended towards the preservation of 
political power and its concomitant economic benefits 
within the confines of a relatively few noble futsi lineages. 
I have analysed the mechanisms of the principles of social 
organisation which led the struggle for power positions 
within the important lutsi lineages to be dissipated into 
dependence on locally based support, and in this way 
resulted in locally based solidarity. Equally within 
these locally based groups of people political, military 
and socio-economic institutions provided avenues for the 
redress of personal grievances and channels for effective 
pressure on the political authorities.
Moreover the system provided for some participation 
in the lower echelons of the political hierarchy by Hutu 
land-chiefs and the absorption of possible challengers 
through the process of enoblement. In my diachronic 
analysis I have demonstrated how these principles of social 
organisation were taken out of the system while on the 
other hand political power positions were exclusively 
granted to members of the traditional noble lineages.
By extension access to wealth, resulting from educational 
achievement, was reserved by the authorities to members of 
the same important lineages.
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The "traditional system had been emptied of its channels 
for exerting pressure and of its avenues for political 
competition while no new competitive institutions, modelled 
on a democratic basis, had been created. a  situation had 
developed in which challengers or would-be competitors who 
did not belong to the important Tutsi lineages had no 
mechanisms at their disposal through which they could 
manipulate individual or locally based grievances for the 
s^lccessful achievement of their own aspirations. The 
removal of these principles of social organisation which, 
through a variety of channels, kept aspirations of a 
political nature at a personal or locally based group 
level, forced them to manipulate grievances and aspirations 
in the wider context of an attempt to change the whole 
system. Since the system could now only be collectively 
attached and the privileged selection on which it was based 
could be expressed in ethnic terms, they were forced into a 
numerically based appeal to a wider group formulated in 
ethnic terms.
The actual incidence of events, as I have shown in my 
previous chapter, resulted in the formulation of appeals 
for group solidarity in ethnic terms. The analysis has 
also shown how response to the leaders1 appeals was also
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expressed in ethnic terms and moreover could no longer he 
dissipated through traditional channels. It therefore 
resulted in group solidarity at a national level on an 
ethnic basis. The formulation of appeals for group 
solidarity in ethnic terms and the response of actual 
ethnic group solidarity cannot he understood unless they 
are seen in relation to the traditional Rwanda social system.
Thus, when, through the edticational system, challengers 
and competitors appeared, a latent conflict situation arose 
in that educated Hutu fouind themselves barred from competi­
tion and in order to reach their goal they had to eliminate 
the system. Issues became formulated in mutually exclusive 
terms in that continuation of the status quo, despite 
promised reforms, could he presented as an irrevocable 
elimination of the Hutu leaders from participation in 
political power and from access to wealth through education. 
On the other hand participation based on ethnic support of 
the Hutu would mean the virtual elimination from the 
political scene of those who had hitherto held the positions 
of power.
A second and additional conflict situation had arisen 
as regards the peripheral areas in their relations with 
central Rwanda. Despite its classification as a state
with centralised monarchical authority, Rwanda contained 
very definite regional variations of an ecological, 
demographic, political, socio-economic, religious and 
historical nature. The people themselves were conscious 
of these variations and expressed strong local loyalties.
This point is demonstrated by the successful resistance 
against attempts to absorb them into a social system not 
their own. The developmental analysis has shown how 
incorporation of peripheral areas into the political system 
of central Rwanda was enforced by the German and later the 
Belgian authorities and how this had a wider socio-economic 
impact.
Initial continued resistance against these absorbing 
centripetal pressures from central Rwanda was forcibly over­
ruled by the colonising and later administering authorities. 
Here we have a latent conflict situation in that the intrudin, 
political authorities in these areas, in reaching their goal, 
were in the process of eliminating indigenous claims to 
scarce status, pov^er and resources in the form of land. 
Redress of this situation could only be obtained by the 
removal of these authorities. As we have seen by 1959 no 
democratic channels existed to effect this redress and the 
situation continued only as a result of its being instituted
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and upheld by the force of the administering authorities.
Exterior force will more easily contain a latent conflict 
situation and prevent it from turning into open conflict if, 
on the one hand, it continues to show support for the party 
which is challenged while on the other hand the challengers 
do not see the actual situation as irreversible and are 
therefore not prompted to take action by the need for an 
immediate solution. In 1959 both these elements for 
containment of the latent conflict situation h±d disappeared.
Ihe futsi aristocracy had fallen out of favour Y/ith the
%administering authorities and the Church. On the other 
hand the Unar demand for self-government in I9 6 0, set 
conditions for an immediate reaching of the goals set by the 
Hutu leaders. 'ihe time constraint demanded an immediate 
reversal while no democratic channels existed to effect 
this reversal. ihe factors hitherto preventing the latent 
conflict situation from turning into an open conflict no 
longer existed either in Rwanda as a whole or in the 
peripheral areas. I'he conflict started where those two 
conflict situations coincided.
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Appendix
1. CoimciX of the chief
It comprised, next to the chief, at least ten 
and not more than eighteen members. These were 
chosen as follows: five to nine members were chosen
by the subchiefs and an equal number chosen from 
among the other members of the chiefdom. These 
latter were chosen as follows: each council appointed
three members who together formed the electoral college 
which chose from among its members the remaining 
councillors to the chief.
2. Council of the Province
It comprised (a) all the chiefs and, (b) an 
equal number of subchiefs elected by the subchiefs, 
and (c) a number of others equal to that of the 
number of chiefs and subchiefs combined. This last 
group (c) was to be elected as follows: each council
of the chiefs chose from among its members three 
members who together formed the electoral college 
which in turn chose from among its members the 
remaining councillors of the provincial council.
307.
3. The Council of the King
It comprised the king and ^b) the ten chiefs 
o'f the provinces, and {o) six members elected by 
and from among the chiefs and ^d) one representative 
for each of the ten provincial councils elected by 
and from among its members and ^e) eight more members 
co-opted by the members of the Supreme Council.
%
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